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Lenders have taken over reorganizations. This fact, largely accepted and celebrated by 
legal and finance scholars, is defended using the framework of the explicit nexus of 
contracts theory of the firm. This dissertation begins by arguing against the 
nonexistent costs of lender control of reorganization, claiming that the explicit nexus 
of contracts uses unrealistic assumptions which serve to hide some of the costs of 
lender control. Specifically, this dissertation shows that lender control costs can arise 
even in the extreme scenario of having only one class of legal claimants. In addition, 
this dissertation uncovers that lender control may constrain debtor‘s investment 
opportunity set, leading to preclude adaptation possibilities.  
This dissertation further shows that lender control liability theories have been largely 
abandoned by United States courts due to an implicit understanding of the firm within 
the framework of the explicit nexus of contracts theory. As a result, lender control 
liability currently is a non-deterrent to opportunistic behavior by controlling creditors, 
as it merely mimics the absolute priority rule. Additionally, this dissertation shows 
that fraudulent conveyance law is a poor substitute for lender control liability due to 
the former‘s transaction by transaction focus.  
Cognitive errors may produce systematic distortions on lender control liability 
adjudications. This dissertation shows that if hindsight bias was the only cognitive 
 error affecting adjudications those worries would be unsupported as a strict liability 
rule would take care of them. Unfortunately, hindsight bias and anchoring working 
together distort adjudications, making the strict liability rule solution ineffective. 
Additionally, this dissertation shows that arguments in favor of a no- liability rule for 
breach of fiduciary duties, à la BJR, do not translate into the lender control liability 
realm as: a) a no- liability rule wouldn‘t improve the controlling lender‘s risk aversion; 
and b) other opportunistic behavior constraints supportive of the BJR seem empirically 
irrelevant in lender control liability cases.   
Finally, this dissertation proposes to limit opportunistic behavior by controlling 
lenders. With that aim, it suggests dropping the negative control safe harbor from 
Agency Law in lender control liability cases within the reorganization context.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Bankruptcy Control and the Theory of the Firm 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the last eight years, the idea that bankruptcy practice has trounced the 
scheme of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (from now on ―The Code‖) has emerged. 
Pioneered by professors Baird and Rasmussen,1 a cluster of legal literature has 
developed around the changes in bankruptcy practice, the reasons behind those 
changes and possible efficiency implications of the professed novel occurrences.2 
There are conflicting opinions over almost every aspect of the debate, but everyone 
seems to agree that contemporary bankruptcy practice has evolved and looks quite 
different from the depictions commonly made two decades ago.  
 
Technological changes together with financial innovations3 seem to have 
triggered the new developments.4 Financial contract design has adopted a widespread 
                                                 
1
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002) 
(from now on TEB) 
2
 See Lynn M. LoPucki ―The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen‘s The 
End of Bankruptcy‖, 56 Stan, L. Rev. 645 (2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Chapter 
11 at Twilight‖, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr. ―Creditors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11‖, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr. ―The Past, 
Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905 (2004); Stephen 
Lubben ―The ―New and Improved‖ Chapter 11‖, 93 Kentucky Law Journal 839 (2004); Barry E. Adler 
―Bankruptcy Primitives‖, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 219 (2004); Jay L. Westbrook ―Bankruptcy 
Control of the Recovery Process‖, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 245 (2004); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. 
Waisman ―Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?‖, 47 B. C. L. Rev. 129 (2005); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 
(2006); Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison ―Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11‖, 1 The 
Journal of Legal Analysis 511 (2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen ―The Prime 
Directive‖, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 921 (2007); Adam Feibelman ―Commercial Lending and the Separation 
of Banking and Commerce‖, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 943 (2007).  
3
 Rajan and Zingales refer to them as ―a bona fide financial revolution‖, where major technological, 
regulatory and institutional changes are the cause of the new era. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi 
Zingales ―The influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms‖, 91 American Economic 
Review 206, 206 (2001)  
4
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1228-9 (2006), for a reference to how modern business 
practices and technology affect control. Professor Skeel , Jr. considers that part of the change is 
 2 
use of agreement specific, increasingly detailed covenants, which allows creating 
contracts that depend upon the new monitoring technology.5 The financial strategist is 
currently able to employ security interests in virtually all the debtor‘s property, present 
and future,6 which is intertwined with the credit agreement in order to reinforce the 
power of the lender. These innovations have helped to c reate new scenarios for 
lenders, who under the new conditions have a tighter grip on the monitoring of the 
debtor‘s financial health. As a result of the increased efficiency of the financial 
contracting system, lenders‘ willingness to advance funding appea rs to have grown, as 
evidenced by the fewer unencumbered assets that debtors have when entering 
bankruptcy.7 Debtors in a compromised financial situation seem eager to accept the 
new flow of capital.  
 
A related development specific to bankruptcy, debtor- in-possession (from now 
on ―DIP‖) financing, appears to have fitted perfectly with the eagerness of both 
                                                                                                                                            
endogenous to the characteristics of American businesses entering bankruptcy. See  David A. Skeel, Jr. 
―Cred itors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11‖, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 922 
(2003) 
5
 Monitoring technology can be a cause for incomplete contracts. See, for example, Rohan Pitchford 
―How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Enviromental Risk‖, 85 
American Economic Review 1171, 1174 (1995).  
6
 Professors Baird and Rasmussen consider that distressed lending‘s relative use and importance grew 
over the last couple of decades helped by the enactment of Article 9 of the UCC and its reform version. 
―Before Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted, acquiring a security interest in all of a 
company's property was hard. Each type of collateral had its own legal regime. Moreover, courts 
viewed with suspicion omnibus clauses that picked up all of the debtor's property and provided no 
cushion for other creditors. In many instances, secured lending was premised upon the creditor's ability 
to take possession of discrete assets and sell them in the event that the debtor defaulted. It was not 
possible to make a secured loan premised upon the corporation's value as a going concern. Article 9, 
and especially the rev ised Article 9, have made it possible for lenders to acquire all of a corporation's 
assets. The modern security interest effectively covers not only a corporation's discrete assets, but also 
the synergy that each asset has with the others. The expanded security interest not only changes the 
basis on which the lender extends credit, but als o the control that the creditor can exercise over the 
business.‖ Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1228 (2006). The point that security interests over all the assets 
covers any synergy those assets may have is previously made by Rizwaan Mokal referring to the British 
receivership system. See Rizwaan J. Mokal ―The Floating Charge – An Elegy‖, in Commercial Law 
and Commercial Practice, pp. 485-93, Sarah Worthington ed. (2003).  
7
 See David A. Skeel, Jr. ―Creditors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11‖, 152 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 925 (2003).  
 3 
lenders and borrowers for more financing.8 Despite the fact that DIP financing has 
been allowed for over a century,9 the new credit market has facilitated the utilization 
of this tool and has made it prevalent among distressed corporate debtors. 10 DIP 
financing‘s pervasive use by chapter 11 corporations shook the foundations of The 
Code‘s system, allowing a DIP lender to obtain effective control of the bankrupt 
debtor.11 
 
Originally, The Code‘s scheme considered the reorganization proceeding as a 
place where the debtor required some ―breathing space‖12 and therefore established an 
automatic stay13 on creditors‘ claims -originated before the debtor entered bankruptcy 
protection upon filing. The intended effect of the stay was to allow some time for the 
                                                 
8
 Chatterjee et. al. (2004) document a growth in debtor in possession financing. See Sris Chatterjee, 
Upinder S. Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez ―Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 28 Journal of Banking & 
Finance 3097 (2004).  
9
 Professor Skeel, Jr. provides a great historical account of the use of receiver cert ificates as the 
precursors of DIP financing. See David A. Skee l, Jr. ―The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing‖, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1908-16 (2004). 
10
 See Maria Carapeto ―Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?‖, Cass Business School 
working paper (2003) availab le at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=161428. It is not 
clear exact ly when the new sys tem emerged, but it can be safely claimed that it emerged after 1989, 
where court opinions were not as deferent to DIP financing agreements. See, for example, In re Tenney 
Village Co., Inc., 104 B.R. 562, 568 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (―Under the guise of financing a 
reorganizat ion, the Bank would disarm the Debtor of all weapons usable against it for the bankruptcy 
estate's benefit, place the Debtor in bondage working for the Bank, seize control o f the reins of the 
organization, and steal a march on other creditors in numerous ways. The Financing Agreement would 
pervert the reorganizational process from one designed to accommodate all classes of creditors and 
equity interests to one specially crafted for the benefit of the Bank and the Debtor's principals who 
guaranteed its debt. It runs roughshod over numerous sections of the Bankruptcy Code.‖); also, see In re 
Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).  
11
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 777-
85 (2002). 
12
 ―The purpose of a business reorganization case ... is to restructure a business's finances so that it may 
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its 
stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the 
industry for which they were designed are more  valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, 
the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in 
the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both trade 
creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or reduce 
its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to 
liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets‖. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 
13
 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §361 (2000)  
 4 
debtor firm to negotiate a restructuring with its creditors. Implicit in this idea was the 
fact that a distressed debtor was unlikely to obtain credit upon entering bankruptcy 
protection. Therefore, the debtor would use as financing the cash- flow that otherwise 
he would have used to pay creditors during the length of the reorganization 
proceeding. Pre-petition creditors were required to act as (involuntary) financ iers for 
the turnaround on the promise that their recovery would be larger due to the forced 
financing. As a result, creditors shouldered the cost of being forced financiers while at 
the same time suffered from the smaller leverage they could exercise over a debtor in 
distress due to the lack of repossession threat. 
 
Nonetheless, The Code limited DIP‘s use and disposition of assets upon the 
existence of security interests.14 As debtors entered bankruptcy with a larger 
percentage of assets encumbered, the obsolescence of The Code financing system has 
became apparent.15 Post-petition financing has taken a prominent role. Creditors have 
been lured to provide fresh funding to the DIP by the advantages available in section 
364.16 As the court in In Re Glover, Inc. expressed it, without the advantages of 
section 364, obtaining credit could be an insurmountable task:   
                                                 
14
 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §363 (2000)  
15
 Professor Skeel, Jr. also attributes the demise of the code financing system to the fact that ―the value 
of New Economy assets deteriorates quickly…‖See David A. Skeel, Jr. ―The Past, Present and Future 
of Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1920 (2004). See David A. Skeel, Jr. 
―Cred itors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11‖, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 918-9 
(2003) (―the "new" new Chapter 11 governance is contractual in nature… Before they even file  for 
bankruptcy, corporate debtors must arrange an infusion of cash to finance their operations in Chapter 
11. To an increasing extent, lenders are using these loan contracts to influence corporate governance in 
bankruptcy. The fate of an asset or division of the company, even the terms of a transfer of control, has 
been spelled out as terms in a debtor's DIP financing agreement.‖). Brecht, Bolton &Roel consider that 
―the term ―corporate governance‖ derives from an analogy between the government of cities, nations or 
states and the governance of corporations.‖ See Marco Brecht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Roell ―Corporate 
Governance and Control‖, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 (last visited 7/15/07). 
16
 Section 364 of the Bankruptcy code allows the DIP to contract credit with the possibility of providing 
security interests in both unencumbered and encumbered assets (the later with priority over any 
previous liens). See 11 U.S.C. §364 (2000).  
 5 
―Creditors are often loathe to knowingly extend credit to entities in 
reorganization. Apart from the onus of bankruptcy, payments may be 
deferred months or years even if the reorganization is a complete 
success.‖17 
 
These post-petition credit arrangements have allowed the post-petition lender 
to gain leverage over the debtor: because these lending agreements are made after the 
filing for bankruptcy, this lender isn‘t constrained by the automatic stay provision of 
The Code. As a consequence, and based on the perceived need to attract fresh capital 
to the firm, those DIP financing agreements can be readily enforced upon default. 18 As 
the number of events of default accepted by courts in their DIP financing decisions has 
grown, so has the amount of influence exerted by the lender. For example, it is fairly 
common for lenders to bargain for a ―forced sale‖ deadline, meaning that if the debtor 
doesn‘t sell the assets or obtain approval of a reorganization plan by a certain pre-
specified date, then an event of default occurs.19    
  
This new ―contractual‖ face of corporate bankruptcy has been received with 
praise,20 as well as doubt.21 TEB considers that  
                                                 
17
 See In re Glover, Inc., 43 B.R. 322, 324 (Bkrtcy.N.M., 1984)  
18
 This result is due to the fact that section 362(a) of the code stays only action originated before the 
commencement of the proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. §362(a). Additionally, lenders usually bargain for a 
covenant in the DIP financing agreement expressing the debtor‘s ―consent to automatic relief from the 
stay upon the occurrence of an event of default under the post-petition lending agreement.‖ See 5 
Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d §94:33.  
19
 See 5 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d §94:33. 
20
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr. ―The Past, Present and Future of 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 25 Cardozo L. Rev . 1905, 1920-1 (2004). The idea of control 
transfers due to debt covenant violations is widely accepted in the finance literature. See, for example, 
Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts ―How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants‖, 63 Journal of Finance 2085, 2085 (2008) (―Upon breaching a covenant, control rights shift 
to the creditor who can use the threat of accelerating the loan to choose their most preferred course of 
action or to extract concessions from the borrower to choose the borrower's most preferred course of 
action‖) 
21
 See Jay L. Westbrook ―The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy‖, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795 (2004); See 
 6 
―Today‘s investors allocate control rights among themselves through 
elaborate and sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial 
distress. In the presence of these contracts, a law of corporate 
reorganizations is largely unnecessary.‖22  
TEB assures us that a senior lender is more likely to make sound decisions than a 
debtor. Professor Skeel, Jr. quickly joins the normative idea adding that the new 
―governance levers have dramatically improved the quality of chapter 11 
governance.‖23  
 
The recognition of the new state of bankruptcy affairs has presented several 
questions to the academic debate. There are important issues that require further 
examination to understand what the role played by creditors in the new setting is. Two 
essential issues to investigate are the scope and concentration of bankruptcy control 
and, if indeed we can assume that there is a transfer of control to the DIP lender, 
whether creditor control generates uninvestigated costs that we should take into 
account when evaluating its efficiency, which will be the focus of the present work.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
Stephen Lubben ―The ―New and Improved‖ Chapter 11‖, 93 Kentucky Law Journal 839 (2004).  
22
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 
(2002). In the same vein they mention ―When control rights are allocated coherently, no legal 
intervention is needed to ensure that decisions about the firm‘s future are made sensibly. Most  large 
firms now allocate control rights among investors in a way that ensures coherent decisionmaking 
throughout the firm‘s life cycle.‖ See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of 
Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 778 (2002). This view seems confirmed in the case of failed h igh 
tech start-ups where Mann found that bankruptcy is an unusual tool compared to privately arranged 
assignment for the benefit of creditors . See R. Mann ―An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation 
Choices Failed High Tech Firms‖, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1375 (2004). Interestingly, Baird writing with 
Jackson several years before was much more skeptical about a creditor laden procedure. See Douglas G. 
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson ―Fraudulent Conveyance and its Proper Domain‖, 38 Vand.  L. Rev. 829, 
836 (1985) (―Complete deference to creditor protection in fashioning legal rules makes no more sense 
than complete deference to debtor freedom. Any device that protects creditors inevitably brings costs as 
well as benefits.‖)  
23
 See David A. Skeel, Jr. ―Creditors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New Corporate Governance in  Chapter 11‖, 152 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 920 (2003) 
 7 
Control has been used in many different ways in different disciplines. Even 
within the same discipline, many authors define or simply refer to control in distinct 
ways. An examination of the conceptual borders of control may help distinguish 
different perceptions of control and understand their diverse implications. 24 In order to 
inform the scrutiny of control this chapter will delve into the different theories of the 
firm as an inevitable base for the understanding of control.  
 
This chapter will proceed as follows: Part II will describe in greater detail 
chapter 11 original governance structure and the way in which it is modified by lender 
control. Then, I will discuss TEB view of the theory of the firm as a theoretical 
building tool. I will argue that TEB‘s view is rather superficial and therefore a deeper 
study of the theory of the firm is required in order to better assess the efficiency of 
lender control. Part III will look into different conceptualizations of the theories of the 
firm and derive from it the notion of value and control under each theory. That will 
lead to the study of potential externalities arising out of different control definitions. 
Part IV will utilize the framework established in part III to evaluate specifically the 
effects of lender control. I will argue that lender control generates costs independent of 
those arising out of any conflict of interest between claimholders. Finally, Part V will 
provide a few concluding remarks.  
 
II. Reorganization governance and TEB’s idea of the firm 
A. Understanding chapter 11 governance  
The degree of difficulty that defining control entails does not appear to 
adequately correspond with the profuse use the concept has in many completely 
                                                 
24
 Professor Skeel, Jr. provides two examples of control that differ in scope, with the US Air case 
involving the financier dictating the course of the reorganization case and the TWA case imply ing a 
lesser degree of control. See David A. Skeel, Jr. ―The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing‖, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1920-1 (2004).  
 8 
different fields.25 Much of the difficulty around the concept of control starts with the 
diverse, and often inconsistent, meanings that are attributed to it. 26 Control is used in a 
variety of contexts to express proficiency, limitation or restraint, prevention of the 
spread of, regulation, verification, influence, etc. Indeed, Oliga mentions that ―In 
social science literature, the concept of control is as elusive as it is pervasive.‖27 
 
Perhaps due to the difficulties that defining control entails, the corporate 
governance literature usually discusses control by focusing on the possibility of 
winning battles in shareholder meetings. This conceptualization, which follows the 
ideas presented by Professor Manne28 and before him Professors Berle, jr. and Means, 
heavily depends on the formal structure of business associations‘ which have the 
shareholders (or equity holders in general) as the ultimate decision making body. As a 
large proportion of public companies have dispersed ownership in the United States, a 
gap has arisen between the formal idea behind business associations‘ formal structure 
                                                 
25
 The profuse use of a vague concept may not be a problem at all for the philosophy of language if it 
was aimed at ―Finding and analyzing borderline cases and refining theories and definitions…‖ See 
Bjorn Hofmann ―The Concept of Disease – Vague, Complex, or just indefinable?‖, Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy, Online First, available at 
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy .library.cornell.edu/content/k0j6824323582v08/fulltext.pdf  
26
 Control seems to be at times a vague concept while at others an ambiguous or even an indefinable 
one (i.e. because it is ever- changing or because it is a primitive element of natural language, akin to a 
semantic prime). 
27
 See John C. Oliga, POW ER, IDEOLOGY AND CONT ROL, Plenun Press, New York, NY (1996), at 
139. The difficulty in defin ing control is shared with other concepts, as for example the concept of 
disease. See Per Sundstrom ―Disease: The phenomenological and conceptual center of practical- 
clin ical medicine‖, In Handbook of phenomenology and medicine, ed. S. Toombs, 109-26, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, at 110 (―The meaning of the word ‗disease‘ is vague, elusive, and 
unstable. You may reach for it, but you won‘t grasp it, except in pieces and fragments. It is prone to 
changes, permutations, and shatterings – according to the circumstances, or irrespective of them. And 
yet, you can use the word, and you may feel confident that it carries some meaning – at least most of the 
time‖), cited by Bjorn Hofmann ―The Concept of Disease – Vague, Complex, or just indefinable?‖, 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Online First, available at 
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy .library.cornell.edu/content/k0j6824323582v08/fulltext.pdf  
28
 See Henry G. Manne ―Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control‖, 73 The Journal of Polit ical 
Economy 110 (1965). Unfortunately, Professor Manne didn‘t define control, and focus  on the market  
for such control.  
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and practical decision- making.29 As a result of that divide, control has been portrayed 
since Berle, jr. and Means as potentially separate from ownership.30  
 
Several years after the work of Berle and Means, Professor Manne re-tied the 
idea of ownership and control. Manne argued that corporate control constitutes a 
valuable asset, independent of any economies of scale or scope.31 Manne‘s considered 
that there are three main ways to obtain control of a corporation: a proxy fight, direct 
purchase of shares (as in the case of a takeover) and mergers. 32 Despite the 
indeterminacy of the concept of control under Manne‘s view, control is clearly tied to 
the voting rights of shares and has then to derive from the formal corporate law 
structure.33 The ability to win elections at shareholder meetings and, specifically, to 
appoint directors to the board are the core or ultimate means of exercising control, 
because ―the powers of the board of directors are plenary.‖34     
                                                 
29
 The work of Berle, jr. and Means focused on control while investigating the degree of concentration 
of stock holdings in large corporations. See Adolf A. Berle, jr. & Gard iner C. Means ―The Modern 
Corporation and Private Control‖, The Macmillan Company, New York, New York (1933). Whenever 
concentration levels are h igher, then discussions center in different issues. See, for example, Marco  
Brecht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Roell ―Corporate Governance and Control‖, working pap er availab le at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 (last visited 7/15/07).  
30
 For example, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ―Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Cap italism‖, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1990), at 85.   
31
 See Henry G. Manne ―Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control‖, 73 The Journal of Polit ical 
Economy 110, 112 (1965). Professor Manne followed in this regard Professors Berle, jr and Means. See 
Adolf A. Berle,  jr. & Gard iner C. Means ―The Modern Corporation and Private Control‖, The 
Macmillan Company, New York, New York (1933), p. 69.  
32
 See Henry G. Manne ―Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control‖, 73 The Journal of Polit ical 
Economy 110, 114-9 (1965). Professors Berle, jr. and Means expressed ―Since direction over the 
activities of a corporation is exercised through the board of directors, we may say for practical purposes 
that control lies in the hands of the individual or group who have the actual power to select the board of 
directors, (or its majority), either by mobilizing the legal right to choose them –―controlling‖ a majority 
of the votes directly or through some legal device- o r by exerting pressure which influences their 
choice.‖ See Adolf A. Berle,  jr. & Gard iner C. Means ―The Modern Corporation and Private Control‖, 
The Macmillan Company, New York, New York (1933), p. 69.   
33
 The view of the relative importance of voting as a governance mechanis m is shared by Eaterbrook 
and Fischel who consider that ―The right to vote is the right to make all the decisions not otherwise 
provided by contract – whether the contract is express or supplied by legal rules.‖ See Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel ―Voting in Corporate Law‖, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395, 
402 (1983). 
34
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen ―The Prime Direct ive‖, 75 U. Cin . L. Rev. 921, 924 
(2007). Due to the broad scope of its powers, they refer to the board of directors  as ―the locus of 
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Following the extant work of Manne, corporate governance scholarship has 
devoted a great deal of attention to investigate the factors influencing boards‘ 
composition, action and inaction,35 while aiming at better understanding 
organizational survival.36 There is a great degree of uncertainty surrounding actual 
allegiances, if any, of firm executives to the board. This uncertainty is not dissipated in 
the bankruptcy context and possibly it is enlarged.37 Maybe because of the somewhat 
unobservable nature of board of directors‘ decision-making process and the belief that 
boards are susceptible to be captured,38 attention has partially shifted to other actors in 
the quest for governance clues. In the case of bankruptcy, an individual or group of 
                                                                                                                                            
corporate governance.‖ See Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen ―The Prime Directive‖, 75 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 921, 923 (2007). Talking about high shareholder concentration, Brecht, Bolton & Roell 
consider that ―Most of the time large shareholder action is channelled through the board of directors. 
Large shareholders are in principle able to appoint board members representing their interests. When 
they have majority control of the board they can hire (or fire) management. Large shareholders can also 
exercise power by blocking ratificat ion of unfavourable decisions, or possibly by initiating decisions.‖  
35
 See, for example, Eugene Fama ―Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm‖, 88 Journal of 
Political Economy 288 (1980) (arguing for the efficiency of independent directors where share 
ownership is dispersed); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach ―Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature‖, 9 Economic Po licy  
Review 7 (2003) (d iscuss ing the effects of board independence); Lucian A. Bebchuk ―The Case for 
increasing Shareholder Power‖, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005) (looking at ways in which management 
captures the board); William J. Donoher ―To File o r Not to File? Systemic Incentives, Corporate 
Control, and the Bankruptcy Decision‖, 30 Journal of Management 239 (2004) (studying the incidence 
of board composition on the financial condition of the firm when filing); Randall S. Kroszner & Philip  
E. Strahan ―Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflict of Interests, and Lender Liability‖, 62 Journal of 
Financial Economics 415 (2001) (studying volatility effects of bank representatives on the board of 
director if their client); Vidhi Chhaorchharia & Yaniv Grinstein ―Corporate Governance and Firm 
Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules‖, 62 Journal of Finance 1789 (2007) (studying the 
incidence of board independence of firm performance). 
36
 As Fama and Jensen describe it  ―Organizat ional survival involves a balance of the costs of alternative 
decision systems and systems for allocating residual risk against the benefits.‖ See Eugene F. Fama & 
Michel C. Jensen ―Separation of Ownership and Control‖, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301, 307 
(1983).  
37
 See for example Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen ―The Prime Directive‖, 75 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 921,  (2007), where they discuss the possibility of executives ―capturing‖ the board of directors.  
38
 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, 
Beard Books, 139-148 (1976). The term capture refers to a difference between what one party expends 
and what the other party gets in the appropriation of a right. See Yoram Barzel, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 5-6 (1997).    
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claimholders is the natural candidates to become ‗capturers‘ of the board because of 
the parallelism that exist between them and shareholders of non-bankrupt firms.39  
 
Following the formal idea of control advanced by Berle and Means as well as 
Manne, voting rights assigned to bankruptcy claims by chapter 11 would be 
theoretically decisive in The Code‘s scheme in order to approve a reorganization plan 
and let the debtor exit bankruptcy.40 In other words, The Code thought about giving 
the claimholders as a whole the possibility to negotiate and be outcome determinative. 
As a result, reorganization control under the Manne ideal has been at least partially 
extracted from shareholders voting and redirected to claimholder voting, almost 
entirely creditor voting.41 This insight has been recognized by some market players 
who actively have pursued the acquisition of bankruptcy claims in order to achieve 
control or block reorganization plans, in pursue of extracting additional rents.42  
 
                                                 
39
 The parallel to the governance focus of Berle, jr and Means on shares voting power as determinants 
of control is clear. See Adolf A. Berle,  jr. & Gard iner C. Means ―The Modern Corporation and Private 
Control‖, The Macmillan Company, New York, New York (1933).  
40
 Under this view, the corporate governance structure under the Code works as an unusual corporation 
where dollars of cred it function as shares and priority serves as preferred stock. 
41
 It is important to note that a reorganizing corporation has a complex control structure, even if control 
is composed merely of voting power, given that shareholders‘ retain a the power to elect directors all 
through the proceedings. See In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662, 664 (2
nd
 Circuit, 1935) 
(―Obviously, the stockholders should have the right to be adequately represented in the conduct of the 
debtor's affairs, especially in such an important matter as the reorganization of the debtor. Such 
representation can be obtained only by having as directors persons of their choice… No reason is 
advanced why stockholders, if they feel that the present board of directors is not acting in their interest, 
or has caused an unsatisfactory plan to be filed on behalf of the debtor, should not cause a new board to 
be elected which will act in conformance with the stockholders' wishes.‖); In re Johns-Manville 
Corporation et al. v. The Equity Security Holders Committee , 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2
nd
 Circuit, 1986) 
(stating that ―the well settled rule that the right to compel a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of 
electing a new board subsists during reorganization proceedings‖ and that the shareholders‘ right to 
govern their corporation is ―a prerogative generally uncompromised by reorganization‖)  
42
 The main strategy was to acquire a blocking number of claims so as to make sure that they have veto 
power of any reorganizat ion plan. Hence, anybody proposing a plan needed to, at least, negotiate it with 
this negatively ―controlling‖ creditor. See generally Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer ―Trad ing 
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11‖, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1990); Robert K. 
Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr. ―The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law‖, 3 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85, 101-2 (1995); Frederick Tung ―Confirmation and Claims Trad ing‖, 90 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1684 (1996). 
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Professors Baird and Rasmussen, followed by Professor Skeel, Jr., have 
exposed the fact that the above description of the bankruptcy control picture is 
incomplete and most likely outdated.43 They have described a world where Manne‘s 
view of the ―voting power‖ nature of control is rather unimportant in today‘s 
bankruptcy practice. What TEB unveiled is that the commonly perceived duality of 
firms either reorganizing through the approval of a plan or liquidating with the 
resulting loss of value (the two formal exit possibilities under The Code), is a false 
dichotomy. Auctions of the firm or a division of the firm are possible without any 
need for creditor voting or liquidation through the section of The Code authorizing 
DIP‘s sale of assets.44 According to TEB, firm or division auctions‘ are possible 
because the market for distressed firms has continually developed and became more 
efficient,45 preventing the big losses associated with selling assets or firms in 
bankruptcy.46 The implicit assumption in TEB follows from the classic hypothetical 
consent idea: neither claimholders nor the bankruptcy judge should object to the 
auction because the latter is a wealth creating mechanism.47 
 
As a result of the development of a larger market for distressed firms, the 
possibility to achieve control through other means has risen as a lucrative one. 48 If a 
                                                 
43
 This idea was not entirely new. The literature based on different theories using control to assign 
liab ility, subordinate or recharacterize claims already employed the concept of creditor control in 
distressed situations. See for example Jeremy W. Dickens ―Equitable Subordination and Analogous 
Theories of Lender Liab ility: Toward a New Model of ―Control‖‖, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 801 (1987).  
44
 See 11 U.S.C. §363 
45
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 786-8 
(2002); Robert G. Hansen ―Auctions of Companies‖, 39 Econ. Inquiry 30 (2001). Eisenberg has 
challenged the notion of liquid and efficient market for firms exists, as it is not the same to have 
efficient market for securit ies than for firms (large collection of securities). See Theodore Eisenberg 
―Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11‖, 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 633 (1993).   
46
 This losses are usually referred as ―asset fire sales‖. See, for example, Gregor Andrade & Steven N. 
Kaplan ―How costly is Financial (not Economic) Distress: Evidence from Highly Leveraged 
Transactions that Became Distressed‖, 53 Journal of Finance 1443 (1998).   
47
 On the hypothetical consent idea, see Daniel Brudney ―Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force‖, 10 
Law and Philosophy 235, 236-40 (1991). 
48
 This follows Manne‘s ideadescribed above that control has a value in itself.  
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party is able to obtain the reins of the bankrupt firm, she has an exit strategy to the 
claimholder voting/ liquidation duality. The exit strategy further increases the 
bargaining power of a controlling party, as the DIP lender could potentially be, which 
could be reflected in the possibility to demand management termination. In turn, this 
signals the degree of control that DIP lenders, as controlling parties, can acquire.49 
Theoretically, then, anyone who obtains full control (if such a thing is ever possible) 
would be in a position to determine the fate of the estate assets without the need for 
any negotiation with other bankruptcy constituents. The exit strategy generally 
accentuates the leeway of the DIP and naturally, the importance of the chapter 11 
process‘s governance.50  
 
Arguably, the importance of chapter 11 governance takes the system by 
surprise. The Code‘s design has left out many corporate governance issues, relying 
heavily on the non-bankruptcy law applicable to each specific case, either because it 
thought to keep the consistency of governance rules or because it believed that those 
items were of an ancillary character.51 The increased flexibility gained by the DIP as a 
                                                 
49
 See F.H. Buckley ―The Termination Decision‖, 61 UMKC. L. Rev. 243, 256 (1992) (―While 
displacement is often a discrete event, it might also amount to a gradual shift of control to creditors. As 
the firm lurches towards financial distress, the firm must rely more heavily upon major lenders, and its 
managers will become more susceptible to creditor influence. The firm will seek to provide full 
informat ion to the lender, whose express restrictive covenants might be bolstered through an informal 
veto over general investment policies. The loan agreement might also provide for creeping creditor 
control through rights to nominate an increasing number of directors as financial covenants are 
breached.‖) 
50
 Following Brecht, Bolton & Roell (2002) ―corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of 
collective action problems among dispersed investors and the resolution  of conflict of interests between 
various corporate claimholders.‖ See Marco Brecht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Roell ―Corporate 
Governance and Control‖, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 (last visited 7/15/07), p.113 The term 
evolved from analogy between the government of nations and cities and that of the corporations. See 
Marco Brecht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Roell ―Corporate Governance and Control‖, working paper 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 (last visited 7/15/07), p.6. 
51
 Elson, Helms & Moncus consider that ―Traditionally, the focus in chapter 11 restructurings has been 
on financial and managerial reform, largely ignoring equally important issues of corporate governance.‖ 
See Charles M. Elson, Paul M. Helms & James R. Moncus ―Corporate Governace Reform and 
Reemergence from Bankruptcy: Putting the Structure Back in Restructutring‖, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1917, 
1918 (2002). A reflect ion of the lack of importance given by the Code to governance structures in 
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result of a better market for bankruptcy sales and the appearance of a creditor vying to 
control the process trumps The Code‘s assumption that the debtor, absent the 
appointment of a trustee,52 would be running the firm through the process that leads to 
the approval of the reorganization plan.53 This is the configuration which allows for a 
lender to obtain what Baird and Rasmussen have called the ―missing lever‖ over a 
distressed debtor, through his dealings with the debtor, 54 eventually tramping any 
control exercised through voting by either shareholders or claimholders. 55  
 
In order for a lender to exercise control and potentially prevent value dilution, 
the lender must have such exercise as a feasible possibility. To better determine which 
types of control are feasible for the lender we must first look at the theory of the firm. 
                                                                                                                                            
chapter 11 is the lack of exp licit sections focalizing on it. Similarly, the Code provides for mandatory 
formation of unsecured creditors committee without providing any guidance into the regulation and 
functions it should have. See Daniel J. Bussel ―Coalition -Building through Bankruptcy Creditors‘ 
Committees‖, 43 UCLA L. Rev 1547, 1549 (1996). The situation was different under the 1973 Report 
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which vowed for the mandatory 
appointment of trustees if the debtor owed 1 million or more dollars or had 300 or more security 
holders, the figure of the admin istrator to handle non-judicial matters or the express focus on control 
when looking at the differences between former Chapters X, XI and XII of the Bankruptcy Act.  See 
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd  
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 244-53 (1973).  
52
 See 11U.S.C. §1104 (a).  
53
 This feature of chapter 11 has been referred to as being biased towards status quo and lacking 
commitment to protect creditors‘ rights. See William W. Bratton ―Venture capital on the Downside: 
Preferred Stock and Corporate Control‖, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 891, 894 (2002).   
54
 See in general Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006). It is true that no interested party can 
determine how the reorganizat ion process unwraps without petitioning to the bankruptcy court for 
approval of a petition to sell assets - see 11 U.S.C. §363(b)(1) - or presenting a reorganization plan for  
court confirmat ion – see 11 U.S.C. §1129 -. Nonetheless, due to the governance structure of the firm 
which allows great leeway to directors in their decision under the business judgment rule, it is easier to 
exercise influence or control over the process and over the debtor assets, through influencing or 
controlling the debtor himself, because the chapter 11 structure respected directors‘ outside of 
bankruptcy right to govern the bankrupt firm. On the business judgment rule see for example Aronson 
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984) (―It is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will 
be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts 
rebutting the presumption.‖)  
55
 Indeed, leverage is so important in Professors Baird and Rasmussen‘s regard that they report that 
―when a business enters financial distress, the major decisions… require the blessing of the banks.‖ See 
in general Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1212 (2006).  
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The study of the theory of the firm as an important methodological step to understand 
reorganizations was also a central feature of TEB‘s framework. TEB‘s objective when 
looking at the theory of the firm was to use it in order to assess the efficiency of firm 
continuation. I depart from TEB‘s analytical framework in that I will employ the 
theory of the firm to understand what the firm is, as necessary step to comprehend its 
implications for what control can be applied to. Only then, I suggest, can efficiency 
consequences be assessed. The following section will review TEB‘s understanding of 
the theory of the firm.   
 
B. Revisiting TEB’s view of the theory of the firm 
As we have seen, lending arrangements nowadays, supervised to a certain 
extent by the courts,56 are the key device utilized by a creditor in order to gain 
influence over the DIP and, more generally, the bankruptcy process. The 
sophistication of those lending contracts in the case of distressed borrowers has grown 
to the extent that they are commonly reported to be extremely detailed, containing a 
googol of covenants that the borrower is needed to abide by. 57 Allegedly, if any 
covenant gets violated the borrower will have to accede to the lender‘s requests in 
order to obtain the necessary default waivers and keep the hope of a successful 
reorganization alive. One of the requests may involve the appointment of a 
restructuring officer,58 a board member or even a new manager, presumably either 
                                                 
56
 Section 364(c) and 364(d) g ives the court power to authorize DIP financing after notice and a 
hearing. See 11U.S.C. §364(c), (d )   
57
 A study by Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez has showed that detailed covenants were found in DIP 
financing cases with a higher frequency than previous literature found in other context (almost 100% of 
cases). See Sris Chatterjee, Upinder S. Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez ―Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing‖, 28 Journal of Banking & Finance 3097, 3108 (2004).  
58
 On the capability of restructuring officers, Miller & Waisman contend that ―CROs are typically 
vested with executive decision making power and direct access to the debtor‘s board, but they can talk 
to the lenders without reporting back to the board.‖ See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman ―Is 
Chapter 11 Bankrupt?‖, 47 B. C. L. Rev. 129, 154 (2005).  
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philosophically or relationally (or both) closer to the lender. 59 As a result, the lender 
can be ‗naturally‘ understood to be running the show, something that TEB believes it 
is more efficient than The Code‘s scheme, especially as TEB believes that firms in 
financial distress have little if any going concern value. 60 
  
TEB‘s examination insightfully starts with a look at the theory of the firm and 
proposes that more attention needs to be placed on the relation between the economic 
and legal understandings of the firm.61 Unfortunately, TEB rapidly focuses on 
insolvency applications without first precisely delimiting what the firm is in order to 
apply it to what lender control means as function of that idea. Nonetheless, TEB 
provides several leads into what its construction of the theory of the firm may be. TEB 
maintains that the firm is basically a nexus of contracts. 62 Their view is heavily 
influenced by Ronald Coase‘s understanding of transaction costs, 63 which they claim 
―now dominates the theory of the firm.‖64 Maybe because their grasp of the theory of 
the firm is so heavily influenced by transaction costs, which have been reduced by 
technological developments, TEB contends that the ―ability to conduct business 
                                                 
59
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1233 (2006).  
60
 TEB arrives to this conclusion as it believes that intangible assets (i.e. the business model) are the 
nowadays‘ valuable assets and if the firm is in distress they likely have no value. See Douglas G. Baird  
& Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 763-8 (2002). TEB‘s position 
is closely related to what Williamson describes as the strong- form natural selection idea rather than the 
weak- form natural selection. In the later, the fitter survive, but there‘s no absolute sense with which to 
assess whether they are the fittest. See Oliver E. Williamson ―Corporate Finance and Corporate 
Governance‖, 43 Journal of Finance 567, 573 (1988).   
61
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 757 -8 
(2002). Much of the following analysis on the theory of the firm and the related control concept will 
focus on TEB, because Creditors‘ Ball, nor The Past, the Present and the Future have claims into the 
definit ion of either concept. 
62
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 757 
(2002). 
63
 See Ronald H. Coase ―The Nature of the Firm‖, 4 Economica 386 (1937).  
64
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 757 
(2002). Whether a transaction costs approach dominates now the theory of the firm is not at all clear. 
Indeed, the number of works on the theory of the firm that are not based on transaction costs economics 
is very large. 
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through contracts as easily as inside a firm is increasingly common today.‖65 As a 
result, the set of economic activities to be performed inside firms relative to those to 
be carried out through markets has been reduced significantly.   
 
Had TEB stopped there and had it left us with the idea that the firm is a nexus 
of explicit contracts, it would be possible to criticize their view of the firm in general 
terms, because it treats contracts as complete posing no incentive problems, 66 uses 
transaction costs as the unit of analysis which is problematic when bureaucratic costs 
relate to many transactions,67 and the market is treated as a black box (in the same way 
that the firm was treated by neoclassical theory). 68 But TEB has looked at firms and 
has pointed at other sources of value. They mention the existence of firm specific 
assets (both tangible and intangible),69  team grounded knowledge or expertise, 70 and, 
more generally, going concern value.71  
 
The recognition of the existence of knowledge in teams which can be carried to 
other firms,72 as well as human specific assets, means that it is possible to conceive 
intangible assets which cannot be fully protected by the law or contract, probably due 
to the fact that both are incomplete legal devices. 73 As a result, transaction costs may 
                                                 
65
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankrup tcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 770 
(2002). 
66
 See Bengt Holmström & John Roberts ―The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited‖, 12 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 73, 76 (1998).  
67
 See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 32-3.  
68
 See Bengt Holmström & John Roberts ―The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited‖, 12 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 73, 77 (1998).  
69
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 758-
68 (2002). Firm specific assets are those which have a larger value inside the firm than outside.   
70
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 768-
77 (2002). 
71
 See section II.C, supra. 
72
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 773 -4 
(2002). 
73
 Due to human inability to plan for some future scenarios and to rationally deciding not to describe 
others because of  the expense involved in planning for them.  
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not be the only factor to focus our attention on for efficiency purposes. The allocation 
of resources and power may generate important ex ante as well as ex post incentives. 
In addition, despite the fact that TEB discusses growth options, the concentration on 
transaction costs (natural consequence of their view of the theory of the firm) 
generates a static understanding of the firm. If a firm can buy and sell all its inputs 
(including contracts) on each period independently of previous ones, then each period 
has no influence over the following ones. This static perspective limits the possibility 
to fully grasp the nature of growth opportunities, its interrelation with assets in place 
and how to keep them inside the firm.74  
 
Therefore, it must be concluded that TEB‘s understanding of the theory of the 
firm is inconsistent with an explicit nexus of contracts view. Unfortunately, TEB‘s 
view cannot be perfectly fitted under other understandings of the theory of the firm 
either, despite the fact that TEB‘s definition of control is closely related to the 
property rights approach 
―control is the ability to make decisions regarding the deployment of 
assets, including human capital‖.75  
As it will become clearer in the next section, TEB‘s nexus of contracts concept ion of 
the firm could never be consistent with a property rights approach because the former 
is based on contractual completeness while the later is founded on contractual 
incompleteness.  
 
From this account of TEB‘s view, we can see that TEB leaves us orphans of a 
theory of the firm which could be used to explore the consequences of assigning 
                                                 
74
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1635 -7 (2000). 
75
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 779 
(2002).  This defin ition is very similar to the one provided by Hart and mentioned in section II.B.4, 
supra. 
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control to a creditor. In particular, defining the firm will determine where value comes 
from and will influence how to protect and foster that value (which will like ly depend 
on how control is allocated). The following section will then explore different theories 
of the firm and the way they determine where value comes from and the sets of 
feasible control which can be exercised.  
 
III. Theories of the firm  
The preceding discussion begs the question of what lender control in the DIP 
financing context is, so that it is possible to analyze its implications. In order to 
examine the concept of control, an intermediate step needs to be taken. The notion of 
what a firm is, the element over which control can potentially be exerted, needs to be 
unveiled to figure out the possible contents and boundaries of the definition of control. 
Understanding what constitutes the firm will determine those limits in the set of 
possible control scopes, while also informing how amenable control is to 
concentration under different conceptualizations of the firm.  
 
This section will delve into the theory of the firm in order to carry forward 
some conclusions to help understand what control signifies and what the consequences 
of its allocation to a secured creditor are. Control applies potentially to the elements of 
the economic firm. In this sense, the scope of control has an upper limit determined by 
what the firm‘s elements are. This is not to say that the strength of control depends 
merely on what the elements of the firm and the legal entitlements are. 76 It means that 
recognizing the limitations that a static analysis may have (shying away from 
questions such as how the definition of the firm and its governance may affect 
                                                 
76
 Compliance with authority, for example, has a cultural understanding and different ways to respond 
to authority may generate different values to firms. For a comprehensive study on the effects of 
authority see Stanley Milgram ―Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View‖, Harpercollins, New 
York, NY (1974). 
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responses to authority), the definition of the economic firm will shape what the scope 
of control could potentially be. The possibility of control concentration is also 
informed by the theory of the firm concept that is adopted, because the lesser the 
commodifiability of a firm element the more difficult it will be to concentrate control 
(due to the non-appropriability of the other elements of the firm). 77 Scope and 
concentration control levels govern an individual‘s (i.e. DIP lender) ability to protect 
firm value.  
 
Investigating the firm elements will also provide clues in order to assess firm 
value. Different firm theories will conceive value as arising from different sources. As 
there is a connection between possible control definition and allocations and firm 
value, this section will also discuss the implications of different theories of the firm on 
its valuation. The incidence of control allocation on firm value will be discussed in 
greater detail infra in section IV.  
 
The theory of the firm has proven to be a fruitful field for research purposes in 
recent years. Many papers and books have looked at what the firm is, creating a host 
of theories.78 Such a proliferation of theories will make the account that follows 
                                                 
77
 For example, Nickerson and Zenger believe that the characteristic of the problem to be solved 
implicates the organizational form. If a p roblem is decomposable (low interaction is needed among 
knowledge sets, hence problems can be decomposed into sub -problems), a market solution is 
appropriate as it provides weak incentives for knowledge sharing. If the problem is of moderate 
interaction (sub-problems can be identified, but the value of the solution depends on the interaction of 
the sub-solutions), an authority-based search is better suited, because it efficiently handles the tradeoff 
between economizing on the transmission and handling of information due to the presence of a central 
figure that understand critical knowledge interactions with the costs arising out of the cognitive limits of 
managers and the overconfidence in their own judgment. Finally, if a problem requires high interaction 
(the complexity of the problem is so big that no knowledge set by itself is sufficient to solve the 
problem), a consensus-based hierarchy, which substitutes education for direction and is better at 
achieving a common language, is appropriate as it resolves disputes based on consensus and has low 
powered incentives which discourages knowledge hoarding. See, generally, Jack A. Nickerson & Todd 
R. Zenger ―A Kowledge-Based Theory of the Firm – The Problem-Solving Perspective‖, 15 
Organization Science 617 (2004).  
78
 For example see Margaret M. Blair ―Firm-Specific human Capital and Theories of the Firm‖, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds., 
 21 
necessarily incomplete and perhaps unsubtle. Nonetheless, and given the difficulties in 
covering every proposed idea in depth, the subsequent discussion will try to highlight 
broad categories of existing theories of the firm to serve as a background when 
analyzing TEB understanding of the firm in the bankruptcy scenario.  
 
 
A. Neoclassical theory 
The neoclassical theory views firms in terms of the technological 
transformations which they are capable of employing. 79 The focus is set on the 
maximization of the production function of the firm, because firms are assumed to 
―deal in markets for homogeneous commodities.‖80 In a simple description, which 
assumes perfect competition in the output market, the theory maintains that the firm 
will attempt to produce so that its marginal cost matches the output price.81 Milgrom 
and Roberts suggest that the neoclassical theory looked at market failures in 
                                                                                                                                            
Brookings Institution Press, 1999; Nico lai J. Foss ―The Knowledge Governance Approach‖, 14 
Organization 29 (2007); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger ―A Kowledge-Based Theory of the Firm 
– The Problem-Solving Perspective‖, 15 Organization Science 617 (2004); Chery l Carleton Asher, 
James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney ―Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder 
Theory of the Firm‖, 9 Journal of Management and Governance 5 (2005); Bengt Holmström & John 
Roberts ―The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited‖, 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 73 (1998); Lu igi  
Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal of Finance 1623 (2000); Erica Gorga & Michael 
Halberstam ―Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge Based 
Theory of the Firm‖, 101 Northwestern L. Rev. 1123 (2007); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales 
―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of Economics 387 (1998); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore ―Property Rights and the nature of the Firm‖, 98 Journal of Political Economy 1119 (1990); etc.  
79
 See Sidney G. Winter ―On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation‖, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, 
& Organization 163, 164 (1988). A lso, see Oliver E. Williamson ―Corporate Finance and Corporate 
Governance‖, 43 Journal of Finance 567,569 (1988). For an early presentation of the neoclassical 
viewpoint, see Jacob Viner ―Cost Curves and Supply Curves‖, 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 
(1932). Hart considers that ―A manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and 
outputs in a spot market and choosing the plan that maximizes owners' welfare.‖ See Oliver Hart ―An 
Economist‘s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm‖, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1759 (1989).  
80
 See Sidney G. Winter ―On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation‖, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, 
& Organization 163, 164 (1988). Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the theory of the firm in neoclassical 
terms just asked ―what forces ensure that the process will maximize profits‖. See Bengt R. Holmstrom 
& Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization  61, 63 (1989). 
81
 See Oliver Hart ―Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure‖, Oxford University Press, New York 
(1995), p. 18. 
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competitive environments to find reasons for non-market organizations, among which 
they mention market power, increasing returns to scale, externalities, missing markets, 
and search, matching and coordination problems.82 
 
The neoclassical conceptualization fails to address important structural issues 
while at the same time making non evident assumptions. Because the neoclassical 
theory rationalizes the firm as a sort of black box which transforms inputs into outputs, 
it circumscribes the object of study to the analysis of how the firm can maximize its 
production. Therefore, the neoclassical theory doesn‘t pay any attention to how things 
work inside the firm and has nothing to say about internal firm organization. 83 As a 
related consequence, the concentration on the technology employed fails to supply a 
―genuine trade-off between integration and non- integration.‖84 Finally, the 
neoclassical theory takes as a given the information set necessary for production, 
effectively treating knowledge as an exogenous factor. 85  
 
According to the neoclassical theory value arises from a given production 
function, with the typical sources being scale or scope economies. Therefore, if the 
firm has value outside of bankruptcy, it will maintain it in bankruptcy, because 
initiating the bankruptcy proceeding does not change that production function. As the 
neoclassical theory doesn‘t say anything about which elements constitute the firms, 
                                                 
82
 See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOM ICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 73-7. 
83
 See Oliver Hart ―Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure‖, Oxford University Press, New York 
(1995), p. 17.  
84
 See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 61, 66 (1989). 
85
 Winter argues that ―By taking production sets or functions as given, [neoclassical theory] fails to 
provide for a framework for explaining why society‘s capabilities should be packed at a particular time 
in one particular way and not some other way… Most importantly, textbook orthodoxy fails to provide 
a basis for understanding the incentives and processes in business firms that produce technological and 
organizational change.‖ See Sidney G. Winter ―On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation‖, 4 Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organizat ion 163, 171 (1988).  
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control scope remains an undefined and open subject. In addition, the lack of precision 
on what constitutes the firm‘s elements doesn‘t rule out any concentration option. 
Ergo, full control concentration appears as a possibility.       
 
B. Nexus of explicit contracts 
The explicit nexus of contracts view of the firm is prevalent in corporate 
finance86 and arguably also in corporate governance. The idea was originated with 
Alchian and Demsetz‘s87 study of organizational forms which would permit a lower 
cost of detecting shirking in a team production setting. Specifically, Alchian and 
Demsetz analyzed a situation where output from a joint venture, for example a 
university, could be verified but input from different individuals could not. 88 As free 
riding would emerge among members of the team, they propose to allow one person 
(i.e. a manager) to be the central party common to all contracts, to monitor the venture 
(―observe input behavior‖), pay the other individuals fixed amounts and to be 
rewarded by receiving all the residual claims from the firm. 89  
 
 Jensen and Meckling90 contributed greatly to this approach by clearly 
defending a view of the firm as an explicit nexus of contracts where the firm is a legal 
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance  1623, 1630 (2000). 
87
 See Armen Alchian & Haro ld Demsetz ―Production, Informat ion Costs and economic Organizat ion‖, 
62 American Economic Review 777 (1972).  
88
 ―What a team offers to the market can be taken as the marginal product of the team but not of the 
team members.‖ See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz ―Production, Information Costs and economic 
Organization‖, 62 American Economic Review 777, 780 (1972).  
89
 See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 61, 67 (1989). Central in Alchian  and Demsetz‘s conception was to find a way to meter 
input productivity and rewards in a team production setting and to therefore be able to tie these t wo 
concepts in such a way that changes in ―rewards fall on those responsible for changes in output.‖ See 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz ―Production, Information Costs and economic Organization‖, 62 
American Economic Review 777, 778 (1972).   
90
 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976).  
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fiction whose purpose is to tie a set of contractual relations.91 As a result, the 
boundaries of the firm are set by the costs the monitor (i.e. the manager) incurs in 
controlling that each agent performs according to the contract obliging her. 92 In their 
conceptualization, the firm will achieve optimal size when the marginal increment in 
value due to size is equal to the marginal increment in loss involved in the 
consumption of additional fringe benefits by any of the agents. 93  
 
This approach generates several implications. As by assumption all contracts 
are explicit, the firm cannot be worth more than the sum of contracts it unites, making 
any sub-partition as valuable inside as outside the firm as long as the same monitoring 
and producing technology applies.94 The explicit nexus of contracts assumes that each 
constituent, but the shareholders, is fully paid its opportunity cost. Therefore, 
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 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976). It is important to 
note that Alchian and Demsetz assigned a smaller relat ive weight to contracting costs vis a vis the 
detection of individual team members‘ performance. See Armen A. Alch ian & Harold Demsetz 
―Production, Information Costs and economic Organizat ion‖, 62 American Economic Review 777, 782 
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 Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as ―a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.‖ See Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownersh ip Structure‖, 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308 (1976). Then agency costs are composed of ―1. the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, 2. the bonding expenditures by the agent, 3. the residual loss.‖ See 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 322 -3 (1976).    
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 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976).  
94
 See Luigi Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1631 (2000). In 
Jensen and Meckling words ―The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which  
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of 
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little  
substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations 
focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for 
various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relat ions are, and how they 
are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes litt le or no sense to 
try to distinguish those things that are ―inside‖ the firm (or any other organization) from those things 
that are ―outside‖ of it.‖ See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 
311 (1976). 
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allocating decision rights to shareholders as residual claimants easily follows, because 
they are the only constituents of the firm bearing immediate risks. 95 Following the 
same logic, only shareholder interests should be pursued by the firm. As a corollary 
consequence, in order to value the firm computing only share price is important, so 
long as the firm is solvent.  
 
The nexus of explicit contracts theory has some shortcomings. Assuming the 
existence of explicit contracts only seems to generate a stark contrast with reality. 
Fama and Miller have pointed out that bondholders are not completely protected from 
shareholder decision making and therefore also incur risks.96 Becker points to 
worker‘s specialization to observe that those employees can be affected if the firm 
fires them before they recoup the investment in specialization and therefore are 
residual claimants also.97 Shleifer and Summers studied efficiency gains of takeovers 
to conclude that at least in part they arise out of wealth redistribution from 
stakeholders to shareholders (the redistribution of wealth may come from employees, 
government or suppliers).98 Finally, Peterson and Rajan while discussing the reasons 
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 Esaterbrook and Fischel consider that ―As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with 
the appropriate incentives (collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions… 
Yet all of the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims 
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 See Eugene Fama & Merton H. Miller THE THEORY OF FINANCE, Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Ill. 
(1972) 
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 Gary S. Becker Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York (1964). Yair Listokin provides a clear 
example: ―organization breach implicit contracts, which are not legally enforceable.27 For example, 
organizations may induce effort and investment in younger employees by promising above market  
wages in later years as a reward for good performance. Good performance may be unverifiable, 
however, so the agreement cannot be reduced to contract. As a result, the controlling patrons can have 
the organization renege on the implicit contract if it suits the controlling patrons‘ interest.‖ See Yair 
Listokin ―The Pivotal Mechanism and Organizational Control‖, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372822 (last checked 04/07/09), page 7.  
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 See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers. ―Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers‖, Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach, pp. 33-56. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press (1988). They contended that firms usually rely on implicit contracts which the 
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which explain the existence of trade credit mention that, provided that the trading 
relationship will continue, also trade suppliers have an implicit equity stake on the 
customer‘s firm.99 Therefore, even though shareholders are the only de jure residual 
claimants in the nexus of contracts, it doesn‘t mean that they are the only de facto 
residual claimants. In fact, the very notion of the existence of a single class of residual 
claimants has been questioned.100 
 
To recap, the nexus of explicit contracts notion views the firm as the mere sum 
of its parts.101 Therefore, any going concern value that a firm may have needs to arise 
necessarily from the transaction costs102 that could be saved from not having to put 
back together the web of contracts already in place.103 It does not necessarily follow 
that the interconnection of contracts is valuable but provided that it is, the value of a 
firm under the nexus of explicit contracts has an upper limit determined exogenously 
by search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs. If technological 
advances reduce these costs, as TEB has suggested happened, then the value to be 
                                                                                                                                            
company must be trusted to respect. To the extent that long term contracts reduce costs, such 
trustworthiness is a valuable asset to the firm. The need for long term contracts derives from the equal 
need to promote firm specific investment. The problem is that even if ex ante efficient, in certain states 
of the world it will be ex post efficient to breach those contracts. Hence, ex post cost breaching needs to 
be measured against ex ante increase in cost (plus it is more likely to be, at least in part, a redistribution 
of wealth than anything else). 
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 See Mitchell A. Peterson & Raghuram G. Rajan ―Trade Cred it: Theories and Evidence‖, 10 The 
Review of Financial Studies 661, 669 (1997). (―Furthermore, if a firm and its supplier continue to 
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MANAGEMENT, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 315.  
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 See section II.B.2 supra. 
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 Richard Posner defines transaction costs as ―the costs involved in organizing economic activ ity 
through voluntary exchange‖. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen 
Publishers, New York, NY , seventh edition (2007), at 419.  
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 This statement assumes that either each member of the organizat ion is replaceable or that each 
member could be potentially rehired. 
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protected in bankruptcy diminishes also.104  
 
As for control, the nexus of explicit contracts theory proclaims that a firm‘s 
elements arise out of the web of agreements which constitute the firm. 105 Naturally, 
the scope of potential control then can be defined only over the uses of the rights 
arising of those contracts. In other words, as the firm purchases each of the inputs 
necessary for production and those are readily replaceable by equal quality ones, 
control (and its scope) is merely a contractual concept. Consequently, and irrespective 
of whoever this control is specifically allocated to, 106 the controlling party will be able 
to determine what the use of the inputs for the periods acquired will be (within the 
restrictions that each contract provides for). At least theoretically then, control can be 
fully concentrated (i.e. one person can be the owner of those rights and decide on the 
usage, or delegate to a manager that decision).  
 
C. Nexus of explicit and implicit contracts 
The previous theory relies on a fairly rigid set of assumptions. Baker, Gibbons 
and Murphy relax some of those assumptions and put forward an alternative, perhaps 
more plausible, theory. They believe that  
―[F]irms are riddled with relational contracts: informal agreements and 
unwritten codes of conduct that powerfully affect the behaviors of 
                                                 
104
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 778-
9 (2002). 
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 The usage of control is generally employed in a negative sense in this literature, referring to ways to 
reduce agency costs. Jensen and Meckling, for example, consider control as a way to limit an  agent‘s 
behavior. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
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 Alchian and Demsetz believe that control should be allocated to equity because they have the best 
incentives to lead the team when global outputs are easily measurable but not individual contribution to 
the output. See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz ―Production, Information Costs and economic 
Organization‖, 62 American Economic Review 777, 781-3 (1972).  
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individuals within firms.‖107  
These informal agreements, or implicit contracts, serve to circumvent problems such 
as non-observability (i.e. moral hazard) or non-verifiability (i.e. non-contractability) of 
outcomes by third parties. The informality of implicit contracts makes them highly 
adaptable to unforeseen situations but, as a drawback, they can merely be self-
enforced. As a result, implicit contracts are not available on demand and require the 
development of trust and the formation of reputation (firm reputation in the situation 
under study), which can only be achieved through the passage of time.108 
 
The nexus of implicit and explicit contracts conception of the firm presents a 
more complex structure, introducing the important interaction between formal and 
informal agreements.109 Because of being constituted by both types of arrangements, 
the firm can be worth more (or even less) than the sum of its individual parts 
depending on the value of the particular investments. As a result, the economic 
definition of the firm may differ from the legal one, as corporations are not viewed as 
owning informal relations, specifically non-contracted upon ones.110 For example, 
relational suppliers may generate value, but that value generally is not considered to 
technically belong to the firm.111 
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 See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy ―Relational Contracts and the Theory of the 
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 Chaver and Fried address the existence of implicit contracts and, as a result, challenge the conceived 
financial value maximizat ion standard (which tries to maximize the value to creditors and shareholders) 
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A notable corollary for bankruptcy purposes is that, under this understanding, 
the firm‘s capital structure increases its importance because liquidity shocks can 
diminish the value of the firm‘s implicit contracts, perhaps in a permanent manner. If a 
firm loses the reputation it has for respecting implicit contracts due to financial 
restrictions, then the value to the firm itself and the mere sum of the individual assets‘ 
value may tend to converge, because the credibility of the firm‘s promises would 
diminish.112 As a result, the implicit and explicit nexus of contracts theory regards the 
firm as having other residual claimants besides equity holders, due to the fact that 
other stakeholders‘ may also have an investment in the relation.  
 
As we mentioned, the nexus of implicit and explicit contracts theory 
recognizes the existence of value outside mere transaction costs. Implicit contracts are 
difficult to understand and value, but their existence implies that there are hidden 
assets in an organization.113 As a consequence, the mere aggregation of financial 
claims may not accurately represent the value a firm has. Focusing on financial claims 
to decide what to do with the assets of a distressed firm will turn out as a suboptimal 
option because it may disrupt an asset ownership and control structure which allows 
for a given promise to be self enforcing.114  
 
The explicit and implicit nexus of contracts theory shares with the nexus of 
explicit contracts the view that control crops up out of the web of agreements that 
constitutes the firm. As seen before, implicit contracts are na turally self-enforcing due 
                                                                                                                                            
standard. See Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried ―Manager‘s Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm‘s Insolvency: 
Accounting for Performance Cred itors‖, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813 (2002). 
112
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1634 (2000).  
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1635 (2000).  
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to their informality therefore the potential scope of control is comprised by legal rights 
and non legal ones. Explicit contracts allocation of control can be done in the same 
way as in the nexus of explicit contracts theory, but implicit contracts control rights 
are split between the parties to those contracts who have full control on whether to 
honor them or not. In an end game situation like bankruptcy, a breach of the implicit 
contracts could be made without paying for the informal consequences.115 As a result 
of these arguments, full control concentration under this theory is impossible. 
Additionally, control transfers may not be neutral to the content of the firm and, hence, 
indirectly to control itself.  
 
D. Property rights approach  
The property rights theory of the firm has developed from a seminal paper by 
Grossman and Hart which was followed by another important article by Hart and 
Moore.116 These authors believe that firms are collections of non-human assets.117 
Having property rights over those assets becomes important because complete 
contracts are infeasible and/or too costly. Then, because contracts are incomplete,118 
having asset ownership grants the possibility, referred to as having residual control 
rights, to decide in an unconstrained fashion on the use of those assets upon the 
occurrence of a non- prearranged situation.119 In Hart‘s words  
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 Peterson and Rajan discuss this possibility specifically in the case of trade creditors. See Mitchell A. 
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―The owner of an asset has residual control rights over the asset: the 
right to decide all usages of the asset in a way not inconsistent with 
prior contract, custom, or law.‖120   
 
The property rights theory of the firm maintains that the allocation of residual 
decision rights via ownership can have an effect on investments in relationship 
specific capital (one which has lesser or no value outside the relation for which is 
created) and, thereby, on overall efficiency. As residual control rights partially 
determine ex post distribution of surplus, how the residual rights are allocated will 
determine the parties‘ willingness to invest ex ante. Therefore, efficiency will be 
served by ex ante allocating asset ownership in proportion to the relation specific 
investment that parties make. For example, Hart mentions the case of GM ownership 
of Fisher Body, as well as electricity generating plants owning coal mines or 
aluminum refineries owning bauxite mines.121 According to this theory, joint asset 
ownership, because several parties can make valuable firm specific investments, 
explains the more sophisticated firm structures.    
 
Zingales believes that a very appealing feature of this theory is to make the 
economic notion of the firm amenable to legal theory, 122 because it is easier to 
associate a corporation with the assets it formally owns rather than, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                            
rights. When it is too costly for one party to specify a long list of the particular rights it desires over 
another party‘s assets, it may be optimal for the party to purchase all rights except those specifically  
mentioned in the contract. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights of control.‖ See Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart ―The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vert ical and Lateral 
Integration‖, 94 Journal o f Po lit ical Economy 691, 692 (1986).  
120
 See Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, Oxford University 
Press, New York (1995), p. 30. Holmstrom and Tirole emphasize that the contracts that shape the 
residual control rights are explicit. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 
Handbook of Industrial Organization  61, 69 (1989). 
121
 See Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, Oxford University 
Press, New York (1995), p. 29- 33, 50-1. 
122
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1638 (2000).  
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labor force it employs. Regardless of the validity of such claim (Zingales never 
discloses what the legal theory of the firm under his view, or anyone else‘s, is), the 
property rights approach has been undoubtedly ground breaking. Nonetheless, it has 
been subject to criticism. A commonly mentioned problem of the property rights 
approach is the identification of ownership and control, 123 which has been shown to 
differ in many corporations since the extant writings of Berle and Means. Another 
difficulty arises from the narrow scope which this theory has, as it does not take into 
account human capital as being part of the firm.124 Finally, as is discussed above with 
the nexus of explicit contracts theory, the value of the firm is represented only by the 
sum of the assets the firm owns, which provides little explanatory power for the role 
of equity.  
 
As we saw, the property rights approach starts from asset ownership to explain 
a firm‘s existence in terms of ex ante incentives to parties that will make them 
generate efficient complementarities. Therefore, physical assets‘ and their allocation 
will determine the value of the firm by increasing or reducing hold up power. 125 The 
                                                 
123
 See for example John Kay, THE BUSINESS OF ECONOMICS, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(1996), at 111; Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam ―Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge Based Theory of the Firm‖, 101 Northwestern L. Rev. 1123, 1136 
(2007). 
124
 See Margaret M. Blair ―Firm-Specific human Capital and Theories of the Firm‖, in  EMPLOYEES 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds., Brookings Institution 
Press, 1999, at 66. See, also, Luigi Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal of Finance 
1623, 1639 (2000) (―However, by defining the firm as a collection of assets, the property rights view 
excludes the insider‘s human capital.‖)  
125
 Referring to the famous GM-Fischer Body integration problem, Hart g ives the following example: 
―Anticipating the way surplus is divided, GM will typically be much more prepared to invest in 
machinery that is specifically geared to Fisher bodies if it owns Fisher than if Fisher is independent, 
since the threat of expropriation is reduced. The incentives for Fisher, however, may be quite the 
opposite. Fisher management will generally be much more willing to come up with cost -saving or 
quality-enhancing innovations if Fisher is an independent firm than if it is part of GM, because Fisher 
management is more likely to see a return on its activities. If Fisher is independent, it can extract some 
of GM's surplus by threatening to deny GM access to the assets embodying these innovations. In 
contrast, if GM owns the assets, Fisher management faces total expropriation of the value of the 
innovation to the extent that the innovation is asset-specific rather than management-specific, and GM 
can threaten to hire new management team to incorporate the innovation.‖ See Oliver Hart ―An 
Economist‘s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm‖, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1768 -9 (1989). 
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former understanding leads Zingales to believe that firm value is identified with what 
the owner can extract as private benefits.126 Zingales arrives at this conclusion because 
the specific investment by the owner, perhaps due to its ability to generate 
complementarities, is what creates the extra surplus making the firm valuable.  
 
The property rights theory of the firm, as mentioned above, considers control 
rights or, with more precision, residual control rights to be the basis for conceiving 
ownership.127 This approach does not differentiate between ownership and control, so 
both are commingled and inseparable. The concept of control here can be understood 
as a way ―to foster and protect relationship specific investments.‖128 As the property 
rights approach focuses on non-human assets, the scope of control would appear to 
exclude them. Nonetheless, firm value (and allocation of ownership) is dependent on 
relations between human and non-human assets. Ergo, the scope of control could 
potentially cover not only non-human assets but also specific investments, with the 
caveat that the later is non transferable. As a result, full control concentration and 
transfer may not be achieved under the property rights approach to preserve (ex post) 
and create (ex ante) firm value.  
 
E. Nexus of Specific Investments 
Building on the theoretical framework of the property rights approach, Rajan 
                                                 
126
 See Luigi Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1639 (2000)  
127
 ―The market can function only in a situation where the ―exclusion principle‖ applies, i.e. where A‘s 
consumption is made contingent on A‘s paying the price, while B, who  does not pay, is excluded. 
Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property rights require exclusion. Given such 
exclusion, the market can function as an auction system.‖  See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. 
Musgrave, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, Mcgraw-Hill College 55 (3d ed. 
1980). 
128
 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387, 387 (1998). As they explain, ―the smaller the space of contracts that can be written and 
enforced, the more important the role of residual rights of control.‖   
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and Zingales have proposed a view of the firm as a nexus of specific investments,129 
considering that it is not just physical assets‘ ownership that generates power ―nor 
necessarily the most efficient in promoting relation specific investments.‖130 Zingales 
affirmed that  
―[W]hat distinguishes the firm from the market is the web of specific 
investments built around a critical resource… By controlling a critical 
resource an entrepreneur can influence the accumulation of specific 
investments so as to build complementarities between the person the 
entrepreneur seeks to have power over and her critical resource.‖131  
The nexus of specific investments theory of the firm allows chronological 
differentiation of what the firm is considered to be: 
―[B]efore investment [in specialized human capital] takes place, the 
firm is defined by who holds the ownership rights to the physical assets 
that are required for production and by who is given access to the 
physical assets.‖132  
Once the specific investments have been undertaken,  
―the firm is defined by the ownership of the physical assets and the 
power that accrues to those who have made specific investments.‖133  
Eventually, if the firm keeps on being successful in its development, at some point the 
web of specific investments may become so important and distinct from the mere sum 
of the parts it is composed of that the web itself turns out to be the critical resource 
                                                 
129
 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales ―The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A  
Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms‖, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 805 (2001).  
130
 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387, 388 (1998). 
131
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1645 (2000).  
132
 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387 (1998). 
133
 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖ , 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387 (1998). 
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around which more specific investments could be made. 134  
 
The nexus of specific investments‘ view of the modern firm is influenced by 
the assessment that physical assets are less unique and hence command less rents than 
before, as in Chandler‘s traditional firm,135 and by the difficulty in appropriability of 
human capital (i.e. no slavery). Complementarily, increased competition at the 
worldwide level augmented the demand for innovation which has been translated into 
more rents to human capital.136 But increased competition changed the game in 
another important way: a firm‘s grip on employees has diminished due to the 
increased access to financing and employment opportunities.137 Increased financing 
leads to exploration of alternative ways of exploiting business opportunities by those 
who know them best and to the creation of additional organizational structures which 
obviously require manpower (i.e. new jobs). Despite the several intriguing aspects of 
this theory, it does face some challenges. On this regard, one of the hardest challenges 
arises out of the fuzzy definition of access, leading up to some indeterminacy.  
 
This theory, like the nexus of explicit and implicit contracts one, generates a 
                                                 
134
 This is a way of explaining the creation and existence of reputation or organizational capital, though 
I am not aware of any fo rmalizat ion of reputation creation in this way.  
135
 See, generally, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ―Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism‖, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1990), at 3-46    
136
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1642 (2000).  
137
 Rajan and Zingales provide several illustrations of the smaller grip a firm has on key employees. For 
example ―Intel, the microprocessor manufacturer, was started, not in a garage or basement as many 
other Silicon Valley start-ups, but when Robert Noyce, the General Manager of Fairch ild  
Semiconductor, and Gordon Moore, its head of Research and Development walked out of Fairchild and 
set up their own firm, Integrated Electronics. Shortly before their departure, a scientist in Moore's 
department had discovered the "silicon-gate" technique to produce semiconductor memory devices. 
This became an important part of Intel's proposed product line… Clearly, of all Fairch ild's employees, 
Noyce and Moore had the greatest access to Fairchild's inventions, and at the very least, took a lot of 
knowledge and, equally important, employees with them to the start -up. Thus, Intel hit the ground 
running, and is now one of the most profitable firms while Fairchild Semiconductor is virtually a 
footnote in business history.‖ See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales ―The Firm as a Dedicated 
Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms‖, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 805, 
806 (2001).    
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plausible explanation to the existence of indirect bankruptcy costs. 138 Reorganizations 
and to a greater extent liquidations, irrespective of being due to either financial or 
economic reasons, may destruct value if they signal to employees that their specific 
investment may become less valuable, in turn reducing the value of organizational 
capital. As a result of the magnitude and alleged irreparable condition of the 
bankruptcy costs, the nexus of specific investment theory believes that the role of 
equity may have mutated from its financing nature into some sort of insurance 
mechanism that protects the long term viability of the enterprise. 139  
 
As for firm governance, it is heavily affected by the particular implications of 
the nexus of specific investments theory. The fact that power is dispersed among 
constituents shifts the governance focus into the prevention of conflicts between 
stakeholders. Besides the need to take into account conflicting object ives, the 
dispersion of power among different stakeholders‘ risks, in the extreme, the 
destruction of firm value as no party fully internalizes the preservation of 
organizational capital.140 Therefore, Zingales considers that the principal role for firm 
governance is  
―to ensure an alignment between the ability to capture the opportunities 
and reward stemming from them.‖141  
 
The nexus of specific investments theory does not generate all the answers in 
                                                 
138
 On bankruptcy costs see Edward I. A ltman ―A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy 
Cost Question‖, 39 Journal of Finance 1067 (1984); Theodore Eisenberg ―Baseline Problems in  
Assessing Chapter 11‖, 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 633 (1993); Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & 
Ning Zhu ―The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganizat ion‖, 61 
Journal of Finance 1253 (2006); Maria Carapeto ―Is Bargain ing in Chapter 11 Costly?‖, Cass Business 
School Working Paper (2003).  
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1647 (2000).  
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1648 (2000).  
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1649 (2000).  
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terms of how to value a firm. This theory is premised upon the fact that  
―what keeps the firm together is the strong complementarity between 
human and physical assets. Thus, an option ―belongs‖ to the firm if it is 
highly complementary with the physical and human capital that 
constitutes the firm.‖142  
With this information, some conclusions follow which are of interest for bankruptcy 
purposes. First, firms consist of more than the mere value of the physical assets they 
have ownership over. Second, value may not reside ―inside‖ the legal notion of the 
firm.143 Finally, value may be very volatile and can be easily lost due to human capital 
mobility, which probably helps to explain bankruptcy indirect costs‘ positive 
correlation with the duration of the proceedings.144   
 
The nexus of specific investments understanding of control is likely the more 
complex of all the theories discussed above. This theory explains that the sources of 
control arise from the existence of critical resources. A critical resource could start 
from the ownership of physical assets, but then specialization of human capital will 
trump the role of being the critical resource. The elements of the firm are then 
comprised by human (non-transferable) as well as non-human assets. Therefore, 
control scope is potentially applied to those elements. As a consequence of the non-
transferability of some elements of the firm, control is necessarily dispersed and 
shared by those who own critical resources. As a result, the ability to exercise control 
by the owners of physical assets is heavily constrained by the power achieved through 
human capital specialization. Then, if human and physical critical resources are not 
                                                 
142
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f F inance 1623, 1649-50 (2000). 
143
 As mentioned above, there‘s an important caveat: it is not clear what the legal notion of the firm is 
under this theory.  
144
 See Edward I. Altman ―A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question‖, 39 
Journal of Finance 1067 (1984);  
 38 
owned by the same person, full control concentration is impossible.      
 
 
F. Implications for this paper 
As it was highlighted throughout this section, the understanding of what 
constitutes a firm is of utmost importance. Ramifications emanating from those 
conceptions will eventually play a fundamental role in answering where a distressed 
firm‘s value stems from. In turn, this answer will help to evaluate whether creditor 
control is optimal to realize firm value, in other words, whether control allocation 
matters. Of course, the definition of the firm will not be the only element employed to 
determine the most efficient bankruptcy control allocation, but each particular 
definition will play an important role in determining the set of feasible answers to the 
allocation question. As each particular theory has the potential to determine different 
sets of answers, the selection of a theory of the firm won‘t be trivial.            
 
This section‘s discussion helps in understanding that value depends on what 
we see the firm as being. As soon as it is recognized that value arises out of non 
physical, potentially non transferable assets or that value is not fully co vered by 
financial claims to the legal firm,145 then the importance of who is assigned control 
grows. In that case, the decision- maker may need to take into account other elements 
besides physical asset value or saving on transaction costs (both values being 
exogenous to the decision-maker action choice), as basically proposed by TEB.  
                                                 
145
 A good example of the difficulty in explicitly defining contract terms is given by Blumenstein and 
Stern who, citing a 1700 pages long contract between UAW and General Motors, express that ―several 
important aspects of this and the other UAW agreements aren't even in the written contracts. According 
to individuals close to the talks, some of the most sensitive provisions, such as how many jobs the auto 
makers will actually guarantee, are settled with an "understanding": a handshake or a wink-and-a-nod at 
the bargaining table.‖ See Blumenstein, Rebecca, and Gabriella Stern, ―UAW, Auto Makers Find Some 
Things Better Left Unsaid,‖ Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1996.   
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The preceding discussion shows that control has different scope and 
concentration possibilities under different theories. As a result of the different 
implications of the definition of control under different theories of the firm, allocations 
of control may not be innocuous towards incentives. The following section will 
investigate the effects of allocating control to a DIP lender.  
 
IV. Lender Control Scope and Concentration Costs 
So far, an investigation of the consequences of different theories of the firm on 
particular firm traits has been explored. This section intends to make as explicit as 
possible the relationship between firm value and allocation of control. As TEB 
implicitly concedes the existence of value outside the web of explicit contracts, this 
section of the paper will try to examine what the costs of lender control could be under 
the other theories of the firm. The main argument to be developed here is that, once  
the explicit nexus of contracts theory of the firm is discarded due to its stringent 
assumptions, other externality costs arise when DIP lender is assigned control of the 
firm, regardless of which other theory of the firm is chosen. 146 
 
The legal literature has usually relied on the nexus of explicit contracts to think 
about bankruptcy control concentration costs.147 An early example of this 
conceptualization comes from a very insightful paper by Triantis. 148 Triantis focuses 
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 Again, given that TEB concedes and it is generally agreed that value outside mere exp licit contracts 
exists.  
147
 Note that the reliance on the explicit nexus of contracts theory and its main implication, i.e. 
shareholder value maximizat ion as the corporate objective function, concerns also other fields. As a 
result, it‘s been referred as an ideology, which covers additionally goals and expectations. See for 
example William Lazonick & Mary O‘Sullivan ―Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance‖, 29 Economy and Society 13 (2000).  
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 See George G. Triantis ―A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 46 Vand. 
L. Rev. 901 (1993). In the same vein, several other examples can be given. See for example, Barry E. 
Adler ―Financial and Polit ical Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy‖, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311 
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on conflicts of interests149 between reorganization claimholders produced by priority 
differences and considers that  
―The most enduring problem, however, is that even if successful, the 
shift in decisionmaking authority to the residual owners does not 
eliminate financial agency problems. Unsecured creditors are residual 
owners only at the margin. Their participation in the company's 
fortunes is bounded on both sides: they share gains with shareholders 
and losses with the more senior creditors. Therefore, conflicts of 
interest between the residual owner who holds decisionmaking 
authority in bankruptcy and these other groups will persist.‖ 150 
 Indeed, exactly this idea is followed by Lopucki‘s critique of TEB151 and recent 
empirical work by Ayotte and Morrison.152 
  
As soon as we move away from the nexus of explicit contracts paradigm, other 
potential costs unfortunately come to share a bankruptcy scene already filled with 
direct and indirect costs. These costs may vary under each theory and arise out of not 
only conflicts of interests between claimholders produced by priority differences153 
                                                                                                                                            
(1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk ―Using Options to divide Value in Bankruptcy‖, working paper, available at  
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/No271.99.Bebchuk.pd
f (last visited 5/12/07); Oliver Hart, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & John Moore ―A 
New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions‖, working paper availab le a t 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/6278.html (last visited 07/02/07). 
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 Mehran and Stulz define conflict of interests as ―a situation in which a party to a transaction can 
potentially  gain by taking actions that adversely affect its counterparty.‖ See Hamid Mehran & Rene M. 
Stulz ―The Economics of Conflict of Interests in Financial Institutions‖, 85 Journal of Financial 
Economics 267, 268 (2007). 
150
 See George G. Triantis ―A Theory of the Regulat ion of Debtor-in-Possession Financing‖, 46 Vand. 
L. Rev. 901, 916 (1993). 
151
 See Lynn M. Lopucki ―The Nature o f the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen‘s The 
End of Bankruptcy‖, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645, 660-5 (2003). Nonetheless, Lopucki considers , without 
explaining how these conceptions interact, that ―going -concern value resides principally in  
relationships‖. See Lynn M. Lopucki ―The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and 
Rasmussen‘s The End of Bankruptcy‖, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645, 652 (2003). 
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 See Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison ―Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11‖, 1 The 
Journal of Legal Analysis 511 (2009).  
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 For example, Bergström, Eisenberg and Sundgren mention that ―Priority differences cause conflicts 
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but also due to the lack of internalization of implicit contracts value 154 or specific 
investments by the entrepreneur or key employees. Therefore, I suggest that these 
costs need to be considered in order to reassess the proclaimed benefits of DIP lender 
control for economic efficiency, especially since efficiency arguments are the only 
ones supporting DIP lender control.155   
 
Let us revisit the scope and concentration of control under the more novel 
theories of the firm and their relation to value. As discussed above, the property rights 
theory of the firm regards control rights in a residual manner. It conceptualizes 
ownership and control as indifferent, making them inseparable and susceptible to full 
concentration. The property rights approach ties asset ownership to ex ante incentives 
that parties have in order to efficiently invest in complementarities. Therefore, value is 
dependent on physical assets‘ allocation and  
―ceteris paribus, a party is more likely to own an asset if he or she has 
an important investment decision‖.156  
 
If control is assigned to a DIP lender, the logic of this theory tells us that ex 
ante incentives will be diminished as the lender would add no complementarities or 
                                                                                                                                            
between high and low priority claimholders... Secured cred itors who believe they will receive close to 
full payment in liquidating bankruptcy may prefer bankruptcy over reorganization, even when total 
payments to creditors would be higher in a reorganization. Secured creditors receive only part of the 
gain if the value of the reorganized firm increases, but bear all of the costs if the value decreases. 
Theorists acknowledge the likelihood that secured creditor incentives are skewed towards liquidation 
over reorganizat ion.‖ See Clas Bergström, Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren ―Secured Debt and 
the Likelihood of Reorganizat ion‖, 21 Int‘l Rev. L. & Econ. 359, 360 (2002). For a recent empirical 
study along these lines see Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison ―Credito r Control and Conflict in  
Chapter 11‖, 1 The Journal of Legal Analysis 511 (2009).  
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 Shleifer and Summers advanced this argument in the context of the nexus of implicit and explicit 
contracts theory of the firm in the context of takeovers. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers. 
―Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers‖, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by 
Alan J. Auerbach, pp. 33-56. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988). Below, I will extend 
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 On the proclaimed benefits of DIP lender control, see section I supra. 
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 See Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, Oxford University 
Press, New York (1995), p. 49. 
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synergetic value, while he would still share in the proceeds. As a result, assigning 
control to the DIP lender will hamper specific investments in complementarities by 
key members of the firm.157 Having said that, a caveat must be noted: proponents of 
the efficiency of DIP lender control rely heavily on lenders selling the firm, as they 
just want to recover what it is owed to them and don‘t have any special knowledge 
about the business of running firms.158 Then, the previous problem would be shoved 
into the future (though unlikely diminished). The conflict of interests‘ problem arising 
from the different priorities enjoyed by different claimants is not affected by the sale 
of the business line of argument and remains at full strength. 159 
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with any inefficiencies arising out of allocating authority to a lesser informed party. On this issue, see 
generally Nicolai J. Foss, STRATEGY, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, AND THE KNOW LEDGE 
ECONOMY, Oxford University Press, Great Britain (2005), at 126-30; Ph ilippe Aghion & Jean Tirole 
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M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison ―Cred itor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11‖, 1 The Journal of 
Legal Analysis 511 (2009) 
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Let‘s think about the implicit and explicit nexus of contracts theory now. This 
theory considers that firm value arises out of the web of agreements that constitute the 
firm. Accordingly, the scope of potential control covers explicit and implicit 
contractual arrangements but, as we have seen above, control cannot be fully 
concentrated due to the self- enforcing nature of the implicit contracts (i.e. an informal 
agreement doesn‘t provide the parties a transferable right). As there are many informal 
agreements, assigning control to constituents who, in the case of a sale, do not 
internalize (impossibility of full concentration) the effect of their decisions on those 
gaining from the implicit contracts, which generates externality costs and likely affects 
the value of the firms‘ hidden assets.  
 
Shleifer and Summers have studied this problem in the context of takeovers, 
where they affirm that gains in stock price do not entirely reflect efficiency gains, due 
to the redistribution of wealth from employees (i.e. in terms of lower wages), 
government (i.e. tax credits) or suppliers to shareholders.160 Therefore, assigning full 
control to equity or debt may be inefficient as long as those implicit terms reduce 
contracting costs and generate efficient incentives. Although, Shleifer and Summers 
were inspired by the takeover wave of the 1980‘s, their view seems readily 
transplantable to bankruptcy, as long as reorganizations are dominated by section 
363(b) sales (as believed by professor Skeel, Jr.) and either the DIP or the DIP lender 
make by himself or together the sale decision.161  
   
Finally, let‘s examine the nexus of specific investment implications of 
allocating control to the DIP lender. This theory is the first to explicitly address firm 
                                                 
160
 See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers. ―Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers‖, Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach, pp. 33-56. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press (1988). 
161
 See section I and II.A, supra. 
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control as intrinsically dispersed as an important way to generate and tie growth 
options to the firm. Zingales refers to the dispersed characteristic of control by saying  
―The secret [to the creation of firm value] is to create a situation where 
employees know that their rewards will be greater if they make firm-
specific investments. The enterprise does this by giving key employees 
or units privileged access to the enterprise or its critical resources, so 
that they have power if they specialize.‖162  
The realization that control over critical physical assets is combined with the power 
over inalienable human assets is an important paradigm shift. What ties the firm 
together and generates value is the interconnection and complementarities of human 
and physical resources. The more complementary the growth options are with the 
resources in place, the more likely it is that they will ―belong‖ to the firm. 163 If a 
biological analogy is permitted, the nexus of specific investments view of control is 
morphogenic, because the firm is directed to adaptive structural transformation as a 
way to maintain and increase its own value.164  
 
As mentioned above in section III.A, the nexus of specific investment 
conceives control‘s scope as potentially covering human and non-human assets. 
Accordingly, the nexus of specific investment implies that complete control 
concentration is impossible (due to the non-transferability of decision making over 
human assets). Therefore, DIP lender control is naturally limited by the impossibility 
of full control concentration. In theory, each person who has made a specific 
investment would have power to extract part of the benefits (as he is essential to 
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1646 (2000).  
163
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1649 -50 (2000). 
164
 For a v iew that integrates organization theory, control and biology, see John C. Oliga, POW ER, 
IDEOLOGY AND CONTROL, Plenun Press, New York, NY (1996), at 121-38 
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obtaining full firm value).165 As the access to the assets in relation to which specific 
investments were made is self enforcing (otherwise value is lost to the firm), 166 lack of 
control concentration would seem to be innocuous. Nonetheless, such a conclusion 
would be misleading: due to the conflict of interests arising out of priority differences, 
access is not self-enforceable anymore. As different claim types (except for equity) 
have a cap on the amount obtainable in bankruptcy equal to what the claimholder is 
owed, a decision maker with those incentives would not express interest in obtaining 
full firm value. Naturally, this scheme would translate into fewer amounts spent on 
specific investments ex ante. As a result, the nexus of specific investment theory tells 
us that DIP lender control deepens the problem arising out of conflict of interests, 
which evolve out of priority differences, because value is not only lost ex post (as 
under the nexus of explicit contracts view) but also ex ante. Then, the allocation of full 
control/ decision-making power with the DIP lender will likely hamper those valuable 
investments.   
 
To summarize, TEB recognizes the existence of value besides the web of 
explicit contracts, therefore conceding that the firm cannot be explained relying 
merely on that theory. When we look at control concentration possibilities under the 
other theories it was showed that allocating control to a DIP lender will generate 
externality costs which the previous literature had not focused on before: diminishing 
ex ante incentives due to conflict of interests arising out of priority differences, lack of 
internalization of implicit contracts value or specific investments by the entrep reneur 
or key employees. Therefore, any claims on the supposed efficiency of DIP lender 
control need to be reconsidered under the new light generated by these costs. As a 
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 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387, 402-3 (1998). 
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 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luig i Zingales ―Power in a Theory of the Firm‖, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387, 405 (1998). 
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corollary, full control concentration has been shown to be infeasible under the rest of 
the theories explored. Therefore, the mere concept of assigning control to the DIP 
lender needs to be reconsidered. What amounts to the transferred control? Is it control 
over physical assets? Is it control over employees with specific investments? Further 
analysis and research efforts are required in order to provide a plausible answer to 
these questions.  
 
V. Conclusion  
Naturally, creditors possess great incentives to obtain safeguards ex ante in 
their contracts and to pursue the results of those contracts by self-help, court action or 
negotiation. There‘s plenty of truth in anticipating that no one else is going to defend 
them. Courts have not shown much sympathy lately. 167 What‘s important, though, will 
be to assess the creditors‘ ability, incentives and credibility as decision-makers in 
order to obtain maximum return in exchange for the firm.  
 
This chapter intended to further the understanding of control and value as 
arising from different conceptualizations of the theory of the firm. In that sense, this 
chapter followed TEB‘s methodological footsteps and attempted to go deeper in the 
investigation of the meaning of the theory of the firm. This chapter has shown that 
DIP lenders do not internalize the value of the whole firm when we understand the 
firm to be more than (or different from) just a nexus of explicit contracts. As a result 
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 In NACEPF, the court decided that the recognition of fiduciary duties to creditors in the ―zone of 
insolvency‖ context may involve: ―using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist.‖ Hence, 
―the need for providing directors with definitive guidance compels us to hold that no direct claim for 
breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a solvent corporation that is operating in 
the zone of insolvency. When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus 
for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the 
corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.‖ See North American Catholic Educational 
Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla , 2007 Del. LEXIS 227 (Del. May 18, 2007), at 19.  
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DIP lenders decisions will likely generate costs arising out of: conflicts of interests 
between claimholders produced by priority differences, lack of internalization of 
implicit contracts value and specific investments by key employees.  
 
There are several implications arising out of the priority differences, lack of 
internalization and specific investments. Mainly, the proclaimed efficiency of DIP 
lender control of the reorganization process must be reassessed taking into account 
those costs. In addition, the very concept of DIP lender control should further be 
revised under the light that it cannot be as far reaching as TEB and others have 
thought. 
 
This introductory chapter also serves to jump start a discussion on several 
questions which require further investigation and which are analyzed more in depth in 
the following chapters. In chapter II, I will further explore lender control potential 
shortcomings, specifically regarding costs arising from creditor control not previously 
accounted for. Specifically, I will discuss conflict of interests and ex ante investment 
problems even in a scenario with only one class on legal claimholders. Additionally, I 
will investigate the effects of lender control on the investment opportunity set of the 
DIP. I will suggest that lender control problems is not merely a consequence of 
commonly recognized risk aversion and liquidation bias, but also is connected to 
relatively poorer adaptation ability,168 increased ambiguity aversion and less 
cooperation due to heightened expectations of failures and non- cooperative signal. 
 
In chapter III, I will examine the connection between standard interpretations 
of what a firm is and the reluctance of courts to impose lender control liability or 
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 As we‘ll see below, this leads to an investment scope restriction. 
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equitable subordination. I will argue that lender control liability theories have fallen in 
disuse in the United States and this was made possible at least in part by an 
understanding of the theory of the firm, by legal academics and courts, as a nexus of 
explicit contracts. A broader understanding of the theory of the firm permits to 
separate lender control liability results from the so called absolute priority rule. In 
addition, I will discuss alternative explanations to this reluctance. I will conclude that 
fraudulent conveyance law cannot be thought of as a functional equivalent, therefore 
not being able to explain the phenomenon. At the same time, the practice cannot be 
explained as a result of diverging conduct and liability standards because the agency 
law safe harbor destroys any ambiguity which would be required for the laws 
expressive function to have complementarities with the liability standard.     
 
In chapter IV, I will look into possible adjudication problems arising out of 
cognitive errors when dealing with lender control liability theories. I will suggest that 
hindsight bias is not the only cognitive bias at play but that we also have to take into 
account its interaction with the anchoring effect. As a result, a strict liability rule 
would not be optimal as a way to achieve an efficient level of precautions –risk taking-  
even in a case of unilateral precautions. A very important consequence of this insight 
is that lender control liability and director and officer liability cannot be analyzed 
within a unilateral precaution framework as it has been in the past. Despite this 
conclusion, the business judgment rule as a no liability rule could still be the best 
alternative to deal with director and officer liability. Even if this was the case, I will 
argue none of the reasons supporting a no liability rule in that situation support a no 
liability rule for lender control liability.  
 
In chapter V, I will use references to the legal development of lender control in the 
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United Kingdom in order to provide further basis for a proposal to revitalize lender 
control liability. In addition, I will offer some concluding remarks.  
50 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Lender Control Unexplored Costs  
 
I. Introduction 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, control is one of the most important 
and commonly used concepts in corporate governance. Nonetheless, the concept has 
proven impossible to define with any precision.169 Even operational definitions of 
control have proven evasive. This difficulty has not stopped researchers from 
investigating normatively how to best allocate control in firms. Since the extant work 
of Aghion and Bolton,170 the finance literature suggests that control should be 
contingently assigned to creditors in distressed firms as a way to limit agency costs. 
As a matter of fact, it is quite common to stumble upon the assumption that violation 
of debt covenants (i.e. non- waived defaults) generates shifts in control in the financial 
literature.171 As we have seen, some legal scholars in the United States have recently 
                                                 
169
 A recent conceptualization of control given by Yair Listokin  illustrates the point ―Legal rules and 
standards, such as fiduciary duties or principles of contractual interpretation, seek to fill [contract] gaps, 
but these rules are imperfect and costly to enforce. Thus, there must be some mechanism for making 
decisions that are not stipulated by contract. The right to participate in this mechanism is called  
―control‖.‖ See Yair Listokin ―The Pivotal Mechanism and Organizational Control‖, working paper 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372822 (last checked 04/07/09), page 
6. A similar point has been brought up by Emirbayer and Mische when they describe the elusiveness of 
the concept of agency. See Mustafa Emirbayer & Ann Mische ―What is Agency?‖, 103 The American 
Journal of Sociology 962, 962 (1998) (―The concept of agency has become a source of increasing strain 
and confusion in social thought. Variations of action theory, normat ive theory, and political- 
institutional analysis defended, attacked, buried, and resuscitated the concept in often contradictory and 
overlapping ways. At the center of the debate, the term agency has maintained an elusive, albeit  
resonant, vagueness; it has all too seldom inspired systematic analysis, despite the long list of terms 
with which it has been associated: selfhood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, 
initiat ive, freedom and creativity.‖)  
170
 See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton ―An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting‖, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).  
171
 See Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts ―How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of 
Debt Covenants‖, 63 Journal of Finance 2085, 2086 (2008) (―However, the instant that the borrowe r's 
net worth falls below this threshold, regardless of the amount, control rights shift to the creditor …‖ 
―…transfer of control rights accompanying a covenant violation leads to a significant decline in  
investment activity, as creditors intervene in order to thwart inefficient investment or punish managers 
for perceived misbehavior‖). For an exception, see Gary  Gorton & James Kahn ―The Design of Bank 
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supported the control shift view, both descriptively and normatively. Baird and 
Rasmussen,172 as well as Skeel,173 have argued that control does indeed shift to 
creditors in the case of distressed firms and that such shift should be welcomed as it is 
beneficial from an efficiency standpoint.  
 
This position stands in stark contrast to the recent experience or, to say the 
least, recent perception in the United Kingdom which led to the adoption of the 
Enterprise act of 2002. This Act has, for the most part, abolished the administrative 
receivership, which had drawn concern due to the perceived lack of transparency and 
accountability,174 leading to inefficient outcomes. Armour and Mokal have described 
the administrative receivership as being  
―widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of power to creditors 
holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked 
sufficient incentives to rescue failing companies.‖175  
 
In this chapter, I further consider the implications of allocating control to the 
main lender in business reorganization cases. Drawing inferences from the literature 
                                                                                                                                            
Loan Contracts‖, 13 Review of Financial Studies 331, 359 (2000) (―The firm somet imes has an 
incentive to increase volatility. The outside claimant that is in a position to prevent this, the bank, only 
imperfectly controls borrower risk-taking‖) 
172
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 
(2002). There have been several proposals on privatizat ions in other areas as, for example, Michael C. 
Jensen ―Active Investors, LBO‘s, and the Privatizat ion of Bankruptcy‖, 2 Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 35 (1989). 
173
 See David A. Skeel, Jr. ―Creditors‘ Ball: The ―New‖ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11‖, 
152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003).  
174
 Unsecured creditors were viewed as the main constituency suffering from the admin istrative 
receivership consequences. See Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance, Cm 5234, 
London, TSO (2001), 9.  
175
 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 29 (2005). This 
perception of inefficiency grew despite the existence of the so called ‗London Approach‖, where 
secured creditors wouldn‘t press for insolvency under the threat of losing future business. See John 
Armour & Simon Deakin ―Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The ‗‗London Approach‘‘ to the 
Resolution of Financial Distress‖, 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21 (2001)  
 52 
on the theory of the firm, I uncover the existence of lender control costs beyond 
conflict of interests due to claimholders with priority differences. The priority 
differences‘ cosmology stems from a view of the firm as composed by explicit 
contracts. Breaking away from that paradigm allows us to identify other sources of 
lender control costs not tied to priority differences between classes of c laimholders. 
Specifically, I show that even when there is only one class of legal claimholders, 
lender control may generate suboptimal results due to the suboptimal investment 
incentives that parties not fully covered by explicit contracts may have. 176 At the same 
time, the existence of other equal priority claimholders with no firm specific 
investments may diminish the incentives of lenders in control to extract private 
benefits through deflating the reorganization value. Finally, I will argue that letting a  
lender control a reorganization process will likely generate other types of costs related 
to inefficient restrictions to business plans.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II, discusses the explicit nexus of 
contracts paradigm of the theory of the firm and its implications for lender control 
evaluations. Section III, presents a simple model to show lender control costs even 
when there‘s only one class of legal claimants to the firm assets. Additionally, this 
section will discuss the possibility of lender control costs arising out of inefficient 
restrictions to the firm‘s business plan.  Section IV, provides concluding remarks.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176
 As it will become clear later on, I am not advancing that control shouldn‘t be contingent on financial 
structure or financial signals. On the contrary, this shift seems to be an ingenious feature of financial 
contracting. Rather, I suggest that if control changes in seemingly subverted ways, costs arising from 
lender control opportunism should be acknowledged and put forward in order to allow the legal system 
to develop an adequate way of dealing with those costs.  
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II. Explicit Nexus of Contracts Permeating into Academic and Court 
Opinions 
Knowing what constitutes a firm is important, in the case of healthy or 
distressed firms, if nothing else, as a way to understand whether it is beneficial to have 
a firm running and what works to the benefit or detriment in determining firm 
efficiency (i.e. allocation of control or governance mechanisms). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, originally the firm was viewed in terms of the technological 
transformations a firm was capable of performing, 177 focusing on the maximization of 
the production function available to the firm.178 Hence, examinations of difference in 
return relative to variations in scale were common. Milgrom and Roberts suggest that 
this ―neoclassical theory‖ merely looked at market failures in competitive 
environments to find reasons for non-market organizations (i.e. market power, 
externalities, coordination problems, etc).179  
 
The previous chapter also described how later advances replaced this 
conceptualization by what Zingales refers to as the ―explicit nexus of contracts 
theory‖.180 The explicit nexus of contracts theory is the prevalent view of the firm in 
corporate finance181 and was originated in a study by Alchian and Demsetz‘s182 where 
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 See Sidney G. Winter ―On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation‖, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, 
& Organization 163, 164 (1988). For an early p resentation of the neoclassical v iewpoint, see Jacob 
Viner ―Cost Curves and Supply Curves‖, 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 (1932). Hart considers 
that ―A manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and outputs in a spot 
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Perspective on the Theory of the Firm‖, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1759 (1989).  
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 See Sidney G. Winter ―On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation‖, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, 
& Organization 163, 164 (1988). Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the theory of the firm in neoclassical 
terms just asked ―what forces ensure that the process will maximize profits‖. See Bengt R. Holmstrom 
& Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 61, 63 (1989). 
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 See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 73-7. 
180
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1630 (2000) . 
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 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1630 (2000).  
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 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz ―Production, Information Costs and economic 
Organization‖, 62 American Economic Review 777 (1972).  
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they modeled a situation in which input from different individuals cannot be verified 
while output can. As free riding would emerge, their solution involved allowing one 
person to be focal to the organization by charging her with the duty to monitor the 
whole venture and pay the other individuals fixed amounts, but also rewarding her 
with all the residual claims arising from the firm. 183 In this way, the monitor would 
obtain all the benefits and bear all the consequences from the venue, generating 
incentives to exert appropriate levels of control. Jensen and Meckling 184 contributed 
greatly to this approach by describing the firm as a legal fiction tying a set  of 
individually complete contractual relations together. 185 As a result, the firm 
boundaries‘ under this theory are set by the costs the monitor incurs in controlling that 
the agents perform according to the underlying contracts. 186 
 
As all contracts are assumed to be explicit, the explicit nexus of contracts 
theory considers that each constituent, except for the shareholders, is fully paid its 
opportunity cost. Therefore, a firm cannot be worth more than the sum of contracts it 
unites187 and shareholders, as only residual claimants, need to be allocated the decision 
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 See Bengt R. Holms trom & Jean Tirole ―The Theory of the Firm‖, 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 61, 67 (1989). 
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 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976).  
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 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976). 
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 Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as ―a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
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Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308-11 (1976). Then agency costs are composed of ―1. the 
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See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 322 -3 (1976). 
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 See Luigi Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1631 (2000). In 
Jensen and Meckling words ―The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which  
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of 
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little  
substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations 
focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for 
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rights.188 In the same vein, only shareholder interests should be pursued by the firm. 
As a corollary consequence, in order to value the firm, computing legal claims‘ prices 
is both necessary and sufficient.189  
 
The explicit nexus of contracts theory is widespread through law academia and 
court opinions.190 For example, in the law literature, Easterbrook and Fischel, when 
they discuss voting, consider that  
―The right to vote is the right to make all the decisions not otherwise 
provided by contract – whether the contract is express or supplied by 
legal rules‖,191  
This statement implies that residual powers need merely be with the only class 
possessing residual rights: the shareholders. As for judicial decisions, an example can 
be observed in the recent opinion Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & 
Young, L.L.P.,192 where the Chancery Court of Delaware, while considering the 
existence of duties towards creditors in vicinity of insolvency, expressed that  
                                                                                                                                            
various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relat ions are, and how they 
are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes litt le or no sense to 
try to distinguish those things that are ―inside‖ the firm (or any other organization) from those things  
that are ―outside‖ of it.‖ See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 
311 (1976). 
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 Esaterbrook and Fischel consider that ―As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with 
the appropriate incentives (collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions… 
Yet all of the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims  
on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) from the undertaking of a 
new project. The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. 
They therefore have the right incentives to exerc ise discretion.‖ See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel ―Vot ing in Corporate Law‖, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395, 403 (1983).  
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 See Michael C. Jensen ―Value Maximizat ion, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function‖, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 19 (2001) (―In sum, the appropriate measure for 
the organization is value creat ion, the change in the market value o f all claims on the firm.‖)  
190
 Hu and Black call this understanding ―the standard contractarian theory of the co rporation‖. See 
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black ―The New Vote Buying: Empty Vot ing and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership‖, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 814 (2006).  
191
 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel ―Voting in Corporate Law‖, 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 395, 402 (1983). 
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 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young , L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, Del. Ch. (2006) 
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―So long as directors are respectful of the corporation's obligation to 
honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in 
good faith profit for the corporation's equityholders.‖193  
This means that other constituents besides shareholders must have their full 
opportunity cost paid.  
 
The explicit nexus of contracts paradigm has generated a standard way of 
approaching control allocation in distressed firms. Following the works of Jensen and 
Meckling194 and Myers195 allocation of control is associated exclusively to conflict of 
interests between classes of individuals holding legal claims with different priority 
levels. Jensen and Meckling‘s observed that if shareholders of an over- leveraged firm 
(i.e. debt over asset ratio over 1) are at the helm, they will have incentives to over- 
invest in high variance projects leaving them to enjoy potential benefits and the 
creditors to suffer potential losses. Myers‘ uncovered the underinvestment problem. 
He described a firm‘s investment opportunity as call options whose likelihood of 
being exercised depended on the conflict of interests between debtholders and 
shareholders. As debtholders had a cap on maximum recovery, if they were at the 
helm they would tend to disregard opportunities that made them suffer losses in bad 
scenarios without letting them enjoy the benefits in the good scenarios, regardless of 
the net present value of the project. Therefore, debtholders‘ control over investment 
policy could lead to underinvestment. Empirical studies linking firm characteristics to 
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 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young , L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174-5 Del. Ch. 
(2006)  
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 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure‖, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976)  
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 See Stewart C. Myers ―Determinants of Corporate Borrowings‖, 5 Journal of Financial Economics 
147 (1977). Recently another category has been added to different priority conflict of interests. See 
Richard Squire ―Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt‖ 123 Harvard Law Review 1151, 
1151-82 (2010) 
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financial policy decisions suggest the accuracy of those theories‘ predictions.196 
Aghion and Bolton extended this line of work to show that ex ante efficiency is 
advanced by allocating control contingent in the financial signals generated by the 
firm in order to avoid over and under- investment situations.197 
 
Relying on some theoretical implications of the explicit nexus of contracts 
theory, Baird and Rasmussen, as well as Skeel, have praised what they perceive as a 
new bankruptcy era where control shifts to creditors upon distress. 198 Baird and 
Rasmussen describe a situation where disputes of control in Chapter 11, which in the 
previous decade gravitated around the trading of bankruptcy claims, have evolved into 
an ex ante contingent allocation. They believe that  
―Today‘s investors allocate control rights among themselves through 
elaborate and sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial 
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 See, generally, Clifford W. Smith & Ross L. Watts ―The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Div idend, and Compensation Policies‖, 32 Journal o f Financial Economics 263 (1992).  
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 See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton ―An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting‖, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992). Note, that Aghion and Bolton depart from 
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 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
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& Jay L. Westbrook ―Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors‖, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1374 
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Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts ―How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants‖, 63 Journal of Finance 2085, 2085 (2008) (―Upon breaching a covenant, control rights shift 
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action or to extract concessions from the borrower to choose the borrower's most preferred  course of 
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control gradually shifts to creditors. See F.H. Buckley ―The Termination Decision‖, 61 UMKC 243, 
256 (1992) (―While displacement is often a discrete event, it might also amount to a gradual shift of 
control to creditors.‖)   
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distress. In the presence of these contracts, a law of corporate 
reorganizations is largely unnecessary.‖199  
Professor Skeel believes that the new ―governance levers have dramatically improved 
the quality of chapter 11 governance.‖200 Although Baird and Rasmussen consider the 
possibility that costs may emerge due to DIP lender control of the reorganization firm 
and process, they suggest that reputation costs, as well as the fear of lender control 
liability, will serve as limits to lender control opportunistic behavior.  
 
Regardless of the appeal of the explicit nexus of contracts theory‘s 
straightforward logic,201 several papers have discussed some of its shortcomings. 
Fama and Miller have pointed out that bondholders are not completely protected from 
shareholder decision making.202 Becker points to worker‘s specialization to observe 
that those employees can be affected if the firm fires them before they recoup the 
investment in specialization and therefore are also residual claimants.203 In addition, 
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 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 
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Shleifer and Summers studied efficiency gains of takeovers to conclude that at least in 
part they arise out of wealth redistribution from stakeholders to shareholders (the 
redistribution of wealth may come from employees, government or suppliers). 204 As 
we can see, all these objections point to the fact that even though shareholders are the 
only de jure residual claimants in the nexus of contracts, it doesn‘t necessarily mean 
that they are the only de facto residual claimants, and likely they are not.205 
 
As we‘ve seen before, other theories, such as the explicit and implicit nexus of 
contracts,206 the property rights theory of the firm207 and the nexus specific 
investment,208 have been proposed to overcome the problems of the explicit nexus of 
contracts theory.209 Despite important differences, all these theories share an important 
conclusion: the allocation of residual decision rights via ownership can have a 
significant effect on investments in relationship specific capital (one which has lesser 
or no value outside the relation for which is created), because it determines to some 
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extent ex post distribution of surplus and therefore will determine the parties‘ 
willingness to invest ex ante. For example, Hart mentions the case of GM ownership 
of Fisher Body, electricity generating plants owning coal mines, and aluminum 
refinery owning bauxite mines, as cases where allocating ownership to GM, the 
electrical plant or the aluminum refinery, respectively, generates lesser possibilities of 
ex post hold-up and consequently more efficient ex ante investment. 210  
 
These theories of the firm describe a more complex structure than the explicit 
nexus of contracts paradigm,211 recognizing the existence of value outside merely 
saving on transaction costs, important as it is, and focusing on the existence of 
efficient complementarities. Implicit contracts and the interaction of specific 
investments are difficult to identify and even more complex to value, but their 
existence implies that there are hidden assets in an organization. 212 As a result, the 
mere aggregation of financial claims may not accurately represent the total value of 
the firm. Further, focusing merely on financial claims to decide what to do with the 
assets of a distressed firm may be suboptimal because it may disrupt an appropriate 
asset allocation and control structure.213 End game situations like bankruptcy 
maximize the importance of control allocation, as the ability of the economic system 
to penalize inefficient actions is considerably diminished.  
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The preceding discussion suggests that control allocation may not be 
innocuous towards incentives beyond mere balancing of agency costs of different set 
of claimants. The next section will look at control allocation costs abandoning the 
explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and will show the existence of other costs that 
need to be taken into account before advancing a definite judgment on the desirability 
of lender control. Specifically, the next section will show that allocation costs occur 
even when only one class of legally recognized claims exist.  
 
III. Single class of claimants and lender control costs 
In this section, I intend to specifically tie the notions of lender control and the 
theory of the firm in bankruptcy. I present a stylized model drawing from previous 
work by Hart,214 to illustrate inefficiencies that may arise in reorganization under 
lender control. The existence of more than one class of legal claimants has been shown 
to be the source of inefficiencies in bankruptcy. 215 The focus of this section is different 
from previous work on the matter because it focuses on lender control costs where 
there is only one class of legal claimants, a situation which could resemble a 
reorganization case where a controlling lender has all the assets encumbered whose 
value is smaller than what is owed to that lender. Hence, I will show that assignment 
of property rights in reorganization is not irrelevant, under certain conditions, to the 
value of a firm and that its effects have been overlooked by authors defending the idea 
of lender control of reorganizations.  
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A. A Simple Example 
A simple example, inspired on a real Louisiana lender liability case, will help 
to motivate the problem.216 Suppose that there‘s a farm adjacent to a large river bed 
and close to some hills. Fluctuations in rain upstream generate occasional flooding 
problems. Additionally, precipitation concentrations on the nearby hills also generate 
flooding because the basin of the creek which carries water into the river can‘t hold 
large amounts of water. As a result, the farm is better apt for beef cattle ranching (an 
activity which allows for great flexibility) and the owner decides to focus on the cow/ 
calf business, which basically involves having a herd of cows and some bulls and 
breeding them from year to year. Unfortunately, cattle- ranching can present several 
difficulties and this farm has some that are specific to it.  
 
Let‘s assume that the owner of the farm enters into a contract with a service 
provider (SP) to manage the cattle (meaning that the farm owner will provide the land 
and the animals, while SP will need to take care of the cattle breeding and growing the 
cattle). Let‘s assume also that SP will get as compensation a fixed percentage of the 
net profit made by the farm in its cattle ranching business. In order to be effective, SP 
needs to invest in acquiring knowledge specific to the farm. SP will need to learn 
among other things the type of grass growing in different sections of the farm as well 
as whether the cattle likes it or not, how resistant to weight the terrain is (i.e. will the 
cattle have difficulty moving through a terrain flooded with a foot of water?), how fast 
does the water drain when there is flood, whether smaller animals adapt better to one 
part of the farm relative to others, etc. Much of what SP needs to learn could be 
potentially applied to other farms, such as the incidence of rain a couple of hundred 
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miles upstream, but an important amount is specific to this particular farm (i.e. how 
fast does the creek water drain). Then, the amount of time and effort that SP will 
decide to invest in learning about his job will be determined by his ability to earn from 
it later and the firm‘s profitability.   
 
As with any other investor, in order to decide how much to invest, SP will 
have to look at the return prospects of his investment. The later will be determined 
partly by the ability of the owner to decide on issues which were non- bargained for.217 
If, for example, SP believes that the owner of the farm may decide to extract private 
monetary benefits and that such extraction can‘t be prevented, the total amount of firm 
net earnings will be reduced and so will his profit share.218 For instance, the owner 
could assign to himself a salary (i.e. arising out of monitoring like functions) well 
beyond market value or spend the farm‘s business money in perks only enjoyable by 
him.219 As the amount of net profits will be diminished by the amount of private 
benefits, then SP‘s incentive to invest in learning about the farm will diminish. In the 
extreme, the rent seeking behavior could lead to a termination of the business relation 
with SP, leaving SP unable to reap the benefits of his specific investments.  
 
The problem of non- bargained for rent extraction can be partially dealt with 
by adjusting different governance and contractual levers. As firms become distressed, 
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the bankruptcy rules become central to the prevention of rent seeking behavior which 
could reduce further the incentives for SP not to invest ex ante. Suppose that there‘s a 
positive probability that after SP‘s investment a sudden change in relative prices will 
lead the farm into Chapter 11 reorganization while all of the farm‘s assets are 
encumbered (as a way to obtain working capital). If the bankruptcy rules allow or even 
favor control shifts in order to obtain debtor- in-possession (DIP) financing, then the 
controlling lender (LC) may be able to shift the business focus into a different scenario 
where SP‘s specific investment is not valuable anymore (regardless of what is the 
more valuable business solution) or to increase his ability to reap private benefits. For 
example, LC may decide to change the business plan from cattle ranching into a cow- 
calf business where SP‘s acquired knowledge is less valuable, or even worthless. As a 
result, SP‘s incentive to invest ex ante will be smaller under such a bankruptcy rule. 
Therefore, and even though there could realistically be only one legal claimant, LC, 
the outcome of chapter 11 could be determined by the allocation of reorganization 
control.      
 
B. A stylized model    
This section illustrates a stylized version of chapter 11 reorganization case 
where, as Baird and Rasmussen and Skeel have discussed, a lender is in control of the 
bankrupt debtor220 and, as a result, in control of the proceedings also. 221 Unlike 
general chapter 11 proceedings, I assume that there is only one class of legal 
claimants, the lender in control (LC) who owns all the debt claims to the firm, and 
another party, an independent SP, who has the ability to make relationship specific 
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investments. The existence of only one source of legal claimants could be interpreted 
as a situation where a firm is so heavily indebted that there is not any plausible 
scenario under which the lender could be fully paid. Alternatively, it could be 
understood as a situation where one person provided all the financing to the firm, as a 
result being the only equity and debt holder for a business, which due to a potent 
financial shock is currently worth a lot less than the face value of debt. 222 It is 
important to note that SP is not an employee of the debtor and therefore will not 
generate a claim to salary under the model. This feature of the model is not essential, 
but serves the purpose of highlighting the existence of control related costs where 
there‘s only one class of legal claimants.223  
 
At the outset of the model, I am denying the possibility that controlling lenders 
can make any relationship specific investments. Although I acknowledge that this is a 
very strong assumption, there are reasons to believe that this assumption is closely 
related to current lending practices. At least in the US, lenders‘ focus seem to be on 
assessing the viability of possible investments and in monitoring those investments.224 
This specialization in monitoring is established by lenders‘ extensive experience on 
the matter.225 At the same time, lenders‘ lack of specific knowledge about other type 
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of business‘ aspects (i.e. day to day running of the firm) is hinted at by Mann who 
obtained extensive anecdotal information showing that lenders prefer to leave assets 
with debtors under the expectation of higher recovery rates than if they get 
involved.226 In addition, and depending on the health of the business –as a proxy for 
access to finance-, asset tangibility may overshadow any other type of general 
business monitoring by lenders, which makes the null specific investment assumption 
by LC even more plausible.227 
 
Let‘s further assume that the debtor firm has only one asset which produces a 
profit. Alternatively, all the assets of the firm can be thought as a unity where the 
ability to work with them is either given or not. This bankruptcy reorganization model 
has two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1, SP chooses an action e representing relationship 
specific investment which generates a total return at date 2 equal to the value of the 
firm V(e). SP‘s action cannot be observed by any other person and makes him incur a 
private cost equal to e.228 In the case that SP does invest (e=0) then at period 2 firm 
value is V(0).229 The previous depiction of the reorganization time frame is entirely 
plausible given the reported length of US chapter 11 proceedings. For example, 
Carapeto found the length of the proceedings for firms reorganizing after the proposal 
                                                 
226
 See Ronald J. Mann ―Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt‖, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159, 
178 (1997) (―When questioned about their reticence to repossess collateral, the account executives 
uniformly pointed to the general success of allowing the debtor to sell the collateral: the executives 
ordinarily expect to get full repayment if they leave collateral in the debtor's possession and rarely 
expect to get full repayment if they do not. Surprisingly, that perception seems to be well justified.‖). 
This may have recently changed for high tech start-ups. See R. Mann ―An Empirical Investigation of 
Liquidation Choices Failed High Tech Firms‖, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1375 (2004).  
227
 See Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello ―Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility and Corporate 
Investment‖, 20 Review of Financial Studies 1429 (2007) (they show a ―nonmonotonic effect of 
tangibility on cash flow sensitivities: at low levels of tangibility, the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow increases with asset tangibility, but this effect disappears at high levels of tangibility‖); and, 
Diemo Dietrich ―Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation‖, 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 995 
(2007). 
228
 It is assumed that SP does not have any financial constraints which would force him to invest a level 
of e in ferior to his first best option.  
229
 When e=0, LC and SP do not enter into an agreement in date 2 and  LC obtains the 100% of V(0). 
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of the first plan to be on average 272 days, while for firms where more than one plan 
was proposed the average length was 524 days. 230 To keep things as simple as 
possible, it is assumed that V(e) is deterministic, twice differentiable and strictly 
concave.231  
  
Following Grossman and Hart,232 there is an action involving the asset which 
can be taken at date 2 but cannot be specified in the contract at date 1. This generates 
contractual incompleteness, in turn making residual control rights relevant as whoever 
is in control will be able to obtain a share of any possible benefits arising out of a 
consensual transaction.233 To show this contractual incompleteness, it is assumed that 
whoever is in control always obtains a non-verifiable fraction (1-α) of V(e) of the total 
proceeds or total cash flows, where 0<α<1. This fraction of firm value may be 
interpreted as if the controlling lender presents a reorganization plan where the value 
of the firm is underscored, so that he can obtain a larger port ion of resulting business‘ 
equity. Indeed, (1-α) speaks about one of the most significant problems in bankruptcy, 
determining firm value, one that the United States reorganization scheme was 
purposely designed to sidestep.234 Alternatively, it could represent above market value 
prices for services rendered by the controlling lender or any other type of tunneling. 235  
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The remaining share αV(e) is verifiable, and therefore contractible upon in the 
first period. It is clear then that a contract between LC and SP can only consist of a 
division of the firm‘s verifiable return or profits, π=αV(e). As only π is verifiable, SP‘s 
reward upon providing his services depends on π and is represented by the fraction βπ, 
where 0<β≤1. βπ is the rule the parties adopt in period 1 to divide any profits arising 
out of their joint venture in period 2.  
  
In order to maximize social efficiency Π and regardless of who is in control, 
the investment should work to maximize Π=V(e)-e. Therefore, social efficiency will 
be obtained when  
    V‘(e)=1    (1) 
Introducing control as a relevant factor modifies the incentive structure. 236 If, as in the 
framework of this paper, LC controls the firm, SP settles at date 1 for a level of e 
knowing that LC will obtain at least the fraction of value (1-α)V(e) and maybe more 
depending on how large β is, SP‘s bargaining power. Therefore, SP will invest at 
period 1 so as to maximize his private benefit βαV(e)-e. It follows that because α<1 
(showing the non-contractible fraction) and β≤1, SP will not capture the full value 
deriving from his effort as his maximization function will be  
     βαV‘(e)=1    (2)  
which is smaller than (1).237  
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 Alternatively, in the case where SP controls the firm, 238 he will invest in order 
to maximize both his verifiable βαV(e)-e plus his non-verifiable share (1-α)V(e), 
which would turn to be 
     βαV‘(e)+(1-α)V‘(e)=1  (3) 
which confirms the intuition that SP‘s investment decision will be closer to the 
socially optimal (perhaps even equal to the socially optimal if β=1) when he doesn‘t 
have to share unverifiable parts with LC.239 Only when SP controls the firm‘s asset the 
investment level can approximate the first-best. The bigger the size of β the closer the 
investment level will be to the optimal one.  
 
 This simple model shows that, under conditions of contractual incompleteness 
and relationship specific investments allowing for value divertion, the value of a firm 
may be heavily dependent on control allocation. In fact, Hart states that giving the 
party capable of making a value enhancing relationship specific investment 
―entitlement to the asset's profit stream will not be enough [to achieve a first best] 
since an outside owner may be able to divert some of the asset's return for his own 
uses, thus dulling the manager's incentives.‖240 In the same spirit, Blair and Stout state, 
while discussing the importance of legal personality of corporations, that  
―Specific investment is discouraged when individual investors have a 
legal right to prematurely withdraw their contributions (and with it, the 
ability to opportunistically threaten to withdraw in order to ―hold up‖ 
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their fellow investors in an attempt to extract a larger share of the 
surplus generated by corporate activity).‖241 
 
C. Relaxing the restriction on the number of claimholders 
In the previous section, a very restricted model was presented where there was 
only one legal claimholder, namely LC. In this section, this assumption of the basic 
model will be dropped to allow for the introduction of more than one class of 
claimholder and, alternatively, more than one claimholder. The analysis to be 
presented below won‘t focus on the negotiation effects of having more than one 
claimholder on ex ante investments, but it will be followed by a succinct discussion of 
those issues.    
 
When LC is not the only class of claimholder (i.e. where there is a class of 
equityholders and/or junior creditors), which is usually the case in corporate 
reorganization proceedings, his ability to obtain verifiable profits will have a cap (C) 
given by the dollar amount of his claim. In other words, LC will be able to extract in 
verifiable profits   
    min (C;(1-β)αV(e)) 
The difference between (1-β)αV(e) and C, if positive, would be allocated not to SP but 
to the other claimholders. In principle, and as expected, this wouldn‘t affect SP‘s 
incentives to invest under either control scenario and would suggest that having more 
than one claimholder implicates the same results.242 
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242
 In this point, I am assuming that SP will have priority over the share of other bankruptcy claimants. 
This assumption follows from the priority that §507(a)(2) o f the Bankruptcy Code allows for 
administrative expenses, which include SP‘s post- filing services which are expenses incurred in the 
general operation of the business.  
 71 
It may be the case, nonetheless, that the effect on the non-verifiable share of 
value which LC may be able to extract will depend on how that non-verifiable value 
can be diverted, possibly acting as a cap there also. Baird and Rasmussen243 have 
advanced that LC‘s abuses will be limited because of the existence of lender control 
liability theories. Even though I will argue in the next chapter that such view is at odds 
with the application of lender control liability theories by courts, lender control 
liability, if revitalized, may still have an effect on how rent is extracted in egregious 
cases. Namely, lender control liability theories may limit rent extraction through 
underscoring the value of the reorganizing entity.  
  
Let‘s see why. If LC diverts profits to himself merely by underscoring the 
value of the reorganizing firm, then his profit divertion capacity may also be indirectly 
capped. As by assumption αV(e) is verifiable, then claiming that the firm is valued at 
U, where U<αV(e) will have a higher risk of lender control liability finding.244 
Therefore, LC will have incentives induced by the legal system not to underscore the 
value of the firm in a reorganization proposal below αV(e). Now, LC‘s cap may be 
bigger than αV(e), in which case LC‘s priority up to C will protect him, or it may be 
smaller. Even if it is smaller, LC‘s incentives may not be modified because SP‘s share, 
βαV(e), needs to be guaranteed in order to get SP to contribute his service to the 
firm.245 When the share of the total verifiable profits (1-β)αV(e) is larger than C, then 
LC‘s incentives to extract unverifiable benefits through deflating the reorganization 
value would be trumped as the other claimant would still get a share     
                                                 
243
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 777-
785 (2002) (d iscussing strategies taken by lenders which include ―recommending‖ the debtor to hire a 
turnaround professional or imposing short term financing). 
244
 Alternatively, LC will risk that his plan won‘t pass the bankruptcy judge mustard or that the 
proposed section 363 sale won‘t be approved. A discussion of acceptable value ranges can be found 
below in section IV of chapter III.   
245
 As I mentioned in a footnote above, SP‘s contribution is assured by §507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
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assignable to LC under a reorganization plan).  
 
 Deflating the reorganization value may not be the only way that LC has to divert 
value to himself, as it has been pointed that whoever controls the firm may have an 
advantage in designing the reorganization plan.246 Then, the relative importance of the 
cap on a controlling lender is apparent. For example, for corporate bankruptcies filed 
in the second part of 2001, Ayotte and Morrison report that ratio of secured debt to 
assets in the filing schedules was 0.65. 247 This figure likely represents a higher bound 
on the ratio as there is a significant drop in the value of the assets reported in the last 
10-K relative to the figure reported in the bankruptcy schedules. 248  
  
 As a result, we find that having more than one class of claimants may actually be 
a good thing to prevent value divertion through undervaluing the assets of a distressed 
firm, because the other claimants will be able to extract part of the private benefits in 
the case where C is smaller than (1-β)αV(e). This result suggests that LC‘s incentive 
to reorganize won‘t necessarily grow as a result of gaining control.  
 
 Unfortunately, even if LC has a cap on the amount of value that he can divert 
due to the existence of other claimholders, the effects are not necessarily beneficial to 
SP or more generally any party making relationship specific investments (unless the 
intersection of the set of relationship specific investors and the set of other 
                                                 
246
 See generally See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang ―Bargain ing and the division of value in 
Corporate Reorganizat ion‖, 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organizat ion 253 (1992) 
247
 See Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison ―Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11‖, 1 The 
Journal of Legal Analysis 511 (2009).  
248
 The mean value of assets reported in the last 10-K in their sample was 122.81 millions, while the 
median value of the assets reported in the bankruptcy schedules was 37.34 millions.  
 73 
claimholders is non empty). Further, the existence of other classes of claimholders 
may be prejudicial to SP as it makes some reorganization strategies less attractive to 
LC as his benefits from reorganization are reduced. In addition, making some 
reorganization strategies less appealing to LC boosts his bargaining position, which 
will be translated in smaller β in the case that the firm actually reorganizes and a 
correlative smaller SP ex ante investment as he will be able to obtain less.  
 
Note that LC‘s incentive to extract private benefits in reorganization through 
undervaluing the assets would be largely diminished if the other claimholders share 
equal priority. When LC is not the only claimholder and the other claimholders share 
equal priority, his ability to recoup both verifiable and non-verifiable profits will be 
determined by the ratio of his claim C to total debt (D). Therefore, LC will be able to 
obtain verifiable profits equal to (C/D)*(1-β)αV(e). It follows from the extraction of 
private benefits rule that we are using that only (C/D)*(1-α)V(e) of the non-verifiable 
profits will be obtained by LC, while the rest would be captured by its equal priority 
claimholder. Paradoxically, unless D is smaller than (1-β)αV(e), having equal priority 
among creditors would, ceteris paribus, generate more liquidations than 
reorganizations because the amount of private benefits to be extracted.  
  
  Naturally, claiming a lower value for reorganization assets is not the only way 
of reaping non-verifiable benefits. Some other ways of reaping those benefits will not 
be shared by other claimholders and may then be preferable to LC. Nonetheless, this 
specific form of extracting value is still available even when decision management and 
decision control are separated, as it is at least formally the case in Chapter 11.249 
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 Fama and Jensen consider that an organization decision process consists on decision management 
(involving the in itiat ion and implementation decisions) and decision control (focused on ratification and 
monitoring decisions). See Eugene F. Fama & Michel C. Jensen ―Separation of Ownership and 
Control‖, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301 (1983).  
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Hence, this form of rent extraction is indeed important to LC.  
 
  D. Inefficient restrictions to business plans 
Start-up firms financed by venture capital firms (VC) have often been related 
to distressed firms, because in both cases the investors have to deal with robust 
conflict of interests.250 According to Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg it is possible and 
likely that VC firms place implicit constraints in business plan modifications251 
because they invested their money in a certain business plan. 252 These constraints 
show a sharp contrast with the evidence on adaptation obtained by Bhide on other 
start-ups lacking VC funding.253 Bhide discusses several cases of entrepreneurs who 
started successful businesses without a detailed business plan at all and little funds. In 
the case of these entrepreneurs, the success of their ventures depends heavily on 
opportunistic adaptation, rather than merely following ex ante ideas. As a result, it 
appears that VC firms in their attempt to limit conflict of interests also restrict the set 
of growth opportunities. 
 
It seems quite reasonable that the same scenario appears with lender control of 
a Chapter 11 proceeding.254 Conditional on the conjecture of similarity between 
                                                 
250
 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg ―Financial Contracting Meets the Real World: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts‖, 70 Review of Financial Studies 281, (2003).  
251
 See Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg ―What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to 
Public Companies‖, working paper available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11581.pdf (last visited 
1/29/2008), at 28-30 (―While the companies grow dramatically, their core businesses remain 
remarkably stable. Within core businesses, firm activit ies tend to stay the same or broaden over time.‖)  
252
 Referring to corporations (as banks or lenders in general) preference towards investments, Bhide 
states ―The nature of the evidence required by corporate decision -makers leads them to favor initiatives 
where the risks and returns can be objectively assessed.‖ See Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND 
EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESS, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 120  
253
 See Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESS, Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY (2000), at 53-68. 
254
 A similar assumption is made by Loghofer and Peters. See Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. 
Peters ―Protection for Whom? Creditor Conflict and Bankruptcy‖, 6 American Law & Economics 
Review 249, 274 (2004) (―By limiting the firm‘s ability to misuse the assets, the creditor may also 
hamper the firm‘s ability to redirect these assets to their highest valued use.‖) 
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distressed financing and start-ups financing which even TEB makes,255 the high 
degree of constraints imposed by controlling lenders of distressed firms on the latter 
business plan, be it in changes or adaptations, limits the ability of distressed firms to 
gain on unexpected opportunities.256 This conjecture is quite plausible, as Williamson 
considers that uncertainty, which makes great use of adaptation, tends to hurt more 
debt financed projects (those based strictly on rules) than equity financed ones and as 
a result ―greater use of equity finance is favored, ceteris paribus‖.257 The fundamental 
reason behind the adaptation ability difference is the relatively poorer ability of a 
controlling lender to attribute unexpected events to the right causes due in large part to 
the lack of expertise in the particular venture.258  
 
Noticing investment adaptation restrictions arising from the financial structure 
of the firm are important at least for two reasons. First, the explicit nexus of contracts 
paradigm focuses entirely on agency costs and, as the agency costs of distress grow, 
changing management becomes one of the most pressing needs. Then, the problems of 
adaptation ability tend to be overlooked in favor of focusing on agency costs.259 
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 TEB links start ups to distressed firms through the proposal of and/or support for an equivalent 
contingent contractual allocation of control, using as an example the case of Webvan (which 
coincidentally was both a start up and a distressed firm. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen 
―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 780-5 (2002). 
256
 On an early empirical account on the constraints imposed by lenders, see Stuart C. Gilson 
―Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Ev idence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and 
Control when Firms Default‖, 27 Journal of Financial Economics 355, 365-8 (1990) (finding that banks 
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investments (22.5%), and capital expenditures (30%)).  
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 See Oliver E. Williamson ―Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance‖, 43 Journal of Finance 
567, 584 (1988) (emphasis in original) (―added uncertainty pushes the firm into a maladapted state 
more often and/or more consequentially‖). Uncertainty is used here in a Knightean sense and is 
understood to arise ―from the impossibility of exhaustive classification of states.‖ See Richard N. 
Langlois & Metin M. Cosgel ―Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: A new Interpretation‖, 
31 Economic Inquiry 456, 459 (1993).  
258
 Bhide considers that the capacity for adaptation depends on the entrepreneurs decisiveness, open-
mindedness, managing internal conflict and attribution skills. See Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND 
EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESS, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 99 -104. 
259
 A notable exception is Buckley, who discusses the adaptation ability of new managers as an 
important factor: ―Termination might also be valuable because of the specialized skills required to 
manage a firm in financial distress. Managers might be required to think creatively of alternative uses 
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Second, the investment scope restriction is separate and complementary to the 
investment magnitude restriction typically imposed by lenders when firms‘ 
performance is poor and discussed at large by the literature.260 It is unclear what the 
conjunct effect of these restrictions turns out to be.  
 
The effect of the adaptation ability difference won‘t be constant261 and will 
most likely be influenced by the specialization of the lending firm and of the specific 
default unit managers which in turn have been found to influence financial firm 
involvement. For instance, in the context of European start-ups, Botazzi, Da Rin & 
Hellman find that ―an active investment style is strongly related to a financial 
intermediary‘s organizational specialization. Independent venture capital firms [firms 
that only engage in venture capital deals and firms which concentrate on relatively few 
deals per partner] are significantly more likely to get involved with their 
                                                                                                                                            
for firm assets, and to deal persuasively with claimholders in a reorganization. These tasks might 
require the skills of ―vulture capitalists,‖ rather than those of incumbent managers, whose expert ise is 
rooted in the firm's current operations. In addition, creditors might  specialize in the alternative uses to 
which firm assets may be put.‖ See F.H. Buckley ―The Termination Decision‖, 61 UMKC 243, 250 
(1992). What Buckley doesn‘t share with us is why banks are better able to hire ―vulture capitalists‖ 
and how does their specialization on finding alternative uses helps these ―vulture capitalists‖ rather than 
constrain them.   
260
 See Greg Nin i, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi ―Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy‖, 
working paper availab le at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928688, p. 3 (last 
checked 11/23/07) (―whether a loan includes an investment restriction is often more sensitive to 
changes in firm performance than amendments to interest rates and collateral requirements‖). See also, 
Amir Sufi ―Banks Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis‖, 22 Review of 
Financial Studies 1057, 1082 (2009) (―Even controlling for the financial factors leading to covenant 
violations, a covenant violation has an independently large and statistically significant effect on the 
availability of lines of credit‖)  
261
 Botazzi, Da Rin & Hellman consider that ―… venture capital is a form of financial intermediat ion 
where investors can choose how much to become involved with their portfolio companies… Active 
venture investors can help their portfolio companies in many ways, including giving advice and 
support, helping with professionalizing the management team, creating strategic alliances, or exercising 
corporate governance… Venture capitalists can also spur their companies‘ innovation… However, not 
all venture capital firms are alike… some are ―hands -on,‖ while others are ―hands -off‖ investors…‖ 
from Laura Botazzi, Marco Da Rin & Thomas He llman ―Active Financial Intermediation: Ev idence on 
the Role of Organizational Specializat ion and Human Capital‖, working paper available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569602 (last visited 9/24/08). 
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companies.‖262 As a result, the internal organization of the lending institutions is likely 
to determine its adaptation ability and indirectly the efficiency of its decision-making 
mechanisms.  
 
Most DIP loans are arranged through lending syndicates led by one of the 
largest financial institutions or by large lending institutions with diversified 
investment portfolios. Again, to the extent that the analogy between venture financing 
and reorganization financing holds, it is likely that a controlling lender‘s adaptat ion 
ability is relatively poor due to its lack of specialization. For example, one of the usual 
lead DIP lenders is Bank of America. Bank of America provides many different 
financing services, ranging from asset based finance to treasury management services 
and declares expertise in industries as diverse as consumer & retail and technology,263 
besides consumer products. As a result, it is highly unlikely that such an institution 
possesses efficient adaptation abilities that can be used when it gets control of the 
firm.264 Naturally, this fact will push the lender decision into favoring quick section 
363 sales. 
 
It is important to stress that even though TEB is correct in claiming that ―[t]he 
enterprises whose future is most uncertain tend to be small businesses when they are 
just starting‖,265 it doesn‘t follow from that premise that uncerta inty is a dismissible 
factor. Indeed, uncertainty is present even in old industries. The car making industry is 
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 See Laura Botazzi, Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellman ―Active Financial Intermediation: Ev idence 
on the Role of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital‖, working paper available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569602 (last visited 9/24/08), at 2-3. 
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 See http://www.bankofamerica.com/index.cfm?page=corp 
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 It appears that venture capital firms in the US privilege limits on business changes. See Steven N. 
Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg ―What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public 
Companies‖, working paper available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11581.pdf (last visited 
1/29/2008), at 30 
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 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 780 
(2002). 
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more than a century old and nonetheless the current crisis has shown the important 
degree of uncertainty which it faces. Indeed, distress situations‘ place the spotlight on 
the problems confronting a firm (and indirectly an industry) and makes evident that a 
central issue to address concerns the uncertainty about the future of the industry.266   
    
In addition to uncertainty, ambiguity appears to play a role in a controlling 
lender‘s decision-making process also.267 According to Camerer, ambiguity is ―known 
to be missing information‖.268 Several experiments, following Ellsberg‘s famous 
paradox,269 have shown that people are prone to have aversion towards ambiguity.270 
Interestingly, a person‘s attitude towards ambiguity is unrelated to her attitude towards 
risk.271 Therefore, the fact that a lender has extensive expertise on decisio n-making in 
general (i.e. takes risks neutral decisions) does not immediately translate into adequate 
decisions when there is ambiguity involved. Problem specific expertise has been 
identified as an offsetting factor for ambiguity aversion. 272 Despite their ability to 
analyze investments in general,273 it is unlikely that controlling lenders will be willing 
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 Indeed, questions related which potential innovative ideas to implement or how to tweak existing 
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 See Colin F. Camerer ―Individual Decision Making‖, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
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643, 650-53 (1961). An accessible discussion of the Ellsberg paradox can be found in John M. Dowling 
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(1974) 
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 See Colin F. Camerer ―Indiv idual Decision Making‖, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995, at 646  
272
 See Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESS, Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY (2000), at 97 
273
 See section III.A supra 
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to invest on gaining the specific expertise necessary to offset the ambiguity aversion in 
each particular firm, as it is not what lenders base their business models on. 
 
Intimately related with lenders doubtful ability to cope with uncertainty, is the 
assessment that other affected parties would make of it. As long as a controlling lender 
limits the investment opportunity set, it may foster an expectation of failure which in 
itself could trigger actual failure.274 It is not the point here that parties which may 
contract with the reorganizing firm controlled by a lender are going to necessarily trust 
the firm less than if it wasn‘t controlled by a lender. The point is far less ambitious. 
Rather, I emphasize the fact that third parties will doubt the ability of the reorganizing 
firm to adapt and be successful and hence may charge more for their products or 
services, perhaps even more than offsetting positive effects generated by lender 
involvement. 
 
Alternatively, a lender in control may be seen as only willing to pursue his or 
her interests and this fact, regardless of the social or group welfare implications it may 
have, may generate detrimental effects. Background information of this sort and the 
social meaning or reputation of lender control,275 may be relevant to get people to 
cooperate, which is essential for cooperative endeavors, like firms are. For example, 
Liberman, Samuels and Ross, have shown that subjects in their study of a prisoner 
dilemma situation tend to cooperate much more when the game is labeled as 
―community‖ than when it is labeled ―wall street‖. 276 Therefore, if parties contracting 
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 For a similar point made on start-ups, see Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF 
NEW BUSINESS, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 72.  
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 Social meaning has been defined as ―the expressive dimension of conduct (not excluding speech) in 
the relevant community… The expressive dimension of conduct is, very simply, the attitudes and 
commitments that the conduct signals.‖ See Cass R. Sunstein ―Social Norms and Social Roles‖, 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 903, 925 (1996).  
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 See Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels & Lee Ross ―The Name of the Game: Pred ictive Power o f  
Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determin ing Prisoner‘s Dilemma Game Moves‖, 30 
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with the firm (i.e. employees) are able to observe that the firm is run by a controlling 
lender who has a reputation for being a quick- trigger liquidator (closely related to 
following self- interest only) rather than pushing for reorganizations (assumed to 
protect other claimants‘ interests), it is quite likely that for example those employees 
will believe the lender to be non-cooperative. As a result, the reaction of parties who 
contract with the debtor firm maybe to defect of any cooperative behavior, generating 
important losses of social welfare.  
 
Closely related to the non- cooperative behavior mentioned above is another 
cost not taken into account by defenders of the efficiency of lender control and it 
relates to the trade credit that a distressed firm has given. Peterson and Rajan explain 
that  
―It is possible that debtors are less willing to repay a distressed firm. 
Since repayment is enforced by the threat of cutting off future supplies, 
such threats are less credible when the supplier is distressed. Also, a 
distressed firm may be less capable of legal action to recover its 
dues.‖277 
As long as debtors to the DIP perceive that the firm is more likely to stop functioning, 
i.e. be liquidated, when a lender is in control, as seems entirely plausible from what 
                                                                                                                                            
Personality and social Psychology Bulletin 1175, 1177 (2004) (― It is equally clear that the name of the 
game exerted a considerable effect on the participants‘ choices. When playing the Community Game, 
67% of the most likely to cooperate nominees and 75% of the most likely to defect nominees 
cooperated on the first round. When playing the Wall Street Game, 33% of part icipants with each 
nomination status Cooperated‖) 
277
 See Mitchell A. Peterson & Raghuram G. Rajan ―Trade Credit : Theories and Evidence‖, 10 The 
Review of Financial Studies 661, 675 (1997) . Miwa and Ramseyer make a related point. See Yoshiro  
Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer ―Trade Cred it, Bank Loans, and Monitoring: Ev idence from Japan‖, 
working paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=843526 (last visited 
4/16/09). (―Apparently, they borrow from their partners when those partners will lend most cheaply. 
They borrow from banks when their partners will not. Yet firms do not treat bank loans and trade credit 
interchangeably. They borrow from banks when they anticipate needing the money for relatively long 
periods; they turn to trade partners when they face exigencies they did no t expect.‖)  
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the literature on lender control suggests, then those DIP debtors incentive to pay will 
further diminish because they think that they will get cut off anyway. Even if the end 
result is just delaying the schedule of payments by the DIP trade partners, it will likely 
mean that a successful reorganization is less likely.  
  
The investment scope restriction, ambiguity aversion and other affected 
parties‘ reactions arguments would further suggest that lenders are suboptimal 
controlling parties not just due to Myers‘ underinvestment argument or a preference 
towards low volatility projects, but also due to credibility problems for project 
developments and alterations: a project modification would require the lender to incur 
additional investigation costs to assess its profitability while his investment upside 
would remain constant and capped. The former is just another reason for the lender to 
disfavor investing new money and would favor a sale of the business, as its expertise 
lies elsewhere.278  
 
IV. Conclusion 
I have shown that broadening the view of the theory of the firm permits to see 
that lender control poses costs non- investigated before. Specifically, the above 
discussion shows that lender control social costs are boosted by the costs of lender 
control discovered under the nexus of explicit contracts. Finally, I exposed the fact 
that lender control may also constrain the investment opportunity set in order to 
exclude sizable business plan changes. Therefore, when considering control 
allocations in lengthy processes as chapter 11, the above analysis suggest that having a 
controlling lender at the helm may, in some instances, be as bad as having 
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 See Ronald J. Mann ―Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt‖, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159, 
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equityholders there. It follows that policymakers reflecting on bankruptcy reform 
would benefit from looking deeper into the effects of either option and analyzing 
further what mechanisms could be used to prevent the worst outcomes from happening 
under either scenario. The following section focuses on one of these intuitions, namely 
lender control liability, to assess it current use and to argue that it should serve to 
penalize self-serving behavior which runs counter to the optimal use of the assets.  
 
It is important to note that this chapter also has served to uncover that lender 
control liability theories are not sufficient to correct all the inefficiencies arising out of 
allocating control to a lender. Because allocation of control is not innocuous in chapter 
11 reorganizations, some of the effects it posses on ex ante relationship specific 
investors cannot be corrected by merely penalizing a controlling lender without at the 
same time penalizing lender‘s gain of control. As a result, it is yet to be proven 
whether a lender‘s gain of control of business reorganizations is inefficient relative to 
other control possibilities. Contrary to this conclusion, the finance literature standard 
model considers that lenders obtaining control contingent on some imperfect signal is 
the more efficient state of affairs when debtor default appears likely. 279 Nonetheless 
this literature does not take into account other constituents in their models. 280 As a 
result, in a broader scenario as the one facing a reorganization judge, it is very much 
an open question whether affording control to a lender is indeed the most efficient 
alternative. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Where did all the Lender Control Liability 
adjudications go? 
 
I. Introduction  
The first two chapters have shown that DIP lender control may generate ex 
ante inefficiencies in terms of investment even in the absence of conflict of interests 
between legal claimholders. This chapter argues that the theory of the firm is further 
useful in providing a rationale for lender control liability and functionally related 
theories.281 Additionally, this chapter suggests that interpretations of what a firm is 
provide reasons as to why the role of lender control liability theories has been 
dwarfing under current interpretations.282 In fact, in this section I will argue that an 
interpretation of the firms as composed only of explicit contracts has unduly 
constrained lender control liability considerations.  
 
These control triggered liability theories have been criticized by academics and 
practitioners alike due to the dire consequences they pose on lending. 283 At roughly 
the same time, their role has diminished dramatically to the point of almost converting 
them in a decorative feature of the legal system. In particular, I maintain that 
broadening the understanding of the firm used by legal adjudicators allows us to 
refocus on the possible role of lender control and functionally related theories (i.e. 
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 In this paper I am shying away from the question of whether a corporation, as a group agent, ca n be 
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equitable subordination) of liability and direct it towards penalizations of a controlling 
lender‘s self-  serving, opportunistic behavior. Broadening the view of the firm also 
allows us to clearly distinguish lender control liability theories from other related legal 
theories such as the absolute priority rule or the fraudulent conveyance law.    
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II describes the dwarfed role that 
lender control liability theories have nowadays especially if compared to the recent 
past. Section III investigates rationales behind the dwarfing role of lender liability 
theories in the United States and argues that it comes about due to the misconception 
of what the firm is. Section IV argues that other remedies the legal system has, as 
fraudulent conveyance, are far from perfect substitutes to penalize a controlling 
lender‘s opportunistic behavior. Therefore, suggestions that it could be used as 
substitute for lender control liability theories are inadequate. Section V explores the 
possibility that lender control liability is understood as a decision rule acting in 
conjunction with a conduct rule in order to assess whether its limited bite doesn‘t fully 
show the influence on behavior that it exercises. Section VI succinctly concludes.  
   
II. A System with no Bite 
  Lender liability is a body of law broadly recognized in every jurisdiction which 
describes a contract or tort claim alleged by a borrower or a third party against a 
lender and due to the lender‘s conduct. The term encompasses a broad array of causes 
of actions including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, as well as control based theories of liability. 284 The wide 
span of different yet successful lender liability causes of action made Fischel call it a 
                                                 
284
 As Lawrence puts it: ―Over the years, an impressive array of nearly a dozen legal theories have 
developed which premise lender liab ility in part on control of the debtor.‖ See William H. Lawrence 
―Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory 
of Secured Financing‖, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1387-8 (1989). 
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―booming area of intense concern to lenders and students of commercial law‖.285  
 
  As mentioned above, it is possible to classify the causes of action as arising 
inside an arm-length lending relationship or as a result of some sort of control rapport. 
Among the later, we find several causes of action arising out of agency, the creation of 
a fiduciary relationship, the alter ego or instrumentality and interference. Once a 
debtor is in bankruptcy, we can add equitable subordination, as well as a one year 
period to void preferences provided that the debtor was actually insolvent at the time 
of the transfer, to the former account.  
 
Control inspired theories of lender liability have an important pedigree line in 
the United States dating at least as far back as Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore 
County et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co.286 Nonetheless, and despite their increased 
sophistication, a long line of precedents in this area has not translated into much 
clarity, at least beyond the objective of preserving equality of distribut ion.287 For 
example, since In The Matter of Mobile Steel Co., in order to subordinate certain 
claims there is a formally clear test requiring a combination of inequitable conduct and 
either unfair advantage or injury to other creditors, 288 but what amounts to inequitable 
conduct remains largely vague. A similar argument can be constructed in the case of 
                                                 
285
 See Daniel R. Fischel ―The Economics of Lender Liab ility‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 133 (1989)  
286
 See Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 50 (4
th
 Circuit, 
1893) 
287
 This equality of distribution is no more than a default rule from contract and property law. See 
Henry Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman ―The Essential Role of Organizat ional Law‖, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 
407 (2000) (―The default rules of property and contract law in effect provide that, absent contractual 
agreement to the contrary, each of the entrepreneur's creditors has an equal-priority floating lien upon 
the entrepreneur's entire pool of assets as a guarantee of performance.‖)  
288
 See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692, 699-700 (3
rd
 Circuit, 1977) (―… three 
conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate. 
(i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct;  (ii) The misconduct must have 
resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; (iii) 
Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act.‖) 
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the law of agency for those cases where there is no explicit consent by the agent to be 
acting on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control. 289  
 
Legal scholars‘ work has not eradicated the uncertainty either.290 For instance, 
Professors Hu and Westbrook have recently considered reasons to impose liability on 
controlling lenders, which they describe as possibly arising from ―considerations about 
accountability, transparency, and deference to property rights‖. 291 Nevertheless, they 
fall short of prescribing a method to think about the problem.  As a result, it is not 
farfetched to think that lender control liability theories have been applied as a reaction 
to situations strongly suggesting an acute ―sense of wrongdoing‖ from an equality 
standpoint, rather than as the implementation of a systematic approach to the problems 
that can potentially arise from lender control.292  
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 See ―Restatement of the Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 
Minnesota Vol. 1 p. 17 (2006). The Restatement defines agency as a ―fiduciary relationship that  arises 
when one person (a ―principal‖) manifests assent to another person (an ―agent‖) that the agent shall act 
on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act‖ 
290
 For example, Professor Lawrence has considered that ―Lender control is neither illegal nor 
inherently bad. Control, however, is easily subjected to a variety of excesses and abuses, so legal 
responses are justified to keep such behavior in check.‖ See William H. Lawrence ―Lender Control 
Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured 
Financing‖, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1390 (1989). It is not clear what exactly constitutes abuse but, as a 
result of the abuse backed reasoning, some scholars call for the substitution of lender liability by 
fiduciary duty principles. See William H. Lawrence ―Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model 
Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing‖, 62 S. Cal.  L. Rev. 1387, 
1423-30 (1989). 
291
 See Henry T. C. Hu & Jay L. Westbrook ―Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors‖, 107 
Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1396 (2007) (―It has long been held that if a creditor takes control of a corporate 
debtor, the creditor will be exposed to liability if it uses its control in a way that is harmfu l to other 
stakeholders. One of the reasons for those doctrines is that such creditor control is often opaque, so that 
other stakeholders dealing with the debtor do not realize their fate is now in different hands. Closely 
related is the importance of associating responsibility with power, lest control be irresponsible. A third 
reason is the importance of preserving bright lines concerning ownership and control of property in a 
market society.‖) 
292
 Indeed, Fischel claims that ―Lender liability cases have led to the creation of an area of commercial 
law that has not been accompanied by the development of a coherent theoretical framework establishing 
the rights of lenders and their duties to their borrowers.‖ See Daniel R. Fischel ―The Economics of 
Lender Liability‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 133 (1989)  
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A more in depth look into prominent lender control liability cases deriving 
from the Law of Agency and equitable subordination seems to reaffirm this 
hypothesis. A milestone case from the law of agency is A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. 
Cargill, Inc.293 In Jenson Farms, Cargill, the creditor, financed Warren‘s, the debtor, 
grain elevator operation and purchased the majority of its grain. Cargill also made 
constant recommendations to Warren, as it believed that the debtor needed strong 
paternal guidance.294 Cargill recommendations were especially relevant as it was part 
to the same vertical chain of business Warren was.295 After Warren ceased operations, 
other creditors sued Cargill under the theory that Cargill became liable as a principal 
of Warren on contracts made by the debtor with the farmers. Minnesota‘s Supreme 
Court affirmed a judgment finding that an agency relationship was established because 
Cargill became a principal when it assumed de facto control over the conduct of his 
debtor as an active participant in the debtor's operations, made key economic decisions 
and decided whether to keep the debtor in existence. The court stated  
“By directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill 
manifested its consent that Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on 
Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill as the part of its normal 
operations which were totally financed by Cargill. Further, an agency 
relationship was established by Cargill's interference with the internal 
affairs of Warren, which constituted de facto control of the 
                                                 
293
  See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981). 
Another important case involving agency law is Buck v Nash-Finch Company, 78 S.D. 334; 102 
N.W.2d 84 (Supreme Court of South Dakota, 1960).  
294
 See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 288-9 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 
1981) (―At approximately this time, a memo was given to the Carg ill official in charge of the Warren  
account, Erhart Becker, which stated in part: ―This organization [Warren] needs very strong paternal 
guidance.‖‖) 
295
 It is quite likely that this fact helped the court decide the issue of whether Cargill had control of 
Warren or not.  
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elevator.”296  
 
Despite being frequently cited as a way to explain lender control liability, 
Jenson Farms doesn‘t provide a clear understanding of why it is desirable to subject a 
controlling creditor to liability (when limited liability is readily available for equity 
holders), what should the extent of that liability be297 nor what it means to be acting on 
behalf of the creditor.298 The same could be said of equitable subordination cases. In 
the famous Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,299 the court found that Standard 
Gas & Electric had operative control of Deep Rock, the debtor. A majority of Deep 
Rock's officers were officers or directors of Standard or Standard‘s parent corporation. 
The officers of Deep Rock reported to and were always subject to the direction o f 
officers and directors of Standard. In addition, the fiscal affairs ―were wholly 
controlled by Standard, which was its banker and its only source of financial aid.‖300 
When Standard tried to obtain a controlling position in the reorganized firm, the 
Supreme Court ordered that ―No plan ought to be approved which does not accord the 
preferred stockholders a right of participation in the equity in the Company's assets 
prior to that of Standard‖301 because Deep Rock was bankrupt as a result of ―the 
abuses in management due to the paramount interest of interlocking officers and 
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 See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 
1981). 
297
 There is, nonetheless, a limit on the amount of the awards, as lender control liability theories 
generally have a retributional character (unless a statute determine otherwise). See ―Restatement of the 
Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 2 p. 115-23 (2006). 
298
 The common Law of Agency requires the agent to further the interests of the principal, but there‘s 
no bright line div ision of where the interests of the principal ends and where the interests of the agent 
begins. See ―Restatement of the Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 
Minnesota Vol. 1, Section 1.01, Comment g (2006) (―Relat ionships of agency are among the larger 
family of relationships in which one person acts to further the interests of another and is subject to 
fiduciary ob ligations.‖) 
299
 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Another landmark case involving 
equitable subordination is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) 
300
 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 311 (1939) 
301
 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 324 (1939) 
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directors in the preservation of Standard's position, as at once proprietor and creditor 
of Deep Rock.‖302 Once again, the questions regarding the reason behind the 
desirability of lender control liability (or the intimately related equitable 
subordination) and the extent of that liability remain largely unanswered.  
  
Perhaps as a reaction against this lack of theoretical clarity, there has been a 
steady stream of cases objecting to the existence of lender control liability.303 The 
trend can be seen in cases dealing with equitable subordination such as In The Matter 
of Mobile Steel Company,304 In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc.,305 
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting,306 and Henry v Lehman 
Commercial Paper,307 and In the Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v 
Associates Commercial Corporation;308 lender control liability under the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act such as Thomas Pearson v. Component 
Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation,309 and Mike Smith v 
Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al;310 lender control liability under the Common Law of 
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 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939) 
303
 A similar conclusion is given by the Reporter Notes to the Restatement of the Law of Agency. See 
―Restatement of the Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 
1, Section 1.01, Reporter‘s Notes to Comment f (2006) (―In the debtor-creditor context, most courts are 
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 See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d 977 (9
th
 Circuit, 2006) 
308
 See In the Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v. Associates Commercial Corporation , 893 
F.2d 693 (5
th
 Circuit, 1990) 
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 See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 
247 F.3d 471 (3
rd
 Circuit, 2001) 
310
 See Mike Smith v. Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al, 144 Fed. Appx. 482 (6
th
 Circuit, 2005). Another 
example of this reasoning comes from Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co.,  Inc. 499 F.3d 144 (2
nd
 Circuit, 
2007). 
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Agency such as Schwan's Sales Enters. v Commerce Bank & Trust Co.,311 all of which 
appear to limit the extent to which remedies on controlling lenders can be applied. 312  
 
In this counter-wave, the first line of defense against findings of liability arises 
out of the Common Law of Agency definition of the requirement that the agent should 
act ―on behalf of‖ the principal. Acting on behalf of another likely generates a 
fiduciary relationship and then fiduciary duties may arise. Because what accounts as 
acting on behalf of someone else is somewhat fuzzy, i.e. how to delineate the 
boundaries of self- interested behavior in a cooperative endeavor and when is it that 
someone begins to act for someone else instead of merely acting for himself, self-
description or formalities gain importance.313 Therefore, the formality of an agreement 
between parties on the way forward each time a decision needs to be taken and an 
explicit or implicit declaration of acting in its own behalf from both parties prevents 
the lender from being deemed the principal of the debtor firm. 314 The same argument 
can be used to impede the lender from owing fiduciary duties.  
 
 As a result, those formal agreements and declarations serve to maintain the 
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 See Schwan's Sales Enters. v. Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 189 (U.S. District Court 
of Massachusetts, 2005) 
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 A notable exception comes from Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation , 828 F.2d 686 
(11
th
 Circu it, 1987), where the court reversed a summary judgment which considered that Citibank (the 
lender) was not a principal of Data Lease (the debtor) (―In determin ing whether an agency relationship 
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 A clear signal of the importance of self-description is the ease to establish agency when the agent 
expressly consents that he will act on behalf and subject to the control of the principal. In this situation, 
it won‘t be easy to establish that the agent wasn‘t furthering the principal‘s objectives. 
314
 A party claiming that the lender was in active control of the borrower will have to bear the burden of 
proof sufficient of overturning the presumption.   
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validity of the separate personhood recognition that Organization Law provides. For 
example, in Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General 
Electric Capital Corporation, Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit reinforced this 
separation with an admonition which left the consequences unspoken, as if stating 
them would have been redundant:   
“…we must be scrupulous in our efforts to distinguish between 
situations in which a parent/lender has ultimately assumed 
responsibility for the continuing viability of a company (thus incurring 
liability for WARN Act violations) and situations in which the borrower 
has retained the ultimate responsibility for keeping the company 
active.”315  
 
Most likely due to a real demand for business certainty, the Restatement of the 
Law of Agency has also established a safe harbor on the related concept of control. As 
a way of distinguishing what controlling parties may do without becoming principals, 
the Restatement of the Law of Agency suggests that the difference between mere 
influence and control depends on whether consent is given by the agent to the exercise 
of that influence or dominance, i.e. whether the influence comes in the form of 
recommendations or instructions.316 But not even all instructions can be considered to 
                                                 
315
 See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 
247 F.3d 471, 506 (3
rd
 Circuit, 2001). 
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 ―A relationship is one of agency only if the person susceptible to dominance or influence has 
consented to act on behalf of the other and the other has a right of control, not simply an  ability to bring 
influence to bear.‖ See ―Restatement of the Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, 
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account for the existence of control. Negative instructions are not deemed valid 
indicators of control by a lender. Indeed, comment f to the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency expresses that  
“[t]he right to veto another‟s decision does not by itself create the right 
to give affirmative directives that action be taken, which is integral to 
the right of control… Thus, a debtor does not become a creditor's agent 
when a loan agreement gives the creditor veto rights over decisions the 
debtor may make.”317  
Considered together, the formality of proclaimed self- interest behavior and the 
absence of positive instructions given by the lender have been consciously constructed 
by the Restatement drafters to avoid any possible determination of agency and, by 
extension, any finding of liability against a ―controlling‖ lender.    
 
As a second part of the strategy, courts combine the previous reasoning with 
equitable subordination added prongs in those cases where the party who allegedly 
acted in an inequitable manner was not an insider. As formalism and lack positive 
instructions indicate that lenders are not in control of the debtor firm, courts do not 
consider that they are insiders absent other facts that would place the lender in such a 
position. Then, to subordinate the claims of a non insider the burden of proof is 
increased. As it was decided in Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper,  
“Where non-insider, non-fiduciary claims are involved, as is the case 
here, the level of pleading and proof is elevated: gross and egregious 
conduct will be required before a court will equitably subordinate a 
                                                                                                                                            
the Restatement section 1 comment f does. See Keith Dowding, POWER, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, MN (1996), at 5.  
317
 See ―Restatement of the Law Third, Agency‖, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 
Minnesota Vo l. 1, Section 1.01, Comment f (2006).  
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claim.”318  
In the same vein, in In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., the court 
held that ―a creditor who is not an insider is under no fiduciary obligation to its debtor 
or to other creditors of the debtor in the collection of its claim.‖319  
 
The counter-wave of cases is heavily defended from a contractual freedom 
point of view. For example, in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of 
Whiting, while overturning a finding of equitable subordination from the Bankruptcy 
Court, Judge Easterbrook mentioned in dictum that  
“…we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires participants in 
commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do 
„more‟ - just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy 
judge assessing the situation years later… Courts may not convert one 
form of contract into the other after the fact, without raising the cost of 
credit or jeopardizing its availability. Unless pacts are enforced 
according to their terms, the institution of contract, with all the 
advantages private negotiation and agreement brings, is 
jeopardized.”320 
 
This line of reasoning has been embraced by courts in similar situations, as it 
can be seen in Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young.321 In Trenwick, 
while discussing a claim for deepening insolvency and the existence of creditor 
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 See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d  977, 1006 (9
th
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the author wonder what then could gross and egregious conduct be. 
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 See In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., 46 B.R. 125, 128 (Bkrtcy. D. Ea. Penn., 
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protection under Delaware Law, the Delaware Chancery Court stated  
“And Delaware public policy is strongly supportive of freedom of 
contract, thereby supporting the primary means by which creditors 
protect themselves - through the negotiations of toothy contractual 
provisions securing their right to seize on the assets of the borrowing 
subsidiary.”322  
Therefore, in order to limit the negative extent of their rulings on the credit market, 
courts consistently decide that a creditor exercising his contractual rights cannot be 
subject to wrongdoing. 
 
It becomes apparent, then, that the objective of equality of distribution which 
has been put forward so far as the rationale behind lender control liability theories may 
not actually be accomplished, as these theories have little, if any, impact on creditors‘ 
(mis)behavior.323 The impact on lender behavior must indeed be relatively trivial when 
the trend signaling the absence of lender control liability is combined by a recent 
steady stream of legal academics claiming that creditors are ca lling the shots in 
reorganization proceedings.324 A similar type of claim can regularly be found in the 
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 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 173 (Del. Ch., 
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 It is not my point that creditors‘ bargaining for protective clauses or debtors‘ bonding themselves to 
stringent covenants will lend per se to creditor misbehavior. The point is that misbehavior goes largely 
undeterred. 
324
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 
(2002); Lynn M. LoPucki ―The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen‘s 
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financial literature.325 Although many situations are likely engineered to prevent any 
sort of control taking by the lender,326 it cannot be the case that this is what happens in 
every case unless all the previous authors were wrong. 327  If we assume that the 
assessment from these authors is correct, as it seems sensible to do given the shared 
academic opinion, the question of why lender control liability cases have consistently 
been solved in favor of the lenders immediately arises.  
 
Alternatively, and more likely, the legal engineering is not geared to prevent 
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indicative of measures taken to avoid lender control liab ility.  
327
 In addition, it could be claimed that the recent escalation of cases claiming ―deepening insolvency‖ 
has been a practical answer to courts closing the lender control liability possibility. On the escalation 
deepening insolvency cases, see Gerald L. Blanchard ―Recent Developments in the Area of Lender 
Liability Law‖, Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law Part I S 3 (2006) (―the year saw continued development in  
the area of deepening insolvency‖).     
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control-taking by the lender but to prevent liability adjudications based on formal 
conceptions of control acquisition. Under this scenario, lenders do obtain some sort or 
degree of control in some DIP lending situations but the Law of Agency‘s over 
comprehensive safe harbor doesn‘t admit any sort of control acquisition findings 
arising from veto power means. If this is indeed what happens, lending practices and 
case law would seem to be describing completely different and possibly unrelated 
situations. The next section will discuss the possible justification grounds for this 
conceptual disconnect in the context of lender control liability adjudications.  
 
III. Beyond the Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm 
In this section, I argue that, at least in part, the previously described ―control 
disconnect‖ derives from an understanding of the theory of the firm akin to the explicit 
nexus of contracts theory. As it was noted in chapters I and II, the explicit nexus of 
contracts theory looks at firms as mere ways of linking contracts which fully pay 
everyone but shareholders their opportunity costs. 328 The explicit nexus of contracts 
theory is firmly based on contractual freedom as a wealth creating mechanism. As 
parties are assumed to only enter into contracts which they deem beneficial, 
contractual freedom leads to Pareto efficient behavior. The string of thought is as 
follows: if freedom of contracts is limited, then the possible set of contract 
permutations and combinations that a firm may produce or, in the same vein, that may 
generate a firm gets reduced. As a result, it is possible that any restriction to 
contractual freedom will cause value enhancing combinations to be left out and social 
efficiency not to be achieved. Following this logic, it comes to no surprise to 
encounter claims like the ones found in the Kham Shoes or Trenwick opinions cited 
                                                 
328
 See Luig i Zingales ―In search for New Foundations‖, 55 Journal o f Finance 1623, 1630 (2000).  
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above.329  
 
An unconditional declaration that contractual freedom is always a wealth 
creation technology requires several assumptions to hold. 330 Chief among them is that 
either there‘s a perfect alignment between private and social costs 331 or, if they are not 
aligned, that the Coase theorem hold, i.e. that transaction costs are small enough not to 
preclude optimal negotiations among parties.332 The explicit nexus of contracts 
paradigmatic view of the firm picks up the first of these assumptions, as everyone who 
transacts with the firm is by assumption fully paid and therefore is deemed better off. 
This theory disregards as structurally meaningful or constitutive to what a firm is that 
private and social costs may diverge.333 It immediately follows that freedom of 
contracts should not be limited in the firm context, as alignments between private and 
social costs are not affected by the firm.334  
 
If, as I am suggesting, firms are understood as explicit nexus of contracts, it 
comes to no surprise that the Law of Agency possesses a negative control safe harbor 
                                                 
329
 For another example, see Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric 
Capital Corporation, 247 F.3d 471, 502 (3
rd
 Circuit, 2001) (―We do not intend to create a jurisprudence 
that discourages loans in general or rescues of troubled business enterprises in particular‖) 
330
 Even with the assumptions holding, not everyone blindly believes on the omnibenevolence of the 
market as a wealth creating mechanism. See Susan Rose-Ackerman ―Inalienability and the Theory of 
Property Rights‖, 85 Columbia Law Review 931, 932 (1985) (―Most of this work, moreover, has been 
excessively confident in the workings of the private market once property rights are firmly established 
and therefore views restraints on alienation with a great deal of skepticism.‖)  
331
 The difference between private and social costs usually arises where externalities, imperfections in 
informat ion or coordination difficulties are involved. See Susan Rose-Ackerman ―Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights‖, 85 Columbia Law Review  931, 938-40 (1985) 
332
 See Ronald H. Coase ―The Problem of Social Cost‖, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, 6 -8 (1960). 
It is quite telling that Coase himself was looking for alternatives to Pigouvian taxes and damages, not 
ruling them out.   
333
 Indeed, the exp licit nexus of contracts theory of the firm does not address that issue, making it 
uncertain what the theory would predict on the treatment of cases where private and social costs are not 
the equal. This theory seems to allow private and social costs to diverge only in non-constitutive firm 
related issues. 
334
 In fact, it would be impossible to present contractual limitations under the explicit nexus of contracts 
theory, as it believes that the firm is nothing more than a way to diminish agency costs (monit oring, 
bonding and residual loss costs). 
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and the complete adherence it has from courts in an area of law where equitable 
considerations are at the basis of juridical opinions. 335 The safe harbor adherence to 
formalities ensures that management will be considered a representative of the residual 
owners, either shareholders or unsecured claim holders, and therefore ―assures‖ that 
wealth creating contracts are not precluded.336 This misconception of the structural 
nature of the firm generates a misleading formula, as logical consistency precludes 
arriving to conclusions that deviate from a stark defense of contractual freedom.   
 
As a result, it follows that the understanding of the theory of the firm 
determines what the causes for unfairness and damages can be. 337 If two parties enter 
into a contract without incurring in any sort of fraudulent or misrepresenting behavior, 
then because they have acted within the scope of their contractual freedom and by 
assumption other parties are paid their full opportunity cost for their services, the 
parties‘ conduct cannot be considered unfair nor produce damages unless the contract 
has been breached.338 The preceding reasoning has been the traditional way of looking 
at lender control liability, as can be seen in Fischel‘s analysis. 339 The same conceptual 
                                                 
335
 I.e. equitable subordination. 
336
 Note that economic agency theory, on which the explicit nexus of contracts is heavily dependent on, 
allows for decision bodies to be captured. As a result, it could be argued that t he safe harbor from the 
Law of Agency doesn‘t ensure that the directors will be running the firm in the best interest of all the 
financial claimants. But this sort of criticism would be having a role at a different level, as it would be 
discussing agency costs within the firm structure and not the defining characteristics of firms per se 
under the explicit nexus of contracts theory. 
337
 This is very important, as some courts recognize that certain cases may generate equitable 
subordination without a specific proof of inequitable conduct. See In The Matter of Virtual Network 
Services Corporation, 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7
th
 Circu it, 1990) (―In sum, we conclude that § 510(c)(1) 
authorizes courts to equitably subordinate claims to other claims on a case-by-case basis without 
requiring in every instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor claiming parity among other 
unsecured general creditors‖) See also United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540 (1996) 
338
 This is where control by a lender becomes important , as without control a lender could not 
opportunistically breach a contract 
339
 For example, when Fischel discusses damages arising due to lender liability he says that ―the 
relationship between a lender and a borrower is contractual.‖ See Daniel R. Fischel ―The Economics of 
Lender Liab ility‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 148 (1989). Also, when considering the source of liability, Fischel 
looks at opportunistic behavior: ―Opportunistic behavior occurs whenever one party attempts to obtain, 
at the expense of the other, a benefit not contemplated by the in itial agreement, either exp licit ly or 
implicitly. Thus, whenever a lender attempts to renegotiate with the borrower for better terms when 
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framework can be observed, for example, in Adams v. Erwin Weller Co.,340 a case 
arising for responsibility for backpay and benefits owed to employees when their 
employer closed without giving them sixty days written notification, as required under 
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act. 341 A class of 
employees moved to collect against Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the main lender 
of the employer, under the theory that through its financing it had become the 
principal. While denying the employees claim, Judge Fagg stated Westinghouse Credit 
Corporation‘s ―use of legitimate financial controls to protect its security interest does 
not make [Westinghouse Credit Corporation] an employer under WARN.‖342 Again, 
contractually agreed controls assumed ex ante to be beneficial are not to be understood 
as unfair later on, especially when due regard was given to use the Law of Agency‘s 
safe harbor.    
 
Interestingly, lender control liability theories interpreted under the umbrella of 
the explicit nexus of contracts theory would generate a result essentially equal to that 
of the absolute priority rule for those cases where the lender did not incur in any 
fraudulent or misrepresenting behavior.343 The absolute priority rule codifies a judge-
made rule providing that reorganization plans need to provide for full compensation of 
higher priority claimholders before they can assign any value to lower priority ones.344 
                                                                                                                                            
there is no basis for doing so, the lender is behaving opportunistically‖. See Dan iel R. Fischel ―The 
Economics of Lender Liability‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 138 (1989). Even though Fischel talks about implicit  
contract terms, he doesn‘t view the existence of non-contractability as a possibility, as on this particular 
point he relies on the analysis of Muris, who explicitly considers that ―the victim would have avoided 
the problem [of opportunism] so long as the costs of prevention were less than the expected costs of the 
opportunism.‖ See Timothy J. Muris ―Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts‖, 65 Minn. L. 
Rev. 521, 524 (1981).  
340
 See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co.,  87 F.3d 269 (8
th
 Circu it, 1996) 
341
 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 
342
 See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co.,  87 F.3d 269, 272 (8
th
 Circuit, 1996) 
343
 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (―the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of 
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any 
property‖) 
344
 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2
nd
 Circuit, 2007) 
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Therefore, anyone with higher priority who obtains less than full compensation can 
ask the court to impede others of lower priority to obtain any compensation until his 
claim is fully satisfied. The link between the absolute priority rule and lender control 
liability theories appears natural as both of them share the objective of equality of 
distribution.  
 
The absolute priority rule is essentially a distributive rule geared to allocate 
whatever assets the debtor firm already has but which doesn‘t look into how it was 
that the firm came to have those assets or how the assets are sold. Absent fraud or 
misrepresenting behavior, the explicit nexus of contracts theory of the firm taken 
together with agency law notions of negative control operationalizes lender control 
liability to follow the strict order and instructions arising out of the contracts between 
claimholders and the firm, as it cannot work to recover any extra assets. Then, at least 
for voluntary creditors,345 lender control liability would generate at most that same 
result as the absolute priority rule, reducing it to a distributive rule. Hence, if we 
assume that claimholders would prefer to seek redress using the absolute priority rule 
as they would obtain the same results and it would be easier to plead, redundancy and 
lower costs would be a reason attempting against the usage of lender control liability. 
Then, redundancy and lower costs would explain its dwarfing.  
   
Only after we move away from the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and its 
stringent assumptions, can lender control liability theories regain a proper role. The 
recognition of the possibility of asset specific investments and/or implicit contracts 
allows us to assign those theories a proper function and not merely replicate the 
distributive function of the absolute priority rule. The focus of these theories should be 
                                                 
345
 Intuitively, I believe that the reasoning applies to involuntary creditors also. 
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dynamic and move beyond immediate distributive concerns recognizing that resource 
allocation is not neutral for efficiency considerations. Further, their focal point should 
be on efficiency based analysis and aim towards penalizing self-serving behavior that 
a controlling lender imposed on the firm when that behavior was counter to socially 
desirable behavior.  
 
IV. Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a substitute? 
An interesting question is whether lender control liability theories have been 
dwarfing because another analogical remedy is available. The preceding discussion 
suggests that an understanding of the theory of the firm as constituted of explicit nexus 
of contracts could have conflated absolute priority questions with lender control 
liability ones because claimants can essentially obtain the same redress. As what a 
claimant may get is similar and the absolute priority rule is easier to plead, then lender 
control liability is chosen in fewer occasions. An alternative explanation is possible: 
that the results sought by lender control liability, even after dropping the explicit 
nexus of contracts theory of the firm, can be achieved through other means, maybe 
through the use of fraudulent transfer law.346 If the latter was the correct explanation 
for lender control liability, lender control liability theories would have been replaced 
by a different preferred substitute, one that maintained the possibility of obtaining 
redress beyond the juridical corset imposed by the explicit nexus of contracts 
understanding of the firm.  
 
Traced back at least to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5 (1571), 347 fraudulent 
conveyance law has obtained reception in both the federal bankruptcy laws 348 and 
                                                 
346
 I‘m indebted to Frederick Tung for pointing this connection to me.  
347
 See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 548.01 (15th Ed. Revised).  
348
 See 11 U.S.C. Sect ion 548 
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state statutory law through the adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 349 By 
fraudulent conveyance law we understand the set of rules aimed to impede 
transactions whose main objective is to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor or group 
of creditors or to discourage transactions that, even without actual fraudulent intent, 
are prejudicial to any creditor or group of creditors, because such transfers are made 
for less than reasonably equivalent value.350 At the heart of the matter is the idea of 
debtors trying to shortchange their creditors. Baird and Jackson considered that the 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth ―was intended to curb what was thought to be a widespread 
abuse‖ at that moment, when England had ―certain sanctuaries into which the King's 
writ could not enter‖, such as the interior of churches. 351 Indeed, Baird and Jackson 
explained the feeling in England at the time of the enactment of this Statute:  
“It was thought that debtors usually removed themselves to one of 
these precincts only after selling their property to friends and relatives 
for a nominal sum with the tacit understanding that the debtors would 
reclaim their property after their creditors gave up or compromised 
their claims.”352  
 
Scholars generally agree that without fraudulent conveyance law economic 
activity could be grossly hindered. As Rose-Ackerman puts it,   
“[A] person who became insolvent could simply give away all his 
assets to family and friends, go bankrupt, and then accept reciprocal 
                                                 
349
 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1984. The orig inal text  is available at  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.htm  
350
 ―The purpose of the fraudulent conveyance doctrine is to prevent assets from being transferred away 
from a debtor in exchange for less than fair value, leaving a lack of funds to compensate the creditors.‖ 
See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 548.01 (15th Ed. Revised). 
351
 See Douglas G. Baird  & Thomas H. Jackson ―Fraudulent Conveyance and its Proper Domain‖, 38 
Vand. L. Rev. 829, 829 (1985).  
352
 See Douglas G. Baird  & Thomas H. Jackson ―Fraudulent Conveyance and its Proper Domain‖, 38 
Vand. L. Rev. 829, 829 (1985).  
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gifts from them afterwards. This practice would introduce an element 
of risk into the making of loans that would serve no productive 
purpose. Ex ante the volume of loans would be inefficiently low and 
interest rates inefficiently high to take account of this possibility of 
hiding assets from creditors.”353 
 
Inspired by Rose-Ackerman‘s intuitive argument, Heaton has used an 
incomplete contracts framework to explain fraudulent conveyance law‘s role.354 
Heaton believes that debtors are unable to commit not to fraudulently transfer assets in 
bad states of the world because contracts are inherently incomplete. 355 Hence, 
fraudulent conveyance law is a non-contractual legal rule which ―overcomes 
contractual incompleteness by providing a way to recover against transferees… by 
voiding the transactions that transferred assets to them.‖356 Through this mechanism, 
the legal system avoids the need of parties to contractually over-constrain ex ante the 
debtor‘s business decision making while, at the same time, ―alleviating the contractual 
incompleteness that diminishes debt capacity.‖357 As a result, the contracting 
possibility set is enlarged. Additionally, transactions costs are saved as contracts need 
not try to fill in all types of incompleteness.358  
                                                 
353
 See Susan Rose-Ackerman ―Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights‖, 85 Columbia Law 
Review 931, 950 (1985) 
354
 See J. B. Heaton ―Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non -contractual Legal Rules: The Case of 
Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law‖, 9 Journal of Financial Intermediat ion 169 (2000).  
355
 See J. B. Heaton ―Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non -contractual Legal Rules: The Case of 
Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law‖, 9 Journal of Financ ial Intermediation 169, 171 
(2000). 
356
 See J. B. Heaton ―Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non -contractual Legal Rules: The Case of 
Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law‖, 9 Journal of Financial Intermediation 169, 171 
(2000). 
357
 See J. B. Heaton ―Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non-contractual Legal Rules: The Case of 
Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law‖, 9 Journal of Financial Intermediation 169, 179 
(2000). 
358
 Besides fraudulent conveyance law, social norms may also diminish contractual in completeness and 
may also save on transaction costs. See Ramon Casadesus -Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber ―Trust and 
Incentives in Agency‖, 15 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 45, 58-61 (2005).   
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Fraudulent Conveyance law is especially attractive in a context where the 
explicit nexus of contracts paradigm dominates because it doesn‘t require any analysis 
of what a firm is or should be and therefore allows for redress where lender control 
liability wouldn‘t be available. Under one of its options, merely showing that less than 
reasonably equivalent value is given to the debtor for the transfer of an asset turns the 
transaction voidable.359 Therefore, fraudulent conveyance law appears as a great 
option for prejudiced non-controlling creditors.  
 
Despite the former suggestion, I believe that Fraudulent Conveyance Law is a 
far from perfect substitute for lender control liability theories. At the heart of the 
problem is the transaction focus of fraudulent conveyance law which limits its ability 
to capture the complexities of firm value dilution. An example will help to describe 
this point. Assume that a debtor firm has 3 assets. These three assets can be used 
altogether, separately or in any pair combination. Further, assume that there are 
complementarities which can be obtained by using a combination of the assets instead 
of them separately. Even though there are complementarities to the joint use of the 
different assets, it is easier to sell them separately because there exists a more liquid, 
closer to complete market for each of the assets. Therefore, there is a higher 
probability to sell at a discount when selling the assets together than when selling 
them separately, even though it is common knowledge that they are worth more if 
                                                 
359
 See 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(1)(B) (―(a)(1)(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and (ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was 
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (II) 
was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which 
any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;  (III) intended to incur, or 
believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor‘s ability to pay as such 
debts matured; or (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation 
to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of 
business.‖) In the same vein, see Section 4(a)(2) of the UFTA. 
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operated jointly.  
 
Additionally, let‘s assume that together the assets are worth 100 (without 
discount) and that, if sold separately, they are worth 80. The lender who is in control is 
owed 70 and the non-controlling creditors (assumed to be the only other claimants) are 
owed 50. As the controlling lender has nothing to gain from a joint sale because he is 
owed less than the value of the assets sold separately and the discount volatility could 
eventually hurt him, he decides to put them up for sale seriatim, using a properly 
designed auction. This type of structure to sell the assets is completely permissible 
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and frequently employed, as debtor firms 
decide how to dispose of their assets.360 Indeed, it is likely that a Bankruptcy Court 
looks with better eyes partial disgorgements of assets than sales of all the assets at the 
same time, as one of the relevant factors suggested by the Second Circuit to take into 
account in order to approve section 363(b) sales is to look at ―the proportionate value 
of the asset to the estate as a whole‖.361 Finally, let‘s assume that the assets get 
allocated to people unrelated to the controlling lender and price paid for each asset is 
well within that of the competitive market range.362 As it follows from the description 
of the example, non-controlling lenders get less under this exit option. Would 
                                                 
360
 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen ―The End of Bankruptcy‖, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 787 
(2002) (―When the number of creditors of a financially distressed firm is small enough, sales do 
proceed. When the number of investors is large, however, those in control of the firm (typically its 
senior creditors) are likely to use Chapter 11 to sell the assets of the firm as a going concern. Chapter 11 
provides a mechanism for selling assets free and clear of all claims even before a plan of reorganization 
is put in place.‖) 
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 See In Re The Lionel Corporation v. The Lionel Corporation , 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2
nd
 Circuit, 
1983). Other relevant factors mentioned by the Second Circuit  are ― the amount of elapsed time since the 
filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the 
effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from 
the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property, which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the 
proposal envisions and, most importantly perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in 
value.‖ 
362
 See Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4
th
 Circuit, 1985) (― Initially, ―value‖ has repeatedly 
been defined as 75% of the appraised value of the asset.‖) 
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fraudulent conveyance law be useful to the non-controlling lenders?  
 
The most likely answer is no. A court looking at a fraudulent conveyance law 
claim under this scenario would first try to assess if there was fraudulent intent. As the 
controlling lender was merely making a decision based on the risk of the discount and 
not trying to hinder, delay or defraud the non-controlling lenders, it seems almost 
certain that the court would decide that this was not a case of fraud. Then, the court 
could examine the constructive fraud possibility. In order to do so, the court would ask 
itself, seriatim, whether there was reasonably equivalent value obtained by the debtor 
firm for each of the transferred assets. As the answer is by the example framework 
affirmative, the court would be obliged to determine that none o f those transfers, even 
though value diminishing from an ex ante perspective, accounted to a fraudulent 
transfer. Hence, no redress would be obtained by the other claimants.  
 
It could be argued that key to the non-operation of Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law is the structure of the sale. Then, and regardless of the strategic incentives 
generated, Fraudulent Conveyance Law could protect other claimants when all the 
assets are sold together. But even this case is restricted. In fact, there‘s a fairly long 
line of precedents affirming that obtaining at least 75 percent of the appraised value of 
the asset on a sale would be fair and reasonable consideration. 363 Therefore, the 
possibility of losing up to 25 percent of value, especially if all the loss arose out of lost 
firm specific investments, would leave Fraudulent Conveyance Law as an inadequate 
protection mechanism for other claimants. As a result of the previous reasoning, only 
if the size of the loss is bigger than 25 percent and provided that the appraisal value is 
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 See In re Rock Industries Machinery Corp., 572 F.2d 1195, 1197 (7
th
 Circu it, 1978); Greylock Glen 
Corporation v. Community Savings Bank, 656 F.2d 1, 4 (1
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 Circuit, 1981); Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 
F.2d 1019, 1022 (4
th
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made taking into account firm specific investments,364 will Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law act as relatively perfect substitute to lender control liability. 365  
 
As we can see, even if fraudulent conveyance law can be thought as a 
substitute to lender control liability theories, it is a rather imperfect, non-equivalent 
one. Therefore, it is very unlikely that a move to the use of fraudulent conveyance law 
as the legal technology to prevent abuses from lender control has caused lender control 
liability theories‘ use to dwarf. In the next section, I will suggest a possible new test in 
order to reposition lender control liability as a deterrent to value diminishing actions 
by controlling lenders.    
 
V. Diverging Standards? 
A different rationale for the current construction of lender control liability 
cases arises out of behavioral ideas. Dan-Cohen has argued that conduct rules and 
decision rules are different, and that the difference is important because each rule is 
aimed at different actors.366 To stress his point, he imagines a world where there is an 
―acoustic separation‖ allowing actors to receive essentially different messages which 
serve to complement each other.367 For instance, Dan-Cohen believes that by thinking 
of the defense of duress in criminal law as a decision rule instead of a conduct one 
allows the legal system to keep its framework fixed: 
                                                 
364
 This point is not minor: if the appraisal is based not taking into consideration  firm specific 
investments, then the utility of using Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a substitute for lender control 
liab ility would likely d isappear.  
365
 It should be notet that if specific investments are going to be lost due to the asset sale the individual 
buyer willingness to pay for those assets will be made without considering those specific investmen ts. 
As a result, the market value of those assets will be an inadequate way to account for specific 
investments. 
366
 See Meir Dan -Cohen ―Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: An Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law‖, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984)  
367
 See Meir Dan -Cohen ―Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: An Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law‖, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 630-4 (1984) 
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―… even when external pressures impel an individual toward crime, the 
law should by no means relax its demand that the individual make the 
socially correct choice.‖368  
This example elicits that a clear distinction may exist between the decision rule and 
the conduct rule and that logically it doesn‘t necessarily follow that both should be 
equal. To make a particular decision rule equivalent to its conduct rule counterpart 
will depend on a normative assessment.369 
 
Melvin Eisenberg picks up these concepts in the corporate context to 
distinguish between standards of conduct and standards of review or liability.370  
Eisenberg considers that standards of conduct in corporate law are not merely 
aspirational.371 Specifically, he believes that there is a clear benefit arising from the 
divergence of the standard of conduct (i.e. duty of care) and that of liability (i.e. 
business judgment rule). The former works in parallel to the later so that the legal 
system can make good use of the expressive function of law to control or influence 
behavior.372 Eisenberg considers that the benefits arising from the expressive function 
of law can be seen for instance when a prudent lawyer gives advice as it will likely be 
                                                 
368
 See Meir Dan -Cohen ―Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: An Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law‖, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 633 (1984)  
369
 In other words, the equivalence can be considered ―a matter of prudential judgment‖. See Melvin A. 
Eisenberg ―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law‖, 62 
Fordham L. Rev. 437, 437 (1993)  
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 ―A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A 
standard of review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine 
whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.‖ See Melvin A. Eisenberg ―The Div ergence of 
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 437 
(1993) (italics in the original).  
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 See Melvin A. Eisenberg ―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 464 (1993). Further, he considers that ―the standards of 
review in corporate law pervasively d iverge from the standards of conduct.‖ See Melvin A. Eisenberg 
―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. 
Rev. 437, 438 (1993) 
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 See Melvin A. Eisenberg ―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 464 (1993). This function of law refers to ―expressing social 
values and… encouraging social norms to move in particular directions.‖ See Cass R. Sunstein ―Social 
Norms and Social Choice‖, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 953 (1996).  
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based on the standard of conduct. The same benefit appears when corporations create 
their codes of conduct, as firms become more likely to follow the standard of conduct 
rather than the standard of review.373 Hence, behavior could potentially be affected in 
a socially desirable way by having a separate conduct and decision rule:374 the 
standard of conduct would help create or maintain social norms, 375 which are informal 
means of facilitating coordination of social conventions and which have the significant 
benefit of being self-enforced. 
 
The statutory standard of conduct could potentially be strengthened by judicial 
commentary. Edward Rock believes that Delaware judges engage in ―corporate law 
sermons‖ of moralistic nature which further reinforce beneficial norms of conduct.376 
Miller believes that these judicial commentaries are especially fruitful because 
directors are motivated by a desire to ―act according to appropriate norms of behavior‖ 
and due to fears of judicial criticism in the opinions. 377 As a result, liability standards 
are indirectly strengthened by the standards of conduct available.  
  
Applying this theory to the lender control liability situation suggests that the 
stringent standard of review arising out of comment f to the Restatement o f the Law of 
                                                 
373
 See Melvin A. Eisenberg ―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 464 (1993). 
374
 On the use of social norms to affect behavior, see generally Cass R. Sunstein ―Social Norms and 
Social Choice‖, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996). For an applicat ion of those concepts to corporate law, 
see Melvin A. Eisenberg ―Corporate Law and Social Norms‖, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999).  
375
 Social norms are generally recognized as important drivers of behavior. See, for example, Ramon 
Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber ―Trust and Incentives in Agency‖, 15 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 
45, 47 (2005) (―social norms, legal duties, and market standards establish enforcement mechanisms that 
enhance the contractual performance of agents by supplementing or replacing explicit contractual 
incentives… social norms, legal duties, and market standards reduce transaction costs by avoiding the 
need to spell out fully contingent contracts and by allowing principals and agents who are not well 
acquainted with each other to form contracts.‖) 
376
 See Edward B. Rock ―Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?‖, 44 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
377
 See Geoffrey P. Miller ―A Modest Proposal for fixing Delaware‘s Broken Duty of Care‖, Co lumbia 
Business Law Review 319, 327-8 (2010). 
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Agency (veto rights) may purposely be different from requiring fiduciary duties to a 
controlling lender. In the later (standard of conduct), the aim would be directed to 
influence behavior towards the desired goal while in the former (standard of liability) 
the objective would be akin to allow for the necessarily tough decisions to be made, 
under the assumption that a more comprehensive liability standard would impede 
optimal decision making. Hence, a greater social cost would result from unifying the 
decision and conduct rule in either extreme.  
 
Dan-Cohen‘s idea is interesting because it elicits that the law may use its tools 
to achieve desirable outcome in subtle ways when faced with complex situations, 
where a straight forward legal answer may be suboptimal.378 This issue should not be 
overlooked as even Nobel laureate winner Kenneth Arrow considers that optimal 
allocation of resources requires more than merely economic incentives. 379 The 
question we face is whether lender control liability divergence, as currently stated, is a 
proper vehicle to influence behavior in the desired way or not, and I believe the 
answer is in the negative due to the characteristics of the standard of liability and the 
players repeated involvement in these matters.  
 
 As we have seen formalism in communication between lender and DIP, 
generate a standard of liability which basically equals to the following: if a lender 
                                                 
378
 If a reductionist view is taken where there are only standards of review, it would ―obscure the 
character of law as a means of social control in general, and as a means of guiding behavior in  
particular.‖ See Melvin A. Eisenberg ―The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law‖, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 462 (1993).   
379
 See Kenneth J. Arrow ―The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment‖, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 
537, 538 (1968) (―Because of the moral hazard, complete reliance on economic incentives does not lead 
to an optimal allocation of resources in general. In most societies alternative relationships are built up 
which to some extent serve to permit cooperation and risk sharing… One of the characteristics of a 
successful economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between principal and agent are 
sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be ‗rat ional economic behavior‘ 
to do so.‖) 
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doesn‘t give positive instructions, then there‘s no lender control. Hence, it would be 
fair to qualify the ―standard of liability‖ as a rule rather than a standard. The 
customary law and economics analysis on the choice between rules and standards tells 
us that frequency of use and adjudication are the key determinants. 380 The more 
frequent a regulated activity is the more preferable a rule (relative to a standard) 
becomes, as designing a rule for a rare scenario is too costly. 381 Similarly, the more 
frequent the adjudication instances are, the less preferable a standard is.  
 
It is doubtful whether lender control liability use and adjudication frequency is 
large enough to require a rule, which would point to an inefficient legal choice. But 
regardless of whether a rule or a standard in the case of lender control liability is 
preferable under customary law and economics analysis, a standard of conduct‘s 
possibility of influencing a standard of liability depends to a large extent on the 
ambiguity or vagueness of the later.382 As Feldman and Harel express it  
―[T]he less specific the legal norm is, the more likely people will base 
their understanding of it on social norms. Thus, individuals are likely to 
interpret a legal standard in light of the social norm. In contrast, greater 
specificity of legal norms often precludes such an interpretation.‖383 
As rules are more generally more rigid or fixed, it follows that the standard of conduct 
                                                 
380
 See, generally, Louis Kaplow ―Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis‖, 42 Duke Law 
Journal 557, 563-4 (1992). 
381
 The different arises from the cost structure of the regulation: while standards are cheaper to create 
than rules, they are more expensive to implement. See Louis Kaplow ―Rules versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis‖, 42 Duke Law Journal 557, 573 (1992).  
382
 See D. Gordon Smith ―A Proposal to eliminate Directors Standards from the Model Business 
Corporation Act‖, 67 University of Cincinnati L. Rev. 1201, 1206 (1999); Yuval Feldman & Alon 
Harel ―Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the 
Rule vs. Standard Dilemma‖, 4 Review of Law and Economics 81, 88 (2008).  
383
 See Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel ―Social Norms, Self -Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An 
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma‖, 4 Review of Law and Economics 81, 89 
(2008) (―More specifically, we shall argue that the ambiguity associated with legal standards would 
lead people to interpret legal standards in light of social norms. In contrast, the specificity of legal rules 
precludes such an interpretation and consequently strengthens the effectiveness of legal rules.‖, at 82).  
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would be rather inadequate to influence behavior in the case of lender control liability.  
 
Geoffrey Miller makes a similar point, questioning the mixed message that 
directors in duty of care case receive, as normative or moralistic judicial commentary 
contradicts a decision refusing to impose liability. 384 Yet another criticism raised by 
Miller is more important: the liability rule will determine whether cases are brought 
and also whether those cases will be settled, altogether precluding moralistic 
commentaries.385 As a result, the ability of judicial comments to influence the social 
norms dictating director or lender behavior in our case is grossly constrained.   
 
A different argument against the usefulness of having a wedge between the 
standard of conduct and that of liability in lender control liability arises out the 
characteristic of one of the players. The distressed lending business is a rather 
complex endeavor which requires a fair amount of specific expertise. As a result, any 
lender is likely to have a team of lawyers repeatedly advising him about the legal ins 
and outs of DIP financing. Even if there was a more ambiguous standard governing 
lender control liability, the lender can be expected to learn how to gain influence 
without amounting to what the court would judge as control just from repeated 
playing. As a result, even with a standard of liability rather than a fixed rule, it is less 
likely that a social norm, in the way of a standard of conduct, will influence behavior 
the more information available about the standard of liability there is. 386 It follows that 
low powered incentives appear a priori inadequate to reduce a controlling lender 
opportunistic behavior. 
                                                 
384
 See Geoffrey P. Miller ―A Modest Proposal for fixing Delaware‘s Broken Duty of Care‖, Co lumbia 
Business Law Review 319, 329 (2010) 
385
 See Geoffrey P. Miller ―A Modest Proposal for fixing Delaware‘s Broken Duty of Care‖, Co lumbia 
Business Law Review 319, 329-30 (2010). 
386
 See D. Gordon Smith ―A Proposal to eliminate Directors Standards from the Model Business 
Corporation Act‖, 67 University of Cincinnati L. Rev. 1201, 1206-9 (1999). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 It should be clear by now that allocating control to a lender in reorganization is 
not a neutrally efficient allocation. The central goal of this chapter has been to 
functionally analyze the ubiquitous problem of lender control by, first, tying it to 
modern economic understandings of what a firm is in order to pave the way for 
reestablishing a proper role for lender control liability theories. Lender control liability 
theories have largely fallen in disuse by United States courts. The implicit 
understanding of the theory of the firm by legal academics and courts has made it 
possible. Broadening the scope of the theory of the firm permits a better understanding 
that there is a role for lender liability theories besides mimicking the so called absolute 
priority rule.   
 
 This chapter has provided with an in-depth look into lender control liability 
theories. It has shown that lender control liability as currently understood is a non-
deterrent to opportunistic behavior by controlling creditors. It has advanced the 
hypothesis that lender control liability‘s lack of bite is a result of understanding the 
firm in accordance with the explicit nexus of contracts theory. Additionally, it has 
shown that transaction by transaction focus of fraudulent conveyance law makes it an 
inadequate substitute to lender control liability. Finally, even if lender control liability 
was understood as a decision rule acting in conjunction with a conduct rule, as 
currently stated lender control liability is an improper vehicle to influence behavior in 
a desirable manner due to the characteristics of the standard of liability and the players 
repeated involvement in these matters. The next chapter will look into the practical 
problems that lender control liability application would run into when using a broader 
understanding of the theory of the firm. Specifically, the next chapter will address 
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problems generated by cognitive biases, namely hindsight bias and anchoring, in 
assessing lender liability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Cognitive Errors and Lender Control Strict 
Liability  
 
I. Introduction 
In first two chapters of this dissertation, I have focused on the advantage of 
using economic theories of the firm to understand what problems may arise from 
lender control in business reorganization settings. Using a theoretical framework 
borrowed from economic theories of the firm, I have advanced two central points. 
First, I have shown that lender control may generate inefficiencies when some claims 
are not legally recognized, regardless of the existence of more than one class of legal 
claimants. This is important both because of the potential cumulative size of those 
claims and because they are potentially ubiquitous. Second, I have shown that the 
current use of the explicit nexus of contracts to inform lender control liability 
decisions renders lender control liability incapable of preventing instances of creditor 
opportunistic misbehavior. As a corollary to the later argument, I have shown that the 
current state of affairs cannot be a consequence of a mere substitution of lender 
control liability by fraudulent conveyance law, because the later is incapable of 
capturing an important number of lender misbehavior situations which should be 
covered by the former.   
 
Analyzing the theoretical feasibility of obtaining better outcomes by the 
introduction of lender control liability is incomplete to claim its practical desirability. 
Indeed, even though more plausible theories of the firm open up the prospect of using 
lender control liability to limit opportunistic behavior, other arguments suggest the 
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need to exercise great caution. Arguments questioning individual rationality387 could 
be suggested in order to impede the use of lender control liability. Specifically, lender 
control liability may need to be constrained if adjudicating problems due to cognitive 
errors are large enough to obstruct a proper achievement of its purpose. Hindsight bias 
has been signaled as one cognitive error important enough to impose limits in the 
application of lender control liability.  
 
This chapter will attempt to start a discussion on the feasibility of obtaining 
first best outcomes by looking at problems produced by cognitive errors on 
adjudications of lender control liability. Specifically, in this chapter, I will discuss the 
standard of liability applicable to a lender in control and its relation to cognitive errors. 
The ordinary understanding of lender control liability considers it to be bad because it 
can trigger harmful strict lender liability. Therefore, lender control liability should be 
heavily limited or even suppressed so that the efficient lend ing is not precluded.388 I 
will argue that this interpretation would be incorrect if the cognitive problem was 
caused by hindsight bias only, as the strict nature of lender control liability would 
avoid inefficiencies deriving from this bias.  
 
Unfortunately, hindsight bias is not the only cognitive error potentially 
distorting judicial adjudications. A closer look at anchoring‘s role in damage 
assessments, permits to refocus policy recommendations and help explain the 
shortcomings of strict liability in this context. I will advance that the same cognitive 
errors that distort judicial adjudications arising in the case of lender control liability 
come up in the case of breaches of fiduciary duties by managers or directors, limiting 
                                                 
387
 See, for instance, Paul Slovic ―The Construction of Preference‖, 50 Am. Psychol. 364, 364-6 (1995), 
for a d iscussion of invariance attacks to rationality.  
388
 See, for example, In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692 (3
rd
 Circuit, 1977) 
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also the debiasing effect of a strict liability rule in that context.    
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II shows that commonly voiced fears of 
adjudication errors due solely to hindsight bias in the context of lender control liability 
theories are unwarranted if the applicable standard is strict liability. Part III shows that 
policy oriented recommendations geared towards lender control liability should focus 
not only on hindsight bias but also on anchoring. The later conclusion follows from 
the fact that both the likelihood of the risk and the size of the damages require 
estimation. Part IV will succinctly provide some concluding remarks.  
 
II. Cognitive Errors tainting adjudication accuracy 
A. Arguments against (strict) lender control liability  
A common argument against lender control liability comes from the perils of 
unevenly heard cases, by both juries and judges. There is a general level of uneasiness 
associated to possible deficiencies in adjudicators‘ abilities. This uneasiness gets 
especially noticeable when the subject matter of their decision is business decision 
making.389 Strategic business decision making requires managers to  
―[A]ssimilate large amounts of information about their own 
organization, the environments in which they do or might operate, and 
possible actions of their competitors, allies, and regulators.‖390  
At the same time, managers are required to ―generate projections about future states of 
those matters and formulate plans.‖391 Due to the complexity of the task at hand it is 
                                                 
389
 There‘s no reason to believe that adjudicating errors in other areas of law would be less problemat ic.  
390
 See Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly ―Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in 
Learn ing from Experience‖, 31 The Academy of Management Journal 628, 628 (1988).  
391
 See Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly ―Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in 
Learn ing from Experience‖, 31 The Academy of Management Journal 628, 628 (1988) (―Regardless of 
the particular model chosen, it is clear that strategic decision making is a dauntingly difficult  
intellectual task‖). 
 118 
feared, especially business oriented individuals, that adjudicators won‘t be able to 
correctly understand the decision making process or something akin to it due to the 
adjudicators‘ lack of expertise on the matter. Besides the lack of expertise, and maybe 
working together with it, there‘s the additional problem that the adjudicator may incur 
in systematic errors when facing an assessment which concerns the appropriateness of 
past decisions.392 Both of these problems may generate liability for managers, 
directors or even controlling parties and therefore may disincentive appropriate levels 
of risk taking, or even participation from the individuals with the best aptitudes and/ or 
qualifications. The former criticism, i.e. lack of knowledge or at least familiarity with 
business decision making, seems largely limited by the specificity of bankruptcy 
courts‘ jurisdiction and the continuous stream of business bankruptcy cases that they 
face.393 The later problem, usually assumed to be generated by hindsight bias, appears 
untamed and seems to remain strong.   
 
The risks from opinions tainted with hindsight bias have been understood as 
especially harmful when they appear in connection with the strict character of lender 
control liability. Sharp criticism has naturally followed. For example, Hynes believes 
that it creates a dilemma for a controlling creditor:  
―The more critical the financial condition of a business, the more 
control the creditor will want to assert in an effort to keep the business 
in a state of solvency and thus able to repay its debts. Yet the more 
                                                 
392
 For an example of concern over hindsight bias in the business setting, see  In The Matter of Mobile 
Steel Company, 563 F2d 692, 702-3 (3
rd
 Circuit, 1977) (―Absolute measures of capital inadequacy, such 
as the amount of stockholder equity or other figures and ratios drawn from the cold pages of the 
corporation's balance sheets and financial statements, are of little utility, for the significance of this data 
depends in large part upon the nature of the business and other circumstances. Nor is the fact of 
eventual failu re an appropriate test. This would  be tantamount to ruling that an investor who takes an 
active role in corporate affairs must advance to his corporation all of the funds, which h indsight 
discloses it needed to survive.‖) 
393
 The fairly constant flow of cases asking from bankruptcy courts to deal with distress business 
decision making increases the probability of adequate evaluations of those decisions.  
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control the creditor asserts, the greater risk it runs under the common 
law of agency of incurring personal liability for the debts of the 
business‖.394  
 
The strict character of lender control liability first appeared in section 14 O of 
the Restatement Second of the Law of Agency,395 which stated  
―A creditor who assumes control of his debtor‘s business for the mutual 
benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability 
for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection with the 
business.‖396 
The Restatement Third of the Law of Agency has dropped section 14 O, but the 
doubts remain on whether lender control still possesses a strict liability character.  
 
In addition to the fears arising from improper adjudication, the supporters of 
limiting lenders‘ liability also look into comparisons with directors and managers 
liability under the so called business judgment rule (BJR) to contrast the latter to a 
strict lender control liability rule.397 If under BJR a director or manager is not liable 
                                                 
394
 See J. Dennis Hynes ―Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor‖, 58 Tenn. L. Rev. 
635, 637-8 (1991). Hynes‘ understanding of the lender liability problem is centered on agency costs, 
relying on the famous phrase of Justice Learned hand in Admiral Oriental Line v. United States 
expressing that ―The doctrine stands upon the fact that the venture is the principal's, and that, as the 
profits will be his, so should be the expenses.‖ See Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201,  
202 (Second Circu it, 1936). 
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 See Section 14 O, Restatement Second of the Law of Agency (1958). The second edition was 
published in 1958. The first edition of the Restatement, published in 1933, contains no reference to the 
topic addressed in Section 14 O. Hynes mentions that ―No case or statutory authority from the 25-year 
period of time between the editions has been uncovered that would account for the promulgation of 
Section 14 O.‖ See J. Dennis Hynes ―Lender Liab ility: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor‖, 58 
Tenn. L. Rev. 635, 637-8 (1991). 
396
 See Sect ion 14 O, Restatement Second of the Law of Agency (1958).  
397
 For a definition of the business judgment rule, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological 
Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 619 (1998), citing American Law Institute, 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §4.01(c) at 177 -78 (ALI 1991) 
(―an officer or director who is informed about a transaction being undertaken by the corporation, and is 
not an interested party in the transaction, ―fulfills his duty [of care to the shareholders] if…he rationally  
believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.‖) 
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unless there‘s evidence of some sort of gross negligence, then imposing strict liability 
on a controlling lender would be strikingly inconsistent for individuals having similar 
decision making roles. 
 
B. Hindsight Bias 
In order to assess these judgments against the lender control liability, it is 
necessary to say something more about cognitive errors in general and specifically 
about hindsight bias. Cognitive errors are patterns of deviation in judgment thought to 
be produced by mental shortcuts which in turn ―can create [the] cognitive illusions that 
produce erroneous judgments.‖398 Among those errors, hindsight bias occurs when  
―[p]eople overstate their own ability to have predicted the past and 
believe that others should have been able to predict events better than 
was possible.‖399  
Hindsight bias is often referred to as the ―knew- it-all-along‖ effect.400 The occurrence 
of hindsight bias seems to suggest that ―in retrospect, people see the world as 
unfolding inevitably toward the present.‖401  
 
Psychologists explain hindsight bias as arising ―primarily from the natural (and 
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 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ― Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 
Cornell L. Rev. 777, 780 (2001) 
399
 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ― Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 
Cornell L. Rev. 777,  799 (2001) (―the hindsight bias consists of using known outcomes to assess the 
predictability at some earlier t ime of something that has already happened‖). See, also, Mitu Gulat i, 
Jeffrey J. Rach linski & Donald C. Langevoort ―Fraud by Hindsight‖, 98 Nw. U.L. Rev. 773, 774 (2004) 
(―People consistently overstate what could have been predicted after events have unfolded… 
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400
 See Lawrence J. Sanna ―Metacognitive Experiences and Hindsight Bias: It‘s not just the Thought 
(Content) that Counts‖, 25 Social Cognition 185, 186 (2007); Tarek El-Sehitya, Hans Haumerb, 
Christian Helmensteinc, Erich Kirch lerd & Boris Maciejovsky ―Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk 
Attitude within the Context of Experimental Asset Markets‖, 4 Journal o f Behavioral Finance 227 
(2002). 
401
 See Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly ―Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in 
Learn ing from Experience‖, 31 The Academy of Management Journal 628, 630 (1988)  
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useful) tendency for the brain to incorporate known outcomes into existing knowledge 
automatically, and to make further inferences from that knowledge.‖402 There are two 
competing hypothesis of how the new information is integrated. One of them assumes  
―[T]hat outcome information will impair automatically and 
unconsciously association strengths or cue values stored in memory, 
thus resulting in a biased numerical estimate or choice in hinds ight.‖403  
The other hypothesis consists in  
―[A]ssuming that hindsight bias is due to a biased reconstruction of the 
original estimate rather than to an impaired memory.‖404  
Understanding how new information generates hindsight bias is important, among 
other things, to evaluate whether it is a product of self-serving judgments.  
 
In order to demonstrate the phenomenon, researchers have conducted 
numerous studies with either a memory or a hypothetical design. 405 In the former, the 
participants of the study are first asked to produce an estimate of a future outcome, 
then are presented with the actual outcome and later on are asked to remember their 
answer as if they didn‘t know about the outcome.406 The second type of study presents 
a group of participants with information about an outcome and asks them to estimate 
the probability of its occurrence while a control group is also asked to estimate the 
probability of occurrence but without being informed about the outcome. While 
                                                 
402
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Heuristics and Biases in  the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?‖, 79 Or. L. 
Rev. 61, 68 (2000). 
403
 See Gaelle Villejoubert ―Could They Have Known Better? Review of the Special Issue of Memory 
on the Hindsight Bias‖, 19 Applied Cognit ive Psychology 140, 142 (2005).  
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 See Gaelle Ville joubert ―Could They Have Known Better? Review of the Special Issue of Memory 
on the Hindsight Bias‖, 19 Applied Cognit ive Psychology 140, 142 (2005).  
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 See Gaelle Villejoubert ―Could They Have Known Better? Review of the Special Issue of Memory 
on the Hindsight Bias‖, 19 Applied Cognit ive Psychology 140, 140 (2005).  
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 The first example of this comes from the work of Fischhoff and Beyth. See Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth 
Beyth ―‗I Knew It Would Happen‘ – Remembered Probabilities of Once Future Things‖, 13 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 1 (1975).  
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hindsight bias has been extensively found using both approaches, study design 
invariance is questioned by researchers.407 
 
Regardless of the mechanism originating the bias and the elicitation method, 
hindsight bias appears to be an omnipresent and very resistant human characteristic.408 
Kamin and Rachlinski report the persistency of the effect despite numerous debiasing 
attempts.409 Kamin and Rachlinski mention that  
―Unfortunately, the hindsight bias has proven resistant to most 
debiasing techniques… Some researchers have obtained limited 
debiasing by significantly restructuring the decision-making task, or by 
having participants consider alternative outcomes. Although these 
cognitive strategies have reduced the influence of the bias, no known 
technique completely eliminates the effect.‖410 
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 See Tarek El-Sehitya, Hans Haumerb, Christian Helmensteinc, Erich Kirchlerd & Boris 
Maciejovsky ―Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude within the Context of Experimental Asset 
Markets‖, 4 Journal of Behavioral Finance 227, 240 (2002) (―Our results do not lend support to the 
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 Rach linski believes that the hindsight bias is so deeply ingrained in the judgment process that it is 
probably impossible to avoid its influence. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory 
of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 602 (1998) (―Avoiding the influence of the hindsight 
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409
 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight‖, 
19 Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 92 (1995). Somewhat surprisingly, one study found no evidence of 
hindsight bias on judges‘ determinations of probable cause. See And rew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & 
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Disregarding‖, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1313-18 (2005). Sanna and Schwarz explain that ―Hindsight 
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Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz ―Debiasing the Hindsight Bias: The Role of Accessibility 
Experiences and (Mis)attribuitions‖, 39 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 287, 287 (2003 ). 
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 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight‖, 
19 Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 92 (1995).  
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It follows that the hindsight bias defies the proficiency of ex post judges to correctly 
distinguish between an irrational, merely suboptimal or self- interested decision vis-à-
vis an unfortunate turn of events. Once this knowledge is applied to the context of 
lender opportunistic behavior, it naturally questions one of the main points raised in 
the previous chapter, namely the benefit of broadening the scope of lender control 
liability due to the risk of penalizing efficient decision making by controlling lenders.  
 
As it was mentioned above, empirical studies in different contexts have 
confirmed the concerns regarding hindsight bias. Specifically, several studies have 
demonstrated that judges, including in particular bankruptcy judges, are also affected 
by several cognitive biases among which is the hindsight bias.411 In addition, several 
opinions recognize the problem and express particular concern about adjudicators 
falling prey to the influence of hindsight bias, what leads them to avoid taking actions 
that would make them prone to cognitive errors.412 A prominent example came from 
the Seventh Circuit opinion in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of 
Whiting, where Judge Easterbrook mentioned, in the context of an equitable 
subordination action, that 
―Debtor submits that conduct may be "unfair" and "inequitable" for 
[the] purpose [of determining whether to apply equitable subordination] 
even though the creditor complies with all contractual requirements, 
but we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires participants in 
commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do 
"more" -just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy 
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 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ― Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 
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 Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort state that ―Courts cite concerns with hindsight in nearly one -third 
of all published opinions in securities class action cases.‖ See Mitu Gulat i, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Donald C. Langevoort ―Fraud by Hindsight‖, 98 Nw. U.L. Rev. 773, 775 (2004).  
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judge assessing the situation years later.‖413 
In the same vein, the Delaware Chancery Court expressed in Trenwick America 
Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., a case concerning the possible breach of 
fiduciary duties by a parent company directors towards the subsidiary‘s creditors, that  
―What Delaware law does not do is to impose retroactive fiduciary 
obligations on directors simply because their chosen business strategy 
did not pan out.‖414  
 
Other instances replicating the worry of hindsight bias affecting the 
objectiveness of assessments has also been brought out in the instructions that trial 
judges give to the jury when considering director‘s liability. For instance, in Theriot v. 
Bourg, trial court‘s instructions read  
―[Y]ou should not evaluate defendants actions through insights and 
wisdom that you have gained only through hindsight. Likewise, you 
can not judge the wisdom of a business venture solely by its results. 
The mere fact that a loss was sustained does not prove that the business 
judgment was improvidently made.‖415 
 
The concern about hindsight bias shows that overcoming its problems is far 
from trivial. Nonetheless, there is a legal debiasing technique which has been 
                                                 
413
 See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting , 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7
th
 circuit, 
1990) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Second Circu it affirmed that after the fact assessments may not 
be more than a wild hunch. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2
nd
 Circu it, 1982) (―Second, courts 
recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business 
decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a 
courtroom years later, since business imperat ives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less 
than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, 
and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a 
background of perfect knowledge.‖)  
414
 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. , 906 A.2d 168, 173 (Del. Ch., 2006) 
415
 See Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213, 220 (1
st
 Circu it, 1997). 
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proposed as a way to avoid hindsight bias problems at least in the context of directors 
and managers liability assessments. The next subsection will discuss this proposed 
technique. 
 
C. Hindsight Bias and Strict Liability 
Despite the sharp criticism voiced against liability judgments due to the fear of 
hindsight bias, Rachlinski has proposed a debiasing416 legal tool in the case of 
managers‘ fiduciary liability.417  Rachlinski proposes to eliminate hindsight bias by 
allocating the liability assessment before the action is taken. His proposal works as a 
way to reduce the problems presented by hindsight bias strictly for those cases where  
―[T]he technology of precaution is unilateral (in the sense that only the 
potential injurer can realistically take action to reduce the probability or 
severity of an accident)‖.418  
Theoretically, strict liability insulates injurers from the possibility of hindsight bias 
because the party who may potentially damage another assesses the situation ex ante. 
As the potential tort feasor is always found liable because negligence plays no role in 
the process, then he doesn‘t have to pay attention to ex post determinations of 
probabilities.419  
                                                 
416
 It is slightly inaccurate to refer to strict liability as debiasing device, as having strict liability avoids 
ex post assessments and therefore avoids hindsight rather than debiasing it once it already occur. I will 
nonetheless use it in order to maintain the current terminology.  
417
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 571, 595-600 (1998) 
418
 In fact, Korobkin and Ulen propose to increase the use of strict liab ility as a way to limit  the effect of 
hindsight bias. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen ―Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics‖,88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1098-9 (2000)  
419
 The idea of letting the possible tort feasor evaluate the probability of harm ex ante and therefore 
avoid bias is closely related to the use of an ex ante custom to avoid judgments biased by hindsight, as 
for example in the cases of medical malpractice. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological 
Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 612 (1998) (―In one class of cases--medical 
malpractice--courts have acknowledged that the profession's ex ante custom is probably superior to their 
ex post judgment. Doctors who have followed customary medical procedure are not to be considered 
negligent. The courts believe that the conditions necessary for the development of eff icient customs 
exist in the medical profession. This exception to the general rule shows that the courts do distrust the 
value of second-guessing ex ante decisions. However, there are reasons other than the hindsight bias to 
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To better understand Rachlinski‘s argument, it is convenient to look at the 
standard tort model used in law and economics for those cases where the technology 
of precaution is unilateral.420 In that model, there are two variables: the potential 
injurer‘s activity level z (chosen by injurers) and the level of care x which he can opt 
to engage in. The activity level will generate benefit b(z) and the level of care will 
generate a probability of harm p(x). In addition, it is assumed that x represents the 
private cost to a potential injurer arising from prevention and that h, a fixed value, 
represents the possible damage caused by the injurer each time an injurer engages in 
his activity.  Then, in order to promote a Kaldor- Hicks type of efficiency, the social 
objective would be to maximize  
b(z) – z(x + p(x)h)   (1) 
Standard law and economics arguments go on to suggest that wealth maximization, in 
this case represented by maximization of (1), should be the main objective the tort 
legal system should try to achieve.421  
 
Following this model, a legal system would be more efficient and, arguably, a 
potential injurer choosing behind the veil of ignorance422 would prefer to be judged by 
strict liability when there‘s a possibility of hindsight bias, as a strict liability system 
erases the possibility that adjudicators ex post determine that the level of care the 
                                                                                                                                            
treat a medical custom as reasonable per se. The medical profession has more expertise than the courts 
at determining appropriate treatments and has sufficient economic incentives to develop customs that 
reflect due care. The inaccuracy of judging in hindsight is yet another strike against the institutional 
competence of the courts.‖)   
420
 See Steven Shavell ―Strict Liability Versus Negligence‖, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980)  
421
 See Daniel Brudney ―Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force‖, 10 Law and Philosophy 235, 235-7 
(1991).  
422
 See Daniel Brudney ―Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force‖, 10 Law and Philosophy 235, 238 
(1991) (―The argument is simply that ex ante she would have consented to the [social wealth 
maximization] policy as in her individual interest. As a rational agent she would have p referred it. 
Therefore, ex post, it ought to be imposed on her.‖)  
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injurer chose generated a probability of harm p (x) larger than it actually did - i.e. p (x) 
> p(x) -.423 The potential injurer will know ex ante the values of x, p(x) and h, while at 
the same time the potential injurer knows that the assessment of h will be accurate.424 
Therefore, the potential injurer will maximize (1) without the need to pay attention to 
anything else. Hence, and regardless of the distributive effects that strict liability 
would carry, strict liability would assure that efficient activity and care levels are 
taken irrespective of any hindsight bias impact.425 
 
Even when the technology of precaution is unilateral, it doesn‘t necessarily 
follow that strict liability should be applied to liability assessments against managers 
or controlling parties (as lenders) as a way to prevent adjudication errors due to 
hindsight bias. In some contexts, Rachlinski believes that it may not be efficient to 
adopt a strict liability rule. Focusing on the BJR, Rachlinski considers that while it 
works as a ―no liability‖ rule it is as an efficient way to achieve a second best 426 in 
dealing with hindsight bias.427 Obviously, a no- liability regime impedes hindsight bias 
                                                 
423
 p (x) is the ex post probability assessment tainted by hindsight bias. Because hindsight would turn 
p(x) into p (x), it fo llows that a negligence rule would  make the potential tort feasor maximize b(z) – z(x 
+ p (x)h), which means that the activity level will never be higher than under strict liability.  
424
 This follows from the model assumption. In the case of an accident, the proto -typical example in 
mind when the model was developed, it is fair to assume that there won‘t be a major problem in the 
assessment of damages. For example, if someone crashes his vehicle into a mailbox destroying the later, 
the money required to replace the mailbox will be easily assessed after checking the market price for 
mailboxes. In the case of lender control liab ility and the business judgment rule it is not clear that the 
amount of damages can be assessed in such a clear way. I will go back to this point in section III.   
425
 Nonetheless, Rachlinski
 
argues that even if negligence is the standard used to assess liability social 
efficiency may not be substantially affected, as lenders will understand the negligence standard as a 
quasi-strict liability one. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 595-600 (1998) (―the hindsight bias converts the negligence 
standard into a de facto system of strict liability. Negligence judgments influenced by the hindsight bias 
should therefore have economic consequences similar to those of a system of strict liab ility.‖)  
426
 On the theory of second best, see Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster ―The General Theory of 
Second Best‖, 24 Review of Economic Studies 11 (1956).  
427
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 571, 619 (1998) (―have fewer adverse consequences than a rule of negligence judged in 
hindsight‖). Jolls and Susntein believe that this type of debiasing rules are of an invasive character, as 
entirely block choice in the hope that legal outcomes will not fall prey  to problems of bounded 
rationality and recommend the adoption of a less intrusive method. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein ―Debiasing through Law‖, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199, 202 (2006) (―Compared with the more 
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as the later can only arise when an ex post assessment is made. Rachlinski provides 
both ―equitable and economic‖ reasons to use a no- liability rule in the case of the BJR. 
The later arguments refer to the disincentive that a strict liability rule would create on 
people to become firm‘s managers, as well as the incentives to take excessive 
precautions a liability rule would create for the individuals who take on a managing 
activity. As a result, general economic activity would be undermined. 428 The former 
arguments focus on shareholders‘ ability to fire managers directly or indirectly by 
selling their stock, the limited amount of loss suffered by shareholders and their ability 
to diversify their risk of loss. Therefore, Rachlinski believes that a no- liability BJR 
prevents the costs of having suboptimal managers, as well as the chance that they 
choose only low risk projects, while at the same time complementary rules allow to 
limit the costs that managers‘ misbehavior can impose on individual shareholders.    
 
To the extent that Rachlinski‘s view can be used as an analogy for lender 
control liability, it vindicates Section 14 O of the Restatement Second of the Law of 
Agency and calls into question the benefit of dropping such clause. In the following 
section, I will look into another cognitive problem, anchoring, to further investigate 
the benefit from having a strict liability rule for lender control liability, as well as for 
directors and/ or managers fiduciary duties. In section III, I will discuss whether a no-
liability rule is a good alternative also in the context of lender control liability.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
common approach of insulating legal outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality, a significant 
advantage of strategies for debiasing through law is that they aim to correct errors while still preserving 
as much opportunity as possible for people to make their own choices… An important corolla ry of 
choice-preserving strategies is that they help to address boundedly rational behavior while avoiding the 
imposition of significant costs on those who do not exhibit bounded rationality.‖)  
428
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 571, 622-3 (1998) 
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D. Anchoring 
Closely related to hindsight bias, another well-known cognitive error is 
commonly referred to as anchoring.429 Tversky and Kahneman define anchoring as the 
bias which occurs when people make estimates depending on an irrelevant starting 
point.430 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich consider that  
―[a]nchors affect judgment by changing the standard of reference that 
people use when making numeric judgments.‖431  
As well as hindsight bias, anchoring is intimately related to the difficult problem of 
disregarding known information.432 Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski provide three 
theories to help explain this phenomenon based on motivation, ironic process theory 
and mental contamination.433 The first theory, motivation, implies that explicitly 
telling people to disregard information may increase their desire to attend to it, a 
concept researchers refer to as ―psychological reactance‖. The second theory, ironic 
process, suggests that even if individuals want to ignore certain information, they may 
find particularly difficult to avoid thinking about that information they do want to 
ignore. Finally, mental contamination theory puts forward that the brain does not 
compartmentalize gathered information. As a result, information which may be 
irrelevant to this decision may, nonetheless, affect individual‘s judgment by 
                                                 
429
 See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich ―The Anchoring -and-Adjusting Heuristic: Why the 
Adjustments Are Insufficient‖, 17 Psychological Science 311 (2006).   
430
 See ―Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases‖, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Pau l Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University 
Press, New York, NY (1982), p. 14. In the same vein, Epley and Gilovich consider that ―the starting 
informat ion, or anchor, tends to exert a  drag on the subsequent adjustment process, leaving final 
estimates too close to the original anchor.‖ See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich ―The Anchoring -
and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments are Insufficient?‖, 17 Psychological Science 311, 311 
(2006).   
431
 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 Cornell 
L. Rev. 777, 788 (2001) 
432
 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Can Judges Ignore Inadm issible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding‖, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1260-70 (2005) 
433
 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregard ing‖, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1260-70 (2005) 
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influencing how subsequent events are processed and which beliefs are formed.  
 
Regardless of which theoretical reflection best describes the existence of 
anchoring, this bias has been empirically observed in many diverse fields.434 
Specifically relating to the focus of this paper, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich have 
produced three separate demonstrations of anchoring, showing that it affects federal 
magistrates, state and federal judges, and bankruptcy judges. 435 The first among these 
studies was conducted over a sample of federal magistrate judges who were asked to 
assess damages arising out of an accident. Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich found that 
their sample group was subject to anchoring,436 despite the fact that ―judges are 
experienced, well- trained, and highly motivated decision makers‖.437 In the second 
study, based on a similar damage assessment case, a sample of federal magistrates, 
state and federal judges were exposed to anchoring effects arising from both low and 
high anchors. As expected, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich found that both anchors 
had a significant impact on the amount of damages awarded. In the third study, 
bankruptcy judges faced a determination of interest rate in a chapter 13 case. 
                                                 
434
 Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec asked MBA students whether they would buy some products for a 
price equal to the dollar figure equivalent to the last two digits of their social security number. 
Afterwards, they were asked to specify the highest amount they would be willing to pay for the 
products while reminded that the social security number is random. The subjects with higher social 
security numbers were willing to pay more for the products. See Colin F. Camerer & George 
Loewenstein ―Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future‖, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS, Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ (2004), p. 13., citing Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec ―Coherent 
Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences‖, 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 
73 (2003). For another example regard ing underwriters recommendations, see Roni Michaely & Kent 
L. Womack ―Market Efficiency and Biases in Brokerage Recommendations‖, in Advances in 
Behavioral Finance, Richard H. Thaler ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (2005), p . 408.  
435
 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 Cornell 
L. Rev. 777, 780 (2001); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding‖, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 
(2005); and, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Bankruptcy Judge‘s 
Mind‖, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227 (2006).  
436
 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 Cornell 
L. Rev. 777, 787-94 (2001). 
437
 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Judicial Mind‖, 86 Cornell 
L. Rev. 777, 782 (2001) 
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Although, the results were relatively smaller, anchoring still had a noticeable impact 
on the outcome. It is not immediately clear why bankruptcy judges were relatively less 
prone to the cognitive error in this study. Rachlinski, Guthrie and Wistrich believe that 
they aren‘t less susceptible to this effect.438  
 
Although anchoring has been found in different contexts, researchers have 
found ways to affect its magnitude. Anchoring produced by declarative information 
has been shown to be negatively affected by the interplay of metacognitive 
experiences, such as  
―[P]articipants provided estimates closer to self-generated anchors (i.e., 
they adjusted less) when they were simultaneously nodding their heads 
up and down (consistent with acceptance…) than when they were 
shaking their heads from side to side (consistent with rejection).‖439  
In addition, anchoring has been shown to be negatively correlated to the confidence 
the evaluator has in its own assessment (i.e. ―when people are not confident in their 
judgments, they are more susceptible to anchoring effects‖), a confidence which 
Sunstein, Kahneman and Schkade believe to be low when awarding dollar amounts. 440  
 
                                                 
438
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ,Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich ―Inside the Bankruptcy Judge‘s 
Mind‖, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227, 1233-37 (2006) (―In the first of these studies, we showed that the 
introduction of an extremely low anchor reduced damage awards by 0.41 standard deviations. In the 
second study, we tested the effects of both a low and a high anchor and found that the low anchor 
reduced awards by 0.58 standard deviations, while the high anchor increased awards by 0.75 standard 
deviations. In the present study of bankruptcy judges, the anchor increased the interest rate by 0.37 
standard deviations. The effect size observed in this study is only slightly smaller than the effect size we 
have observed in our previous studies of generalist judges. Therefore, we cannot conclude from this that 
bankruptcy judges are less susceptible than generalist judges to the anchoring effect‖) 
439
 See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich ―The Anchoring-and-Adjusting Heuristic: Why the 
Adjustments Are Insufficient‖, 17 Psychological Science 311, 312 (2006), cit ing Nicholas Epley & 
Thomas Gilovich ―Putting adjustment back in the  anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Differential 
processing of self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors‖, 12 Psychological Science 391 (2001)   
440
 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade ―Assessing Punitive Damages (with 
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)‖, 107 Yale L. J. 2071, 2109 (1998).   
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In the next section, I will explore the possibility of anchoring and hindsight 
bias acting together and affecting ex post assessments. To the best of my knowledge, 
there has not been any study yet connecting anchoring, in addition to hindsight bias, to 
lender control liability theories or the BJR. 
 
III. Damage Assessments: the Role of Anchoring 
What is the relation between anchoring and hindsight bias? If both cognitive 
errors were to act together, then it would question whether a strict liability rule is an 
efficient way to limit biases in ex post adjudications. If that was the case, and 
regardless of whether Rachlinski‘s BJR analysis could be extended to lender control 
liability,441 the inability to trust adjudicators on liability assessments would not merely 
be due to hindsight bias but also to anchoring. If this was the case, this analysis would 
apply analogously to the BJR context.  
 
A. Lender Control Liability: The Interplay of Anchoring and Hindsight 
Bias 
I will suggest that where lender control liability theories are involved, the 
superior characteristic of strict liability in unilateral torts doesn‘t apply because 
damage determinations are difficult to establish and are also prone to cognitive errors 
(i.e. anchoring). As it was explained above, in the standard unilateral tort model used 
                                                 
441
 The ―equitable‖ reasons provided by Rachlinski do not seem compelling for lender control liability 
on firms formed partially with implicit contracts. First, as stock is not the only way to participate in the 
―ownership‖ of the firm, then voting control has  a limited disciplining power. In addition, because the 
firm is in d istress selling the stock (or claims) to sanction a controlling lender would have a very limited 
effect (if any at all). Second, if there are firm specific investments, the magnitude of th e loss could be 
higher (i.e. in lost wages) than what was invested, frustrating for these actors the limited liability of 
corporations. Third, firm specific investments are not easily diversifiab le (i.e . you can‘t make large 
numbers of firm specific investments). The ―economic‖ reasons may not deter a controlling lender. It is 
not clear what comprises excessive precautions. As lender control liability can potentially generate 
costs which are externalized to other constituents, it is not clear that today the  optimal level of 
precautions is taken. I leave the resolution of these issues for future research. 
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in law and economics the level of damages is entirely independent from the level of 
care exercised by the potential injurer and, more importantly, it is assumed that the 
level of harm is fixed whenever an accident occurs. The later simplifying assumption 
makes sense when we discuss damages arising from accidents, where the amount of 
damages is fairly easy to establish and can generally be thought to be a product of the 
level of care exercised by the potential injurer. For example, in the case of an out of 
control car running into a fence and destroying it, the amount of money required to 
make the owner of the fence even is easily established by checking the market price 
for the materials and labor required to reconstruct the fence. In those situations where 
damages assessments require counterfactual inquiries, as with lender control liability 
cases, the possibility of falling prey to cognitive errors shows that thinking of damages 
as fixed amounts may be counterproductive. Indeed, the amount of damages won‘t 
likely be a product of the potential injurer‘s level of care, but rather a product of the 
potentially biased assessment by the adjudicator.  
 
An example, concentrating on the size of the damage determination, will help 
to illustrate the later point.442 I will put aside the complex questions of whether the 
lender was in control or not in order to merely focus on the amount of the damage 
assessment.443 Let‘s assume for simplicity that a controlling lender of a reorganizing 
firm has two options444: he can either liquidate the firm, generating a fixed amount L, 
or he can attempt to reorganize it. If he chooses the latter, he will incur for sure 
                                                 
442
 This example follows what Fischel calls a familiar pattern in lender liability cases. See Daniel R. 
Fischel ―The Economics of Lender Liab ility‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 147 (1989) (―Damage claims in lender 
liab ility cases follow a familiar pattern. A lender is alleged either to have wrongfully refused to lend, or 
to have called, a loan. The borrower then demands huge actual damages based on lost profits.‖) 
443
 A proposal on how to assess whether a lender is in control or not will be given in the next chapter. 
For now, it is assumed that it is evident whether a lender is in control or not.  
444
 In this example, I am assuming that there are no problems emerg ing from d if ferent classes of legal 
claimholders and that relationship specific investments are not affected by the decision. Although I 
recognize the unrealistic nature of these assumptions, using them will help us to focus on why strict 
liab ility cannot help to insulate against the hindsight bias.  
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reorganization costs C. These costs may derive from several different sources, such as 
negotiation costs, the costs of running the firm until a plan is approved, the costs of 
lost managerial energies, etc. Let‘s further assume that if the reorganization option is 
chosen, the firm may obtain a favorable reorganization value R+ with a probability 
p(R+) or, alternatively, an unfavorable reorganization value R- with probability p(R-). 
Therefore, a controlling lender willing to maximize firm value 445 and deciding on a 
course of action under a strict lender control liability rule should choose, in a cognitive 
error free scenario, depending on whether L is bigger or smaller than  
 
Cpp   )R(R)R(R   (2) 
 
Unfortunately, this is not a cognitive error free world. Let‘s assume then, that 
if the controlling lender chooses option L, the state of the world that realizes is the 
favorable one where an independent adjudicator having to assess the propriety of the 
liquidation option will have to infer the value or range of values which would have 
realized if the reorganization option was chosen. Finally, let‘s assume that as a result 
of the realized state of the world the controlling lender gets sued under lender control 
liability under the theory that the rest of the claimholders were prejudiced due to the 
clearly (or even knowingly) mistaken liquidation decision. How will the adjudicator 
likely proceed in order to resolve this dispute? 
 
In order to determine whether the controlling lender liquidation decision was 
detrimental to the other claimants the adjudicator will need to investigate the existence 
of damage, which by assumption is traceable to the controlling lender‘s decision. To 
                                                 
445
 It is unlikely that a controlling lender who gets control through covenants in the debt contract and 
having a security interest in most, if not all, of the debtor assets will choose following (2), as he would 
prefer to maximize a sure return over a risky one. Nonetheless, in order to simplify the analysis I will 
abstract away from this issue  and assume that the controlling lender will be ―altruistic‖.  
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accomplish the damage evaluation, the adjudicator needs to compare L, which is 
assumed to have been obtained in a fair process, with his assessment of the ex ante 
result of reorganization. If the adjudicator was cognitive error free, the answer would 
be given by (2). Provided that the reorganization estimate is bigger than the liquidation 
value, then the controlling lender could potentially have to pay damages up to that 
difference.446 As L is fixed by whatever amount was obtained in the liquidation of the 
firm‘s assets, then the damage assessment will depend on the estimated value of the 
counterfactual reorganization. 
 
For an adjudicator to determine the reorganization value, three set of quantities 
need to be estimated: the probabilities of each state of the world occurring, the costs of 
restructuring and the reorganization value in each of the possible states of the world. It 
is safe to assume that courts can estimate rather accurately restructuring costs due to 
their extended experience with this type of cases. In addition, there is a fairly 
important number of empirical papers describing a consistent range of mean and 
median direct, and even indirect, bankruptcy costs. 447 The potentially problematic 
issue is to determine the assessments of probabilities, as well as reorganization values.  
 
It is fair to assume, as we have seen before, that probabilities would likely be 
overestimated due to hindsight bias. Again, strict liability would prevent a controlling 
                                                 
446
 We are abstracting away from any damages occurring out reliance in the behavior or words of the 
controlling lender.  
447
 See Edward I. Altman ―A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question‖, 39 
Journal of Finance 1067 (1984); Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet ―The Insignificance of 
Bankruptcy Costs to the Theory of Optimal Capital St ructure‖, 33 Journal of Finance 383 (1978);  
Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu ―The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 
11 Reorganizat ion‖, 61 Journal of Finance 1253 (2006); Maria Carapeto ―Is Bargain ing in Chapter 11 
Costly?‖, Cass Business School Working Paper, availab le at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241569 (2003); and, Robert M. Lawless & Stephen 
P. Ferris ―Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations‖, 75 Wash. U. 
L. Q. 1207 (1997). 
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lender from suffering from an unfair treatment as long as the amount of damages was 
easy to assess without error. But the need to estimate the reorganization value in 
different states of the world changes the picture, as it is not immediately evident that 
this will result in an accurate assessment. And precisely here is where I suggest that 
anchoring enters the picture and prevents strict liability to be a solution.  
 
In the simple model presented in the example above, both reorganization 
values need to be assessed by an adjudicator who, to use Rawls figure, won‘t likely be 
behind a veil of ignorance. In a way, an anchor for R+ and R- will be given as the party 
bringing up the suit against the controlling lender will come up with a number for 
what R+ and R- and they will communicate this amounts to the court. As receiving a 
larger amount of damages than what the moving party asked for is unlikely, the 
reorganization estimates are likely to be biased towards being larger. Therefore, if 
either R+ or R- is assessed in a bias way towards the amounts suggested by the moving 
party (or his expert witness), then a strict liability rule will not limit the effects of 
cognitive errors. The overestimation of R+ and R- won‘t be due to hindsight, as it is 
not a probability assessment, but most likely due to anchoring, leading to a suboptimal 
assessment of the damage amount.448   
 
As it was hinted above, the same analysis should be applied to adjudications of 
liability under the duty of care, regardless of using the BJR or other liability rule as the 
appropriate standard. The BJR requires an assessment of damages which also depends 
on a counterfactual (what value would the firm have, had the manager/ director acted 
differently) which inevitably leads towards an assessment of the damage amount by 
                                                 
448
 Another possibility of bias may be due to representativeness heuristics (i.e. a great description of the 
firm). See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman ―Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases‖, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, NY (1982), p. 8.  
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the adjudicator. As a result, a strict liability rule would not achieve an efficient 
outcome as previously advanced by Rachlinski due to the interplay in this case also of 
anchoring and hindsight bias. This analysis can be extended to any unilateral 
precaution situation where a counterfactual valuation and probability assessment need 
to be conducted. In these cases, a strict liability rule cannot be thought of as a 
debiasing technique. 
 
To sum up, a controlling lender may accurately estimate probabilities ex ante 
and therefore avoid problems related to hindsight bias if a strict liability rule were to 
be used. Nonetheless, as other values need to be estimated (i.e. the value of the 
reorganized firm under some states of the world), these estimates are outside of his 
control (actually decided upon by the adjudicator) and based on a counterfactual type 
of analysis, a strict liability rule will likely be an inadequate debiasing legal tool for 
lender control liability. The efficiency of a lender control liability case then depends 
not just on hindsight bias but also on anchoring, the magnitude of the distortions and 
maybe the effects of these two heuristics on each other, if any. 449 As a corollary, the 
same analysis applies to adjudications of liability arising from alleged violations of the 
duty of care by managers/ directors, and hence a strict liability rule won‘t guarantee an 
adequate level of care by those managers/ directors.  
 
B. A no liability rule for lender control liability? 
As it was mentioned above, even though Rachlinski believed that a strict 
liability rule would avoid the problems generated by hindsight bias in cases alleging 
breach of fiduciary duties by directors, some contextual elements implied that it was 
                                                 
449
 In relation to their experiment Kamin and Rachlinski discuss hindsight bias  interaction with 
anchoring. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in 
Hindsight‖, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 101 (1995)  
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better to have a no liability rule as the BJR.  If a no liability rule for individuals in 
control was judged appropriate for directors when avoiding hindsight bias problems 
was considered possible through a strict liability rule, then it could be argued that a no 
liability rule would be even better fitted for lender control liability cases where 
cognitive errors seem to be unavoidable. Should we then advance a no liability rule 
policy, as I have alleged in the previous chapter that courts usually do, for lender 
control liability cases? 
 
In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to look at the arguments that 
justified the no- liability rule for breach of fiduciary duties in general, as lender control 
liability could be understood as a special case of the later. There are two sets of 
different yet complementary arguments in favor of a no- liability rule: (i) one set is 
composed by what would happen otherwise type of arguments, which I refer to as 
―consequentialist fear‖ type of arguments; and, (ii) the other is based on what 
alternatives exist to prevent damages of large magnitude from arising under a no- 
liability rule, which I refer to as ―functional alternatives‖. On the first set of 
arguments, ―consequentialist fear‖, we find three strands all of which arise in one way 
or another from the inability of judges to evaluate correctly directors‘ and officers‘ 
conduct.450 First, Rachlinsky claimed that the BJR works as a no liability rule in order 
to avoid excessive precautions and, more generally, risk aversion from managers who 
are heavily invested on the firm.451 Second, Rachlinsky posited that a no- liability BJR 
prevents the best qualified manager prospects from not accepting a managing position 
                                                 
450
 See Geoffrey P. Miller ―A Modest Proposal for fixing Delaware‘s Broken Duty of Care‖, NYU Law 
and Economics Research Paper No. 09-41, available at  
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1200&context=nyu_lewp  (last visited 06/11/10) 
(claiming that the justificat ion for inaction is that Delaware courts lack the ability to monitor, an  
observation extending back at least as far as Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
- ―judges are not business experts‖-. 
451
 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 571, 619-23 (1998). 
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due to the fear of liability.452 Finally, Bainbridge suggests that a rule which moves 
away from no- liability would undermine the social norms of group behavior which in 
turn constrain bad decision making.453 The second group of arguments, ―functional 
alternatives‖, suggest that assigning a termination option to the shareholders to fire 
managers (in our case the option would be assigned to debtor‘s lender), actually 
constrain rather effectively managers‘ misbehavior. Additionally, and specifically for 
lender control liability, it is argued that creditors‘ termination rights would not be 
abused due to the danger of damaging the creditor reputation as well as from the 
ability to obtain credit from other sources.454 Thence, a creditor would use its 
termination rights as additional leverage to increase or complement its monitoring 
abilities.455 
 
Let‘s start by looking at the excessive precaution argument. Everyone seems to 
agree that risk aversion is something to avoid when looking for a business manager 
(or, a controlling party).456 Business decision making requires constant risk taking 
which makes risk aversion a fast lane to sub- optimal performance. In spite of using an 
approach at odds with the BJR (imposing a liability regime instead of a no liability 
one), secured lender control liability also looks essentially to limit excessive 
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 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 571, 619-23 (1998). 
453
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ―Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance‖, 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 49-50 (2002). 
454
 Buckley, for example, discusses reputation costs in order to limit opportunistic termination of 
managers by lenders. See F.H. Buckley ―The Termination Decision‖, 61 UMKC. L. Rev. 243, 269 
(1992) (―Under costly signaling theories, the issuance of unconstrained termination rights signals high 
firm quality. While such rights increase the costs of creditor misbehavior, such costs are more easily 
borne by highly solvent firms. Although the creditor is permitted to terminate at any time, he will 
realistically be constrained from terminating solvent firms by reputational sanctions for creditor 
misbehavior.‖).  
455
 See F.H. Buckley ―The Termination Decision‖, 61 UMKC. L. Rev. 243, 277-8 (1992). 
456
 Rachlinski, for instance, considers that if excessive precautions are undertaken general economic 
activity would be undermined. See Jeffrey J. Rach linski ―A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging 
in Hindsight‖, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 622-3 (1998) 
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precautions, a point which appears to have been missed by previous researchers.  
 
In order to see why, it is convenient to focus on the incentives which the 
different parties hold. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, a controlling lender 
obtains such a role in a business reorganization through having most if not all the 
assets of the debtor encumbered, being a post-petition lender (i.e. not being captured 
by the automatic stay provisions) and contracting for very stringent covenants on the 
part of the debtor which serve as extra sensitive trip wires. As these trip- wires could 
be triggered at any point, the lender becomes extremely necessary to provide the 
debtor with contractual waivers in order to avoid a default. Through the waiver 
mechanism the lender can impose its preference over risk- taking as well as the path 
towards his desired outcome. These preferences are well documented to lead toward 
insufficient risk- taking and a liquidation bias for the bankruptcy process, 457 especially 
when total amount of debt owed to the controlling secured lender is less than the va lue 
of the assets securing the debt.  
 
The rest of the reorganization claimants have lower priority and therefore 
would probably prefer higher levels of risk taking which would raise the expected 
value of their claims, as well as raising the value of the real option of delaying the 
shutdown decision.458 As a result, it is most likely that these lower priority claimants 
would bring a lender control liability claim against the higher priority controlling 
lender when not enough risk taking was exercised than otherwise. Then, permitting 
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 The liquidation bias is broadly recognized. See for example Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen ―Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance‖, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 
1246 (2006). 
458
 On risk taking and option value of keeping the firm running, see Douglas G. Baird & Edward 
Morrison ―Bankruptcy Decision Making‖, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org. 356, 358 -62 (2001) (―The ability to 
postpone the shutdown decision has value and should be factored into the calculation when deciding 
whether to shutdown the firm… The value of the option increases as the uncertainty about future 
earnings increase.‖)  
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lender control liability cases to come forward would limit excessive precautions and 
risk- aversion in general by the controlling lender.  
 
The second consequentialist fear argument focuses on preventing that top 
qualified individuals reject managing positions,459 doesn‘t have equal importance for 
lender control liability cases as the lender itself is the one being sued. Nonetheless, the 
present problem is closely related to the disincentive which lenders may have to lend, 
under the assumption that if lenders are going to be sued then they will either charge 
for their services more or decide not to lend. While this is possible, it may not be as 
large of a problem as it may seem at first sight. On the one hand, lenders who provide 
DIP loans are typically the main lenders from before the initiation of the bankruptcy 
proceeding. As a result, main lenders will still have an important incentive to lend 
once the debtor enters a reorganization proceeding in order to better continue 
monitoring the debtor.460 On the other hand, if lenders are today relying on obtaining 
control of a bankrupt debtor in order to price their loans, then those loans could be 
artificially low. In other words, DIP loans may be too cheap if the lender knows that 
he will get extra rents out of acting opportunistically once in control. Hence, more 
expensive lending could actually imply a more efficient allocation of resources.  
 
 The last consequentialist fear argument was advanced by Bainbridge within his 
group decision-making theory of boards.461 Bainbridge believes that the firm must be 
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 See, for example, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner ―Outside Director 
Liability‖, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1140 (2006) who in the context of analyzing outside director liability 
conclude that the limited deterrence is justified as ―[a] significantly higher level of risk for outside 
directors could well deter good candidates from serving and make directors who do serve exces sively 
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460
 Otherwise, they risk putting the monitoring into another lender‘s hand whose interests may be 
conflicting with those of the original lender.  
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 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ―Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance‖, 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1 (2002).  
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viewed as a set of production teams embedded within a hierarchical structure. At the 
top of this hierarchy stands the board of directors, a collective body which is able to 
benefit from the advantages of group decision-making over individuals relative to 
critical evaluative judgment.462 One of the advantages arising from having a collective 
body as the ultimate decision maker is that it provides checks for individual 
overconfidence and alternative viewpoints from equally situated individuals. In 
addition, it creates a ―network of reputation and other social sanctions‖. 463 Bainbridge 
believes that BJR as a no-liability rule can be understood as a way to prevent 
disruptions to social norms or personal relationships which are key to the development 
of social pressure.464   
 
 Whatever real bite this argument has in justifying a no liability rule as the BJR, 
it clearly cannot carry the same weight into LCL cases. Naturally, as a lender obtains 
control of a debtor and especially in those cases where the lender obtained control by 
informal means, whatever social norms applied to the board of directors as a decision 
making body become largely irrelevant for decision making purposes. The relevant 
social institutions now are whichever ones, if any, are in place within the creditor 
restructuring department. As a result, there shouldn‘t be any qualms about imposing 
LCL at least with respect to the disruption of board of directors‘ social norms. 465  
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 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ―Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance‖, 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 27-30, 33-7 (2002) (concluding that group interaction has synergistic effects 
allowing groups to outperform even the best decision-makers within the groups). 
463
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ―Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance‖, 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 37 (2002).  
464
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ―Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance‖, 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 49 (2002).  
465
 It could be argued that the disruptive effect wouldn‘t occur within the debtor‘s board of directors but 
within the lender‘s one. I believe that such an argument would be incorrect, as the liability does not 
follow direct ly to the lender directors. As a result, it is not immediately clear how the network of social 
relationships and sanctions would be affected. 
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The second set of defenses towards a no- liability regime for lender control 
liability problems, the functional alternatives defense, looks at other means to avoid 
losses arising out of lender control which would make lender control liability 
adjudications trivial. Two are prominently suggested: one based on lenders‘ 
reputation; the other on alternative sources of credit. 466 The reputation story tells us 
that lenders are repeated players and that extracting value opportunistically from a 
distressed debtor would tarnish their reputation. Then, they will look at how much 
future business they would lose by behaving opportunistically and thence will decide 
not to. This argument relies on the ability of future trading partners to know whether a 
lender behaved opportunistically or not in a relation with others (i.e. how easy it is to 
identify opportunistic behavior). But lender control of a reorganization proceedings 
looks a lot more like murky Amazon waters than crystal ocean ones.  A situation of 
informal take of control of a firm with far from optimal recent financial results is not a 
fertile ground for quality and consistent information. In addition, the creditor relative 
size may completely limit the reputation effect, likely due to its market power. In fact, 
in a recent study looking at the effects of large bankruptcies on lead syndication 
arrangers Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli found that  
―… that the increase in lead allocation following large bankruptcies is 
confined only to small lead arrangers (lead arrangers within the 95th 
percentile in terms of syndication volume); i.e., large lead arrangers are 
unaffected by large bankruptcies… These results highlight a key 
limitation of the reputation mechanism, and may go some way towards 
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 See Daniel R. Fischel ―The Economics of Lender Liability‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 138 (1989) (―… the 
lender must be concerned about the effect of opportunistic behavior on its reputation. Most lenders are 
typically larger than borrowers and more likely to be repeat players. Reputation will be a more effective 
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performance or, more specifically, the availability of other sources of credit, limits lenders' ability to 
extract concessions from debtors. The size of any concessions must be smaller than the costs to the 
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explaining the concentrated nature of the loan syndication market.‖467 
  As a result, it is rather unlikely that the reputation mechanism can work to prevent 
controlling creditors from behaving in an opportunistic way in a reorganization 
setting. 
  
The other argument in favor of a no liability rule looks at the limit that an 
alternative source of credit would establish on the controlling lender opportunistic 
behavior, under the assumption that the size of any concessions to the lender must be 
smaller than the costs of obtaining a new lender. The determination of the cost of 
obtaining a new lender or even the availability of one (due to the time constraints) is 
an entirely empirical matter. There are good reasons to believe that these costs could 
be substantial. First, it wouldn‘t be easy to find a new source of money not just for 
current expenses but one that is willing to replace the whole loan of a controlling 
lender.468 It would be even worse if it was a controlling syndicate. The evidence 
obtained by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli mentioned above strongly suggests that 
alternative sources of finance are not easy to find. 469 Second, any prospective lender 
would be very skeptical of the debtor‘s chronicle of the events which led him to need a 
new lender given his financial condition. In addition to the standard information 
asymmetry problem between borrower and lender, debtors would have the problem of 
convincing the new lenders that they need them because their actual lender will 
behave in an opportunistic fashion. But perhaps most importantly, even if the 
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 See Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Vikran Nanda & Vijay Yerramilli ―Does Poor Performance Damage 
the Reputation of Financial Intermediaries? Evidence from the Loan Syndication Market‖, working 
paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571474 (last checked 05/19/10), 
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 Otherwise, the pre-existing lender would fight extremely hard against post filing priming liens.  
469
 The recent credit market crunch following the burst of the housing bubble suggests that the 
alternative source of credit argument is especially weak in some contexts. In the case of smaller 
business which rely more heavily on regional banks as their source of credit, both the reputation and 
alternative source of credit arguments seem notoriously inadequate. 
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borrower is able to convince a new lender to fill in the shoes of an older lender it is not 
clear how the debtor will be able to preclude or limit ex post opportunistic behavior 
arising from the replacement. 
 
As a result of all the previous arguments, it is unlikely that a no- liability rule 
as the BJR would promote risk taking by the controlling lender, or better allocation of 
lending funds. At the same time, it is problematic to argue that the size of any 
damages to be triggered by lender‘s opportunistic behavio r will be trivial because of 
the constraints the credit market imposes or that the reputation costs will make the 
lender self- limit his opportunistic behavior.   
 
IV. Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have focused on the interplay of cognitive shortcomings and 
lender control liability adjudications. In doing so, I have exposed that even though 
lender control may not be optimal, cognitive errors may produce systematic distortions 
that challenge the application of lender control liability theories. These cognitive 
errors have been previously been linked entirely to hindsight bias. This chapter has 
uncovered that the widespread worries related to hindsight bias in the lender control 
liability adjudications would not be supported if hindsight bias was the only cognitive 
error affecting adjudications. Nonetheless, hindsight bias is not the only heuristic at 
play and which must be taken into account when thinking about lender control liability 
application. Anchoring plays a substantive role in distorting adjudicative decision 
making. Indeed, if it wasn‘t for the combined effects of hindsight bias and anchoring, 
strict liability would be an efficient legal tool to use in order to limit a controlling 
lender‘s opportunistic behavior.  
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As a result, this chapter has showed that a strict liability rule would fail to 
achieve first best outcomes. Additionally, this chapter conveyed that the beneficial 
effects from having a no- liability rule for breach of fiduciary duties, à la BJR, do not 
clearly translate into the lender control liability realm. If anything, those arguments 
seem to imply that a no- liability rule wouldn‘t improve the risk aversion problems 
associated to lender control, because of the liquidation bias that creditors in control 
have within the bankruptcy context. Finally, other opportunistic behavior constraints 
that are considered important in constraining managers within a no liability 
interpretation of the BJR appear to be empirically irrelevant in reorganization cases. 
Armed with these perhaps troubling insights, in the next chapter I will bring forward a 
proposal to amend lender control liability through modifying part of the Law of 
Agency applicable.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A new test for control in reorganizations  
 
I. Introduction 
The discussion in the earlier chapters should have made it clear by now that 
lender control of a reorganization process does not come without difficulties. While 
many bankruptcy legislations focus on the prevention of social problems associated to 
reorganization control in general,470 the analysis put forward on the previous chapters 
has been concentrated on economic costs. Those economic costs can mainly arise out 
of the seemingly unfettered ability of a controlling creditor to make the exit decision 
of a corporate debtor in chapter 11. The concerns about those very costs has made a 
legal system previously structured around secured creditor control, as the English was 
before the Enterprise Act 2002, to switch into a system friendlier to other 
constituents.471  
 
While a move towards allocating control outside the hands of the main secured 
creditor maybe a credible option, in this chapter I will argue that such an attempt is 
rather naïve and would encounter important practical difficulties. Specifically, as 
evidenced by the recent UK experience, attempts to wrestle control away from 
creditors have been largely ineffective as a practical matter.  At the same time, it 
would fail to account for important advances in financial contracting, spawning from 
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 See, for example, Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Administrative Receivership and Administration – An 
Analysis‖, 57 Current Legal Problems 355, 383 (2004) (stating that administrative receivership was 
changed because it was destructive to social value ―in terms of unnecessary job losses and other 
resource misallocations‖.)  
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 See ―A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms‖, The Insolvency 
Service, London, UK, HMSO 1999.  
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Aghion and Bolton‘s seminal article.472 Therefore, I will argue that a better way 
forward would be to address possible creditor control misbehavior through the use of a 
legal tool which has fallen out of use nowadays in the United States: lender control 
liability.473 In this line, I will suggest that a sensible technique to address the problem 
would be to eliminate the negative control safe harbor of Agency Law for lender 
control liability cases within the context of reorganization cases. Further, I will argue 
that this approach will not generate out of proportion adjudications against lenders. In 
addition, even if the advanced proposal is empirically found to be ineffective, I believe 
that it would be an adequately conservative first attempt to limit a controlling lender 
opportunistic misbehavior.   
  
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section II describes the experience in 
United Kingdom before the enactment of the 2002 Enterprise Act, which lead to 
coordinated efforts to restrict the main lender control of the administrative 
receivership. Section III looks again into the lender control liability problem and 
provides a proposal to optimize the current state of affairs by dropping the negative 
control safe harbor of Agency Law for lender control liability cases within the context 
of reorganization cases. Section IV provides a specific conclusion to this chapter and 
general remarks on possible ways to continue this line of research.  
 
II. Creditor control problems and the experience of the United 
Kingdom 
The difficulties associated to creditor control of the reorganization process are 
not novel. They have been analyzed by scholars across the globe and at length in the 
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 See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton ―An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting‖, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992). 
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 On lender control liability‘s lack of b ite, see Chapter III.  
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United Kingdom by both legal and finance academics. In the UK, a specific category 
of creditors474 was afforded a great deal of power in the recent past. Up until the 
enactment of the 2002 Enterprise Act, a creditor holding a ―floating charge‖475 had 
considerable leeway to decide what the future of the business would be through the 
appointment of an ―administrative receiver‖. This practice was facilitated by historical 
circumstances: because English law did not carry an automatic stay of creditors until 
1985, private resolution of financial crises developed into the rule providing the 
necessary organization to this collective action problem. 476 Within that context, it is 
quite likely that the development of private resolutions of insolvency cases was 
advantageous as it helped to avoid a race to the assets by creditors which may have led 
to sub-optimal dismemberments of the debtor business.477   
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Perhaps as a result of the newly mandated creditor stay provision, the 
administrative receivership system was viewed as increasingly problematic by the end 
of the 1990‘s.478 Essential to this critical assessment were two intensely connected 
issues: the artificially heightened incentives of a controlling lender to sell assets and an 
improper accountability. Regarding the first issue, and a t the heart of the criticism, 
was the deep rooted belief that socially inefficient bankruptcy fire sales were more 
likely in those cases where an over-secured creditor was calling the shots, as the over-
secured creditor wasn‘t the firm‘s residual claimant. 479 For example, Armour and 
Mokal described receivership as ―giving an unhealthy amount of power to creditors 
holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked sufficient 
incentives to rescue failing companies‖480 The magnitude of the problem can be 
grasped as it was believed that secured creditors were under-secured in less than half 
of the insolvencies of the 1990‘s.481 As a corollary, it was believed that receivership 
generated a bias against continuations and, in general, against a rescue culture. 482  
                                                                                                                                            
requires a coordinated resolution involving all creditors. This prevents individual debt collection 
remedies that tend to destroy asset value‖). On  the common pool problem, see Garrett Hardin ―The 
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save companies which have a decent chance of survival so that they are not driv en to the wall 
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The second source of criticism stemmed from the definition of who were the 
beneficiaries of the receiver‘s fiduciary duties, namely the creditor holding a floating 
charge.483 This rule created incentives for the receiver to disregard other 
constituencies‘ interests once appointed. Along these lines, it was argued that the 
procedure rendered the administrative receiver insufficiently accountable to those who 
were affected by her actions (i.e. other unsecured creditors). 484 For example, Armour 
and Mokal explained that  
―The receiver, who was not an officer of the court, owed unsecured 
creditors few duties and their information rights amounted to little more 
than an entitlement to be told about what in most cases was a fait 
accompli.‖485 
 
Additionally, those incentives created by the legal rule were further 
exacerbated by the fact that a floating charge holder had an unfettered ability to 
appoint the receiver, limiting any initial loyalty to other groups. Such a floating charge 
laden structure led Frisby to state that the ―administrative receivership is heavily 
biased in favor of a single secured creditor, and it is but a small step from there to 
posit that the regime is detrimental to successful rescue initiatives.‖486  
 
                                                                                                                                            
unnecessarily.‘‖); K.M.J. Kaiser "European Bankruptcy Laws: Implications for Corporations Facing 
Financial Distress," Financial Management 85  (Autumn, 1996).      
483
 See Julian Franks, K Nyborg and W Torous ―A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency 
Codes‖, 25 Financial Management 86, 86 (1996) (―… in the UK, receivership gives control rights to a 
particular secured creditor, who has no duty to take account of the interests of other more junior 
creditors‖). 
484
 See Insolvency Service (2001), Insolvency—A Second Chance, Cm 5234 (London: DTI).  
485
 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28 (2005) (italics in  
original). 
486
 See Sandra Frisby ―In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002‖, 67 The Modern Law 
Review 247, 252 (2004) 
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A particular manifestation of the unaccountability problem concerned 
administrative costs: it was commonly argued that over-secured lenders would fail to 
monitor the costs incurred by insolvency professionals in carrying out their 
functions.487 As a result, the insolvency fees and remuneration expenditures would be 
needlessly and wastefully inflated further hurting unsecured creditors or even 
shareholders of the insolvent debtor. Again, the worry of oversecured creditors 
running the show supported the view demanding modifications to the Insolvency Act.  
 
With these criticisms in mind, the new Act was designed to ―facilitate 
company rescue and to produce better returns for creditors as a whole.‖488 Three core 
developments in the new legislation aimed at correcting the perceived deficiencies. 
First, administrative receivership was for most purposes abolished 489, as Section 250 
of Enterprise Act 2002 prohibits the holder of a qualified floating charge from 
appointing an administrative receiver. Second, the primary insolvency procedure 
became the new administration regime, designed to ―capture the benefits of speed and 
flexibility associated with the receivership mechanism yet at the same time to foster 
accountability.‖490 The new regime flexibility is demonstrated by its allowance of out-
of-court appointments, both by the holders of qualified floating charges and directors 
of the company.491 The third major development has been to erase the Crown‘s 
preferential status, in favor of having a portion of the floating charge reserved for 
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 See Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis‖, 57 Current 
Legal Problems 355, 359 (2004).  
488
 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 28 (2005)  
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 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 35 (2005)  
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 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 29 (2005).  
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 See Sandra Frisby ―In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002‖, 67 The Modern Law 
Review 247, 258-9 (2004) (―Either the company or its directors can appoint an administrator under 
paragraph 22 unless a petition for winding up has been presented, an admin ist ration application made or 
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distribution among the general unsecured creditors. 492 
 
Equally important to these structural changes are the new objectives that the 
administrator has to follow. An administrator has a duty to act in furtherance of 
precise objectives: 
―(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or  
(b) achieving a better result for the company‘s creditors as a whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more 
secured or preferential creditors.‖493 
These objectives are set in a hierarchical way. Therefore, the administrator can only 
pursue objective (c) if the others are not reasonably practicable and following (c) 
doesn‘t unnecessarily harm creditors.494 In addition, the administrator must follow (a) 
unless he believes that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective or if 
objective (b) would bring about a better result for creditors as a whole.495 Finally, and 
clearly aiming for a greater accountability, the Enterprise Act mandated administrators 
to perform their functions in the interests of the company‘s creditors as a whole. 496    
 
The changes to the Insolvency Act of 1986 worked primarily to limit the 
controlling creditor discretion as a way to prevent possible abuses. Nonetheless, it 
didn‘t go as far as to eliminate the controlling lender influence, something I believe 
should be applauded. Indeed, it would arguably have been naive to discard the main 
                                                 
492
 This final change also signals a political move towards not leaving the weakest claimholders without 
redress. 
493
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(1) 
494
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(4) 
495
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(3)  
496
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(2) 
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lender as a relevant decision making actor in a reorganization process, especially given 
creditors‘ relational knowledge of many distressed borrowers and large economic 
interest in all of them. Additionally, eliminating or largely limiting the controlling 
lender influence maybe impractical as economic interests always seem to find a way to 
manifest themselves.497 In this regard the new United Kingdom legislation still 
provides a prominent role for qualified holders of floating charges, as between 
different types of administrators‘ appointments, appointments done by a qualified 
floating charge holder, either out of court or once an insolvency proceeding has been 
opened,  enjoys priority,498 regardless of the risk that administrators get captured by 
appointing banks.499 
 
III. Lender Control Liability as a source of creditor accountability   
The experience from the United Kingdom expresses concern about a view of 
lender control of the reorganization process as coming without costs. Unfortunately, 
those costs are usually not the easiest to observe. Indeed, the process of receivership 
was usually regarded as speedy and with great adherence to the debt contract, 
                                                 
497
 Two clear examples of the ways lenders find to manifest their influence are the appearance of a 
bankruptcy claim market at the beginning of the 90‘s and the development of the market for d istressed 
firms in the late 90‘s and early 2000‘s. Additionally, public choice theory strongly suggests that 
eliminating powerful lenders‘ influence would be impractical.  
498
 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal ―Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act of 2002‖, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 37 (2005) (― If the 
company or its directors wish to appoint an admin istrator out-of-court, they must first give five days‘ 
notice to any QFCH, who may then appoint an administrator themselves under paragraph 14 in the 
interim. If an admin istrator has been appointed under paragraph 14, then the directors may not appoint 
under paragraph 22. Similarly, if an admin istration application has been made to the court under 
paragraph 11, any QFCH must be notified of the application, and will then have the right to petition the 
court to have a specific person appointed as administrator‖, citing Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 
12, 25-6). 
499
 See See John Armour, Audrey Hsu & Adrian Walters ―The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor 
Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK‖, working paper, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912302 (p. 5) (―Banks typically operate ‗panels‘ for 
the selection of accountants to act as their insolvency practitioners, which will impose reputational 
constraints on the latter‘s‘ actions: those appointees who take steps contrary to the banks‘ interests in 
the course of an appointment may expect not to be appointed again.‖) 
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signaling that direct bankruptcy costs were generally not a great cause of concern.500 
As time goes on, gradual identification of those less visible costs comes about, which 
goes in line with the analysis presented in previous chapters. The question then is how 
to limit those costs, while at the same time not unduly compromising the important 
involvement of the secured controlling creditor in the proceedings.  
 
As it was discussed at length in chapter III, today lender control liability cases 
are especially difficult to win because an understanding of the theory of the firm as an 
explicit nexus of contracts prevents any visualization of injustice in the fact that a 
lender obtains control. Understood in this way, the use of the Law of Agency‘s safe 
harbor to prevent gains of control seems largely innocuous. It follows that as the 
paradigmatic view of the firm as an explicit nexus of contracts is dropped the use of 
Law of Agency‘s analytical framework should be reexamined.  
 
Let‘s recap a little to clarify what will follow. As it was mentioned above, 
judicial control determinations are heavily dependent on formalities. Two of them are 
especially important. First, if borrower and lender elicit that they are acting on their 
own best interest, then when the control determination question is faced by an 
adjudicator such borrower and lender manifestations are something that needs to be 
overcome by the party claiming lender control. Second, in order to determine whether 
the lender was in control of the borrower when parties manifest to be acting on their 
own behalf, the Law of Agency has a safe harbor which establishes that negative 
control, such as bargained for veto power,501 cannot amount to convert a lender in a 
                                                 
500
 See Julian Franks, K Nyborg and W Torous ―A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency 
Codes‖, 25 Financial Management 86, 100 (1996)  
501
 Veto power are at the most basic level a take it  or leave it  game, though ―this simple p rocedure is 
[often] embedded in more complex procedures‖. See Charles Cameron & Nolan McCarty ―Models of 
Vetoes and Veto Bargaining‖, 7 Annual Review of Political Science 409, 410 (2004). 
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controlling lender. If we assume that a controlling lender will not willingly manifest 
that he is actually running the debtor‘s show in order to avoid liability, then a re-
examination of the Law of Agency safe harbor appears to be the best way forward.  
 
Traditionally, negative control or veto powers were considered a way to 
maintain a given status quo.502 Under this interpretation, the veto power has only been 
geared to avoid changes while proposing powers rested with directors and 
management.503 Hence, agenda control was supposed to be much more responsive to 
the later than to the former, leaving the veto powers merely as an anchor on the status 
quo.504 As a result, exceptionally used veto powers were associated to mere decision 
control rather than decision management, using the wording of Fama and Jensen. 505  
 
Once negotiations become frequent in the reorganization context the nature of 
veto powers morphed greatly, enough to be able to determine actions. Such is the case 
of a controlling lender who is able to negotiate for enough positive and negative 
covenants as to make sure that contractual technicalities‘ effectively serve as an 
adjustable corset on debtor decision-making.506 What was thought at the time when 
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 For instance, in a political science context, McCarty and Poole consider that the veto power is 
described as providing ―an additional safeguard against ―unwise‖ measures that might be passed.‖ See 
Nolan M. McCarty & Keith T. Poole ―Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive 
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(1995). 
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contractual limitations backed by secured credit didn‘t carry as much force, is largely 
inadequate nowadays as a proxy to establish whether control is obtained or not. The 
negative control category seems to have little to do with reality, as both legal and 
finance scholars regularly point to actual transfers of control achieved only through 
negative control.507 Indeed, it may merely be a matter of semantic quibbles, as the use 
of negative dynamic definitions may turn to be equivalent to instructions as a control 
mechanism. If this is supported by informal recommendations or communications that 
further guide the debtor actions towards the lender‘s preferred path, then it is almost 
impossible not to think as the lender having control.508  
 
The Problem with formalities as a no liability rule  
As I have discussed above, an actor‘s level of care needs to linked to the 
possible level of harm produced by his underlying activity in order to allow for the  
internalization of the costs he generates. A clear example of the former comes from 
the classic law and economics models of optimal levels of harm with unilateral 
precautions presented by Shavell and explored in Chapter IV. 509 Tying the level of 
care to the level of harm caused by the underlying activity generates a positive 
correlation between the harm produced by the potential injurer and the liability he will 
incur.510  
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 Agency law has had this distinction even before the appearance of the explicit nexus of contracts 
theory of the firm, as can be seen on section 14(o) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency Law (1958). 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the emergence of this theory has served to support this 
categorization. It could be argued, though, that the negative control category is, as proposed in other 
contexts, an ―attempt to avoid rely ing on hindsight by identifying an ex ante norm to apply.‖ See Jeffrey  
J. Rachlinski ―Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?‖, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 72 
(2000) 
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 This is exactly what the financial and legal literature has recognized. See generally chapter II.  
509
 See Chapter IV above.  
510
 Additionally, as discussed in Chapter II, lender control liaiblity can help to limit a form of rent 
extraction, i.e. reducing the value of the assets in freeze out sort of sale. 
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When formalities intervene to generate a no liability rule, as we explained in 
Chapter III for negative control and lender control liability, 511 level of care 
considerations shift from a focus on the underlying activity (both its level of harm and 
the probability of harm occurrence) to a focus on conforming with the formalities 
required by the law as safe harbors against liability (i.e. the ones that assure that no 
control will be found by a DIP lender and therefore no liability will be attached to his 
actions). And if the system eradicates the probability that the DIP lender will be found 
to be in control, then a rational profit maximizing DIP lender will always prefer to 
leave other constituents unprotected from his potentially harmful actions if precaution 
costs are higher than the costs of complying with the safe harbor requirements.  
 
The end result of this legal alchemy is to produce a clear break in the 
incentives of a DIP lender in control: he will have an incentive to engage in an 
efficient level of precaution only up to the point where the costs of precautions equal 
the cost of complying with safe harbor provisions; once the former costs exceed the 
later he will dismiss any considerations towards the potential harm he may inflict in 
other claimants. The perils of this legal strategy are evident and have been recognized 
for long, even by one of the authors of TEB. In the words of Baird and Jackson  
―Complete deference to creditor protection in fashioning legal rules 
makes no more sense than complete deference to debtor freedom. Any 
device that protects creditors inevitably brings costs as well as 
benefits.‖512  
 
I believe that a possible way to attack this problem is quite simple, perhaps 
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 See Chapter III above. 
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 See Douglas G. Baird  & Thomas H. Jackson ―Fraudulent Conveyance and its Proper Domain‖, 38 
Vand. L. Rev. 829, 836 (1985)  
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rather obvious.513 As a matter of fact, I advance that the easiest way to put back in 
synch the controlling lender‘s precaution incentives with his ability to cause harm 
while at the same time not naively looking to eliminate a principal lender‘s influence 
is to drop the negative control safe harbor from agency law when dealing with lender 
control liability cases within bankruptcy proceedings. This would ensure the 
availability of a means for the bankruptcy estate to recoup any possible losses 
resulting from suboptimal controlling lender behavior. Naturally, any proposal of this 
sort will need to overcome several criticisms. I believe that the arguments against such 
a proposal are of two kinds. First, there would be worries that dropping the safe harbor 
would be overbroad, opening the gates for opportunistic and inefficient lawsuits.514 
Second, there would be worries that dropping the safe harbor would not achieve 
enough. I analyze those objections seriatim. 
     
The first kind of objection considers the possibility that even if it was true that 
dropping the safe harbor from agency law when dealing with lender control liability 
cases within bankruptcy proceedings would help to avoid inefficient exit options, it 
may at the same time open the gate for other inefficient lawsuits. In fact, banking law 
practitioners often warn observers about the legal perils of distressed lending.515 
Indeed, given the deep pockets that controlling lenders usually have, it is natural for 
them to be lawsuit targets in bankruptcy cases, therefore helping to increase the debtor 
moral hazard problem. I believe that this type of criticism can easily get overblown. 
First, even if the agency law safe harbor is dropped, it will not be easy to demonstrate 
that the lender was in control rather than merely exercising influence, especially as 
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 It‘s important to remember that, as I explained in Chapter IV, a no -liability rule is not an adequate 
option to solve the lender opportunistic behavior problem in the reorganization context.  
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 And, therefore, dropping the safe harbor would generate inefficient incentives ex ante also. 
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 As an early example of this, see generally James P. Koch ―Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured 
Lender‖, 99 Banking L. J. 788 (1982). 
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borrowers do not have a duty to keep records of their conversations with their 
lenders.516 Indeed, such a change to the law would presumably not affect the general 
way judges have of analyzing these types of disputes and specifically how scrupulous 
courts are towards making the subtle distinction between influence and control.517 
Second, even if the lender was found in control, it would still not be easy to prove that 
any harm was made by any lender‘s decision. This is point that has often been missed 
as Lawrence explains that  
―Rather than recognizing that control is a necessary element for finding 
liability under a variety of different theories, the tendency has been to 
treat lender control itself as a basis for liability… The false assumption 
is that control alone leads to liability.‖518  
But even in those cases where courts find that a lender was in control and that he 
caused harm to the bankruptcy estate, it is likely that out of proportion damages would 
be reversed.519 All three counterarguments suggest that even if the moral hazard 
problem of was enlarged by lender control liability, other checks would limit its 
size.520  As a result, I do not believe that this line of argument is strong enough as to 
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 At the same time, it  should be noted that, as my focus has been on lender opportunistic behavior, I 
have not discussed the positive effects that lender liability has on the over-leveraging problem. On this 
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completely foreclose the possibility of redress, i.e. the current state of affairs.  
 
The second type of criticism to my proposal would attack it from the opposite 
angle claiming that it underachieves, perhaps grossly. Actually, if the ability to prove 
that a lender is in control and that any harm was done is as difficult as I mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, it could certainly be argued that the proposal fails to achieve 
its main purpose. This is the sort of criticism I feel more comfortable dealing with, 
because the present work was never intended to be an attack on the idea of bankruptcy 
financing or lender monitoring, both of them extremely necessary to provide for 
prompt business recovery. Indeed, note that under this line of criticism the worst that 
can happen is that a controlling lender‘s incentives are unchanged even after dropping 
the safe harbor. Problematic as it may be, opting for merely dropping the safe harbor 
can be thought as the first step towards limiting gross controlling lender misbehavior 
and only after it is shown that it has no effect on lender behavior other more taxing 
options could be explored.521 As a result, I believe that dropping the safe harbor, at 
least for lender control liability within reorganization cases, could provide better 
prospects to limit opportunistic behavior by lenders in control.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided further evidence that lender control indeed 
comes along with important costs. The experience of the United Kingdom suggests 
that unchecked lender control is problematic. At the same time, the changes to the 
Insolvency Act generated by the 2002 Enterprise Act also point out to the fact that 
eliminating lender influence altogether would most likely be prejudicial, given the 
                                                                                                                                            
issue, see generally, Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Sp ier ―Strategic Judgment Proofing‖, working paper, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159184 (last visited 08/13/08). 
521
 Note that as LCL may generate under monitoring if lending firms are scared of being considered in 
control, therefore increasing agency costs, looking for the least taxing option must be a priority.  
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lender‘s important role in monitoring and curving the debtor‘s own misbehavior.522 
Indeed, even after the changes introduced by the 2002 Enterprise Act Armour, Hsu 
and Walters believe that in the United Kingdom it is ―practically impossible in many 
cases for an administrator, even if so minded, to achieve an outcome contrary to that 
desired by the secured creditor.‖523    
 
I have argued that lender control liability as currently understood provides no 
check for lender misbehavior as it has little if any practical bite in limiting lender 
opportunistic self-serving behavior. The proposal advanced in this chapter in order to 
deal with lender control problems is admittedly modest. I believe, nonetheless, that it 
follows the same line of reasoning that the drafters of the Restatement on the Law of 
Agency used. These drafters were not financial industry lobbyists trying to get the 
biggest possible share of the pie for their clients. They most likely had a legitimate 
worry on sight which arguably was the same one that debtors have when they decide 
to contractually bond themselves with stringent contract clauses. When debtors bond 
themselves they know that they are losing some decision-making leeway, but 
nonetheless they do it to signal their quality as debtors and ultimately to obtain better 
deals for themselves.  
 
The Restatement drafters had these types of considerations in mind. The 
drafters knew that lenders bargain hard for contractual rights in order to cover against 
the debtor‘s possible financial troubles. Therefore, in order not to hamper economic 
activity, lenders would be benefited by the assurance that their attempts to recover 
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 See John Armour, Audrey Hsu & Adrian Walters ―The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor 
Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK‖, working paper, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912302 (p. 5) 
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from the debtor in a non wasteful manner would be protected from ill- founded liability 
attacks. The way the drafters found to give a clear assurance to lenders came in the 
form of the negative control category, where bargaining for veto power for certain 
decisions doesn‘t amount to obtaining actual control. What the drafters probab ly 
didn‘t have in mind though is that much more than mere veto power could be achieved 
through extensive use of negative covenants and continuous and informal lender-
borrower communications. Connecting this fact with the more comprehensive theories 
of the firm than the explicit nexus of contracts, as discussed in Chapter I, clearly 
shows that the drafters‘ creature, i.e. negative control safe harbor, has a few problems.    
 
At the same time, the proposal advanced in this chapter tries to capture some of 
the insights from the analysis provided in Chapter IV. In that chapter it was concluded 
that systematic cognitive errors may affect damages determinations in lender control 
liability cases due to the interaction of both hindsight bias and anchoring. 
Additionally, in Chapter IV it was noted that a no- liability rule cannot work in lender 
control liability cases in the same way as it does for director liability cases under the 
business judgment rule. I believe that dropping the negative control safe harbor as 
proposed above supports the finding that a no- liability rule for lender control cases 
does not share the advantages of a no-liability rule under the business judgment rule. 
Furthermore, only dropping the negative control safe harbor gives the system 
flexibility (removing the artificial restriction affecting controlling lenders) while at the 
same time it doesn‘t make proving control much easier, especially given how 
scrupulous courts have promised to be in differentiating influence from control.  
 
There are several avenues for future research stemming from the work done in 
this thesis, three of which I outline here. First, as the theory of the firm shows that 
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there may be value not captured by legal claims, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether bankruptcy definition of claims should be enlarged to incorporate some of 
these economic factors today not accounted for by bankruptcy laws. Such a study 
would work towards better defining efficiency allocations and distributional justice. 
Second, the relation between different heuristics used in control liability adjudications 
seems to be a fruitful field for future research. Questions regarding the potential 
influence of anchoring on hindsight bias or hindsight bias on anchoring or both need 
to be answered to provide better policy recommendations. In addition, an assessment 
of the overall effect of heuristics, given the individual variation on cognitive errors, 
would be especially helpful.524 Finally, it would be interesting to explore the accuracy 
of the common assumption in the literature stating that control shifts to the lender after 
covenant violations.525 Such a study would help in assessing the magnitude of the 
societal costs generated by refusing to accept the possibility of lender control costs, as 
well as better being able to differentiate between mere influence and control.  
                                                 
524
 For discussions on individual variation, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ―Cognitive errors, Individual 
Differences and Paternalism‖, 73 U.Chi. L. Rev. 207 (2006); and, Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein 
―Debiasing through Law‖, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199 (2006)  
525
 See Stuart C. Gilson ―Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders‖, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics 355, 356 (1990) (―…models of bankruptcy often assume that creditors take control of the 
bankrupt firm‘s assets‖); Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton ―An Incomplete Contracts Approach to 
Financial Contracting‖, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).  
 165 
APPENDIX 
LIST OF CASES 
 
A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minnesota Supreme 
Court, 1981) 
Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 (8th Circuit, 1996) 
Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (Second Circuit, 1936) 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (1984) 
Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 50 
(4th Circuit, 1893) 
Benton Johnson v First National Bank of Shreveport , 792 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 3 
Circuit, 2001) 
Buck v Nash-Finch Company, 78 S.D. 334; 102 N.W.2d 84 (Supreme Court of South 
Dakota, 1960) 
Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant Technologies Inc., 148 F.3d 742 (7th Circuit, 1998) 
Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 828 F.2d 686 (11th Circuit, 1987) 
Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. 499 F.3d 144 (2nd Circuit, 2007) 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) 
Greylock Glen Corporation v. Community Savings Bank, 656 F.2d 1 (1st Circuit, 1981) 
Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d 977 (9th Circuit, 2006) 
In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990) 
In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662 (2nd Circuit, 1935) 
In re Glover, Inc., 43 B.R. 322 (Bkrtcy.N.M., 1984) 
In re Johns-Manville Corporation et al. v. The Equity Security Holders Committee, 
801 F.2d 60 (2nd Circuit, 1986) 
In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2nd Circuit, 2007) 
 166 
In Re The Lionel Corporation v. The Lionel Corporation, 722 F.2d 1063 (2nd Circuit, 
1983) 
In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., 46 B.R. 125 (Bkrtcy.D.Ea.Penn., 
1985) 
In re Rock Industries Machinery Corp., 572 F.2d 1195 (7th Circuit, 1978) 
In re Tenney Village Co., Inc., 104 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) 
In the Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v. Associates Commercial 
Corporation, 893 F.2d 693 (5th Circuit, 1990) 
In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692 (3rd Circuit, 1977) 
In The Matter of Virtual Network Services Corporation, 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Circuit, 
1990) 
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th circuit, 
1990) 
Mike Smith v. Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al, 144 Fed. Appx. 482 (6th Circuit, 2005) 
National Westminster bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd, UKHL 41 (2005) 
North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
2007 Del. LEXIS 227 (Del. May 18, 2007) 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) 
Schwan's Sales Enters. v. Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 189 (U.S. 
District Court of Massachusetts, 2005) 
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) 
Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213 (1st Circuit, 1997) 
Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital 
Corporation, 247 F.3d 471 (3rd Circuit, 2001) 
Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, Del. Ch. 
(2006) 
 167 
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996) 
Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019 (4th Circuit, 1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 168 
REFERENCES 
5 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d 
A REVIEW OF COMPANY RESCUE AND BUSINESS RECONSTRUCTION 
MECHANISMS, The Insolvency Service, London, UK, HMSO 1999 
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 
45 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1993) 
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 219 (2004) 
Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992) 
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority, 105 The Journal of 
Political Economy 1 (1997) 
Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, Transferable Control, 2 Journal 
of the European Economic Association 115 (2004) 
Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and economic 
Organization, 62 American Economic Review 777 (1972) 
Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello, Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility and 
Corporate Investment, 20 Review of Financial Studies 1429 (2007) 
Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost 
Question, 39 Journal of Finance 1067 (1984) 
American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (ALI 1991) 
Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How costly is Financial (not Economic) 
Distress: Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 
Journal of Finance 1443 (1998) 
Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable 
Demand Curves without Stable Preferences, 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 73 
 169 
(2003) 
John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom , 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 1699 (2002) 
John Armour & Simon Deakin, Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The 
„„London Approach‟‟ to the Resolution of Financial Distress, 1 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 21 (2001) 
John Armour, Audrey Hsu & Adrian Walters ―The Costs and Benefits of Secured 
Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK‖, working paper, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912302 
John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal, Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: 
The Enterprise Act of 2002, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28 
(2005) 
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 537 (1968) 
Cheryl Carleton Asher, James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, Towards a 
Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 9 Journal of 
Management and Governance 5 (2005) 
Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 
11, 1 The Journal of Legal Analysis 511 (2009) 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002) 
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance and its Proper 
Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829 (1985) 
Douglas G. Baird & Edward Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. L. Econ. & 
Org. 356 (2001) 
 170 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 
751 (2002) 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 
673 (2003) 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006) 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
921 (2007) 
George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relational Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39 (2002) 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. (2000) 
Yoram Barzel, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, Cambridge 
University Press, 2d ed. (1997) 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Using Options to divide Value in Bankruptcy, working paper, 
available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/No27
1.99.Bebchuk.pdf 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7203, Jul. 1999, available 
at www.nber.org/papers/w7203 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
833 (2005) 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the division of value in 
Corporate Reorganization, 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 253 (1992) 
Gary S. Becker, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REREFENCE TO EDUCATION, National Bureau of 
 171 
Economic Research, New York (1964) 
Clas Bergström, Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Secured Debt and the 
Likelihood of Reorganization, 21 Int‘l Rev. L. & Econ. 359, 360 (2002) 
Adolf A. Berle, jr. & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE CONTROL, The Macmillan Company, New York, New York (1933)  
Amar V. Bhide, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESS, Oxford 
University Press, New York, NY (2000) 
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 
58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055 (2006) 
Margaret M. Blair ―Firm-Specific human Capital and Theories of the Firm‖, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. 
Roe, eds., Brookings Institution Press (1999) 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in 
Corporate Law, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 719 (2006) 
Gerald L. Blanchard, Recent Developments in the Area of Lender Liability Law, Ann. 
Surv. of Bankr. Law Part I S 3 (2006) 
Blumenstein, Rebecca, and Gabriella Stern, UAW, Auto Makers Find Some Things 
Better Left Unsaid, Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1996 
Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, 
and Organizations, 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 95 (1998) 
Laura Botazzi, Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellman ―Active Financial Intermediation: 
Evidence on the Role of Organizational Specializa tion and Human Capital‖, working 
paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569602 
William W. Bratton, Venture capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate 
Control, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 891 (2002) 
Marco Brecht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Roell, Corporate Governance and Control, 
 172 
working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461 
(last visited 7/15/07) 
Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation 
versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 Journal of Finance 1253 (2006) 
Daniel Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 Law and Philosophy 235 
(1991) 
F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC. L. Rev. 243 (1992) 
Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems 
in Learning from Experience, 31 The Academy of Management Journal 628 (1988) 
Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors‟ Committees, 43 
UCLA L. Rev 1547 (1996) 
Colin F. Camerer ―Individual Decision Making‖, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995 
Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein ―Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, 
Future‖, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS , Colin F. Camerer, 
George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 
(2004) 
Charles Cameron & Nolan McCarty, Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining, 7 Annual 
Review of Political Science 409 (2004) 
Maria Carapeto, Is Bargaining in Chapter 11 Costly?, Cass Business School Working 
Paper (2003) 
Maria Carapeto, Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?, Cass Business 
School working paper (2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=161428 
Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15 
 173 
S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 45 (2005) 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ―SCALE AND SCOPE. THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALIM, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
(1990) 
Sris Chatterjee, Upinder S. Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing, 28 Journal of Banking & Finance 3097 (2004) 
Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The 
Role of Debt Covenants, 63 Journal of Finance 2085 (2008) 
Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Manager‟s Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm‟s 
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813 (2002) 
Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing, working paper, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159184 
Vidhi Chhaorchharia & Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The 
Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, 62 Journal of Finance 1789 (2007) 
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 
(1960) 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th Ed. Revised) 
Sandeep Dahiya, Kose John, Manju Puri & Gabriel Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 Journal of Financial 
Economics 259 (2003) 
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: An Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) 
Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A study of 
Defaults in France, Germany and the UK, 63 Journal of Finance 565 (2008) 
Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Biased Principals as a Discipline Device, 8 Japan 
 174 
and World Economy 195 (1996) 
Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans 
and Directly Placed Debt, 99 Journal of Political Economy 689 (1991) 
Jeremy W. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender 
Liability: Toward a New Model of “Control”, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 801 (1987) 
Diemo Dietrich, Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation, 13 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 995 (2007) 
William J. Donoher, To File or Not to File? Systemic Incentives, Corporate Control, 
and the Bankruptcy Decision, 30 Journal of Management 239 (2004) 
Keith Dowding, POWER, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN (1996) 
John M. Dowling & Yap Chin-Fang, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE 
AND DECISION MAKING, Hackensack, NJ, World Scientific (2007) 
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: an International 
Comparison, 59 Journal of Finance 537 (2004) 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 Journal of 
Law and Economics 395 (1983) 
B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn ―Economic Effects of Auction Bankruptcy‖, 
working paper, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1387347 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS, Beard Books (1976) 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437 (1993) 
Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 633 (1993) 
 175 
Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 643 (1961) 
Tarek El-Sehitya, Hans Haumerb, Christian Helmensteinc, Erich Kirchlerd & Boris 
Maciejovsky, Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude within the Context of 
Experimental Asset Markets, 4 Journal of Behavioral Finance 227 (2002) 
Charles M. Elson, Paul M. Helms & James R. Moncus, Corporate Governace Reform 
and Reemergence from Bankruptcy: Putting the Structure Back in Restructutring, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 1917 (2002) 
Mustafa Emirbayer & Ann Mische, What is Agency?, 103 The American Journal of 
Sociology 962 (1998) 
Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjusting Heuristic: Why the 
Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 Psychological Science 311 (2006) 
Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 Journal of Political 
Economy 288 (1980) 
Eugene Fama & Merton H. Miller THE THEORY OF FINANCE, Dryden Press, 
Hinsdale, Ill. (1972) 
Eugene F. Fama & Michel C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
Journal of Law and Economics 301 (1983) 
Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 943 (2007) 
Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal 
Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 Review of Law 
and Economics 81 (2008) 
Daniel R. Fischel ―The Economics of Lender Liability‖, 99 Yale L. J. 131 (1989)  
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, „I Knew It Would Happen‟ – Remembered 
Probabilities of Once Future Things, 13 Organizational Behavior and Human 
 176 
Performance 1 (1975) 
Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of 
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1990) 
Nicolai J. Foss, STRATEGY, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, Oxford University Press, Great Britain (2005) 
Nicolai J. Foss, The Knowledge Governance Approach, 14 Organization 29 (2007) 
Julian Franks, K Nyborg and W Torous, A Comparison of US, UK, and German 
Insolvency Codes, 25 Financial Management 86 (1996) 
Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to 
Medium Size UK Companies, 9 Review of Finance 65 (2005) 
Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, Financial Innovations and Corporate Bankruptcy, 14 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 283 (2005) 
Sandra Frisby, In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002, 67 The 
Modern Law Review 247 (2004) 
Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes 
in Corporate Ownership and Control when Firms Default, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics 355 (1990) 
Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Vikran Nanda & Vijay Yerramilli, Does Poor Performance 
Damage the Reputation of Financial Intermediaries? Evidence from the Loan 
Syndication Market, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571474 
Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Northwestern L. Rev. 
1123 (2007) 
Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 43 (1992) 
 177 
Gary Gorton & James Kahn, The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, 13 Review of 
Financial Studies 331 (2000) 
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 Journal of Political Economy 691 
(1986) 
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 773 (2004) 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001) 
Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of Companies, 39 Econ. Inquiry 30 (2001) 
Henry Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
Yale L.J. 387 (2000) 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968) 
Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 119 (1988) 
Oliver Hart, An Economist‟s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1757 (1989) 
Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, Oxford 
University Press, New York (1995) 
Oliver Hart, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & John Moore, A New 
Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions, working paper available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/6278.html 
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the nature of the Firm, 98 Journal of 
Political Economy 1119 (1990) 
Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to 
the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 33 Journal of Finance 383 (1978) 
 178 
J. B. Heaton, Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non-contractual Legal Rules: The 
Case of Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 9 Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 169 (2000) 
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 
Economic Policy Review 7 (2003) 
Bjorn Hofmann, The Concept of Disease – Vague, Complex, or just indefinable?, 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Online First, available at 
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/content/k0j6824323582v08/full
text.pdf 
Bengt Holmström & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 73 (1998) 
Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 61 (1989) 
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963 
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. 
No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) 
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811 (2006) 
Henry T. C. Hu & Jay L. Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 
107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321 (2007) 
J. Dennis Hynes, Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor, 58 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 635 (1991) 
Insolvency Service (2001), INSOLVENCY—A SECOND CHANCE, Cm 5234 
(London: DTI) 
 179 
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors‟ 
Bargain, 91 Yale Law Journal 857 (1982) 
Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBO‟s, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, 2 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 35 (1989) 
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8 (2001) 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976) 
Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Tunneling, 90 AEA Papers and Proceedings 22 (2000) 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein ―Debiasing through Law‖, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199 
(2006) 
Paul A. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-
burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
33 (1985) 
John C. Joyce, Lender Liability: The Problem Is still with Us, 115 Banking L. J. 477 
(1998) 
K.M.J. Kaiser, European Bankruptcy Laws: Implications for Corporations Facing 
Financial Distress, Financial Management 85 (Autumn, 1996) 
Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in 
Hindsight, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 89 (1995) 
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Meets the Real World: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Review of Financial Studies 281 
(2003) 
Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg, What Are Firms? Evolution from 
Birth to Public Companies, working paper available at 
 180 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11581.pdf 
Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke Law Journal 
557 (1992) 
John Kay, THE BUSINESS OF ECONOMICS, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(1996) 
James P. Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured Lender, 99 Banking L. J. 788 
(1982) 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000) 
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflict of 
Interests, and Lender Liability, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 415 (2001) 
Richard N. Langlois & Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the 
Firm: A new Interpretation, 31 Economic Inquiry 456, 459 (1993) 
Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in 
Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 1207 (1997) 
William H. Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with 
Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387 
(1989) 
William Lazonick & Mary O‘Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 Economy and Society 13 (2000) 
Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels & Lee Ross, The Name of the Game: Predictive 
Power of Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
Game Moves‖, 30 Personality and social Psychology Bulletin 1175 (2004)  
Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 
Review of Economic Studies 11 (1956) 
Yair Listokin,  The Pivotal Mechanism and Organizational Control, working paper 
 181 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372822  
Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, Protection for Whom? Creditor Conflict 
and Bankruptcy, 6 American Law & Economics Review 249 (2004) 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and 
Rasmussen‟s The End of Bankruptcy, 56 Stan, L. Rev. 645 (2003) 
Stephen Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 Kentucky Law Journal 
839 (2004) 
Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 159 (1997) 
R. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices Failed High Tech Firms, 
82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1375 (2004) 
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 The Journal of 
Political Economy 110 (1965) 
Nolan M. McCarty & Keith T. Poole, Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical 
Analysis of Executive and Legislature Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, 11 Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 282 (1995) 
Hamid Mehran & Rene M. Stulz, The Economics of Conflict of Interests in Financial 
Institutions, 85 Journal of Financial Economics 267 (2007) 
Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability, 102 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1203 (2002) 
Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Market Efficiency and Biases in Brokerage 
Recommendations, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, Richard H. Thaler 
ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (2005) 
Stanley Milgram ―OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW‖, 
Harpercollins, New York, NY (1974) 
Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & 
 182 
MANAGEMENT, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992) 
Geoffrey P. Miller ―A Modest Proposal for fixing Delaware‘s Broken Duty of Care‖, 
Columbia Business Law Review 319 (2010) 
Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B. C. L. Rev. 129 
(2005) 
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Trade Credit, Bank Loans, and Monitoring: 
Evidence from Japan, working paper, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=843526 
Rizwaan J. Mokal, The Floating Charge – An Elegy, in Commercial Law and 
Commercial Practice, pp. 485-93, Sarah Worthington ed. (2003) 
Rizwaan J. Mokal, Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis, 57 
Current Legal Problems 355 (2004) 
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 
521 (1981) 
Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, Mcgraw-Hill College (3d ed. 1980) 
Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowings, 5 Journal of Financial 
Economics 147 (1977) 
Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm – The 
Problem-Solving Perspective, 15 Organization Science 617 (2004) 
Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment 
Policy, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928688 
Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d (2008) 
John C. Oliga, POWER, IDEOLOGY AND CONTROL, Plenun Press, New York, 
NY (1996) 
 183 
Mitchell A. Peterson & Raghuram G. Rajan, Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence, 10 
The Review of Financial Studies 661 (1997) 
Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171 (2007) 
Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof 
Firms and Enviromental Risk , 85 American Economic Review 1171 (1995) 
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Publishers, New 
York, NY, 7th edition (2007) 
Dianna Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm 
Value: The Role of Lending Synicates, 20 Journal of Banking & Finance 577 (1996) 
Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance, Cm 5234, London, TSO 
(2001) 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 571 (1998) 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 
79 Or. L. Rev. 61 (2000) 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive errors, Individual Differences and Paternalism, 73 
U.Chi. L. Rev. 207 (2006) 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy 
Judge‟s Mind, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227 (2006) 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 387 (1998) 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The influence of the Financial Revolution on 
the Nature of Firms, 91 American Economic Review 206 (2001) 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory 
of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 805 (2001) 
Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate 
 184 
Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85 (1995) 
RESTAMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, AGENCY, American Law Institute 
Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 1  (2006) 
RESTAMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, AGENCY, American Law Institute 
Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 2  (2006) 
Michael R. Roberts & Amar Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical 
Investigation, 64 The Journal of Finance 1657 (2009) 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997) 
Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled 
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 Public Choice 27 (1978) 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Columbia 
Law Review 931 (1985) 
Lawrence J. Sanna, Metacognitive Experiences and Hindsight Bias: It‟s not just the 
Thought (Content) that Counts, 25 Social Cognition 185 (2007) 
Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Debiasing the Hindsight Bias: The Role of 
Accessibility Experiences and (Mis)attribuitions, 39 Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 287 (2003) 
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980) 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, edited by Alan J. 
Auerbach, 33. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988) 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, Who Accepts Savage‟s Axioms?, 19 Behavioral Science 
368 (1974) 
Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 Am. Psychol. 364 (1995) 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors‟ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in 
 185 
Chapter 11, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003) 
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 
25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905 (2004) 
Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 Harvard Law 
Review 1151 (2010) 
Clifford W. Smith & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 Journal of Financial Economics 
263 (1992) 
D. Gordon Smith A Proposal to eliminate Directors Standards from the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 67 University of Cincinnati L. Rev. 1201 (1999) 
Amir Sufi, Banks Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis, 22 
Review of Financial Studies 1057 (2009) 
Per Sundstrom, Disease: The phenomenological and conceptual center of practical- 
clinical medicine, In Handbook of phenomenology and medicine, ed. S. Toombs, 109-
26, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2001)  
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996) 
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages 
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L. J. 2071 (1998) 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) (1984), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.htm 
George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 
Vand. L. Rev. 901 (1993) 
Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1684 (1996) 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman ―Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases‖, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 
 186 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University Press, 
New York, NY (1982) 
Jukka Vauhkonen, Financial Contracts and Contingent Control Rights, working paper 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=438501 
Gaelle Villejoubert, Could They Have Known Better? Review of the Special Issue of 
Memory on the Hindsight Bias, 19 Applied Cognitive Psychology 140 (2005) 
Jacob Viner ―Cost Curves and Supply Curves‖, 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 
(1932) 
Jay L. Westbrook, Bankruptcy Control of the Recovery Process, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. 
L. Rev. 245 (2004) 
Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795 (2004) 
Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 Journal of 
Finance 567 (1988) 
Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation, 4 Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 163 (1988) 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1251 (2005) 
Workers Technology Skill Development 29 U.S.C. 
Luigi Zingales, In search for New Foundations, 55 Journal of Finance 1623 (2000) 
 
